The Nature and Nurture of Patriotic Virtue

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Both Blimps [the military and imperialist class] and highbrows took for granted, as though it were a law of nature, the divorce between patriotism and intelligence. If you were a patriot you read *Blackwood’s Magazine* and publicly thanked God that you were “not brainy”. If you were an intellectual you sniggered at the Union Jack and regarded physical courage as barbarous. It is obvious that this preposterous convention cannot continue… Patriotism and intelligence will have to come together again. It is the fact that we are fighting a war, and a very peculiar kind of war, that may make this possible (Orwell, 1941: 75).

George Orwell wrote this as German bombers rained destruction on England, and he did so in praise of an English patriotism to which only “the Europeanized intelligentsia are really immune” and criticizing that intelligentsia’s “persistent effort to chip away English morale and spread a hedonistic, what-do-I-get-out-of-it attitude to life” (65, 103). “A nation trained to think hedonistically cannot survive amid peoples who work like slaves and … whose chief national industry is war,” he wrote (104), but neither can it succeed at war if its ruling class and military leadership are oblivious to present realities and prepared to fight not the present war but the last one (67-73). Patriotism and intelligence came together well enough for Orwell’s England to survive, but the intervening years have offered abundant confirmation of his observation that they do not always come together when nations act instinctively in unison “like a herd of cattle facing a wolf” (66). Intelligence is rare enough in moments of calm repose, and inaccessible without courage in moments of peril and without sôphrosunê or immunity to seduction in moments of hedonic enticement. Peril and enticement may conspire to enfeeble judgment in time of war, as Orwell saw and many in the U.S. failed to see after the attacks of 11 September 2001.
I could speak now of the United States’ presently ascendant demagogue, whose appalling ignorance of world affairs and pretensions of strength in the name of national greatness would be pathetic if they did not resonate so widely with a public bedazzled by opulence and primed for celebrity worship and xenophobic hate. Doing so would illustrate the timeliness of my topic, but descending that far into the weeds of U.S. politics is hardly necessary. It is as obvious today as it was when Orwell wrote it, that “Anyone able to read a map knows that we are in deadly danger…. [W]e are in the soup, full fathom five, and we have been brought there by follies which we are still committing and which will drown us altogether if we do not mend our ways quickly” (78). The emergency we face today is not an enemy that could strike across the English Channel, but the drought in Syria and elsewhere that is stimulating conflict and displacing populations, the floods that are here again this year in England, the collapse of agriculture as groundwater is sucked dry across the world, oceans all but emptied of fish, and already even today enough carbon in the atmosphere to raise these oceans thirty meters. It is a long emergency that we have brought on ourselves through follies we are still committing, a hedonistic, what-do-I-get-out-of-it attitude to life, excessive crediting of economic liberties that Orwell condemned as “the right to exploit others for profit” (59), and a patriotism less intelligent and open to global cooperation than the survival of our own civilization requires – follies all, “which will drown us altogether if we do not mend our ways.”

So what is virtue today? What are the virtues essential to saving a civilization threatened as ours is now? How are we to cultivate such virtues? Is there a genuinely virtuous form of patriotism, one that is appropriately responsive to what is valuable not just at home but abroad, accepts the burdens of membership together with its benefits, offers and appraises dissent in the public interest on its rational merits, faces challenges with courage and endurance, and avoids destructive racialized responses to perceived threats? If there is a virtuous form of patriotism, can it be taught or nurtured in schools? Should it be taught or nurtured in schools, and, if so, by what

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1 I answer these questions, is a fashion, in R. Curren & E. Metzger, Sustainability: The Art of Preserving Opportunity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), which is tentatively scheduled for release in early 2017.
means? If patriotism, or national loyalty, is a predictable correlate of feeling at home in a country – experiencing a kind of membership and entanglement of one’s identity and fate in it – how far are we likely to succeed in wedding it to intelligence?²

I take it as evident that the only form of patriotism that schools should be in the business of encouraging is one that is a true virtue of character, and if there is no genuinely virtuous form of patriotism then patriotism should not be encouraged. I also take it as evident that a virtuous form of patriotism would be morally virtuous, in the sense that it would have the qualities that are essential to other human attributes qualifying as moral virtues and would be, as a true virtue, compatible with the expression of other moral virtues. It would be responsive to reasoning and evidence, justice-seeking, and person and land respecting at home and abroad. It would be morally motivated in the sense of being appropriately responsive to everything of moral value, including persons and other sentient beings, their flourishing, the necessities essential to their flourishing, and the just institutions, practices, and natural environment that create and sustain their opportunities to live well. It would be conducive to the global cooperation that is required by justice and essential to the well-being of one’s own country.

The argument of this paper will be fitted around the following sequence of propositions:

1. Patriotism is a devotion to the good of one’s country, a country being a corporate entity that lives together across generations, more or less cooperatively, in a geographic region within the jurisdiction of a common constitutional structure.

2. Virtuous devotion to the good of an individual, collective, or corporate entity involves an appropriate responsiveness to its value, where appropriateness is determined by what is actually good for it and not bad for anything else of value. Virtuous responsiveness is targeted and proportionate: it protects what is good and opposes what is bad. The value of a country is principally constituted by the intrinsic value of its people and the opportunities for living well

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² These questions about the nature and nurture of patriotism are the subject of R. Curren & C. Dorn, Patriotic Education: Realizing America in a Global Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), for which a publication date is not yet determined.
provided by its geographic region, living and built environments, cultures and ways of life, and constitutional system.

3. A country being a transgenerational population making a life together upon the land within the jurisdiction of a constitutional system, all countries with the potential to provide their inhabitants with opportunities to live well would necessarily have value worthy of protection, and bad aspects that should be opposed. Given the nature of virtue, there is surely a genuinely virtuous form of patriotism, and one that is widely applicable across jurisdictions.

4. Virtuous patriotism would be compatible with cosmopolitan respect for people everywhere and with the fair terms of global cooperation countries are morally required to establish in circumstances of unavoidable globalization and interdependence.

5. Virtuous patriotism would normally be expressed both in defense of what is valuable in a country and loyal dissent and civic action to overcome its defects and inform its policies.

6. The sources of patriotic attachment begin with an individual’s experience of acceptance, free and equal citizenship, and enjoyment of fair opportunity. The first priority in encouraging patriotism is to make the country itself worthy of every citizen’s love.

7. Schools can legitimately facilitate patriotism through a civic curriculum that presents the merits of the country’s history and constitutional system without distortion; through being good for children in ways that earn their cooperation with the values it represents, and that provide them pathways into responsible adulthood; and by nurturing civic friendship across the cultural and class divides that may be obstacles to a shared devotion to fair terms of social cooperation.

1. *The nature and focus of patriotic attachment.*

Societies have long devised symbols and rituals of unity at the time of their unification and as reassertions of unity and belonging. Images of the deities representing the family clans of Athens were erected together at the city’s courts, communicating a commitment to a common good and impartial justice, and lawgivers and moralists from Solon to Socrates reaffirmed this commitment in
their portrayals of Athenian law itself as an impartial codification of divine wisdom. Gandhi and Nehru conjured images of a pluralistic India’s common struggle for self-rule and were aided in this by Rabindranath Tagore’s composition of “Jana Gana Mana,” which became the country’s national anthem. Its addressee is similarly an immortal personification of moral law – “You who bring in the unity of the people!” – and its words evoke the breadth and beauty of India’s landscapes and regions, people, and traditions (Nussbaum, 2012: 237ff.). The U.S. has a more militant national anthem focused on war as a necessity of self-rule, of course, but also a popular tradition of patriotic song much closer in spirit to “Jana Gana Mana” and Orwell’s references to the “dozens … of characteristic fragments of the English scene… bound up with solid breakfasts and gloomy Sundays, smoky towns and winding roads, green fields and red pillar-boxes” (Orwell, 1941: 57; see, similarly, Wingo, 2007). One that is now neglected but particularly poignant for Americans born in the era of Jim Crow apartheid is “The House I Live In,” composed by Lewis Allan and first recorded in 1947 by Paul Robeson. It opens and closes with the words:

What is America to me?
A name, a map, of a flag I see
A certain word, democracy
What is America to me?

... The house I live in, my neighbors white and black
The people who just came here or from generations back
The town hall and the soap box, the torch of liberty
A home for all God’s children
That’s America to me.

The house I live in, the goodness everywhere
A land of wealth and beauty with enough for all to share
A house that we call freedom, the home of liberty
But especially the people, that’s America to me
But especially the people, that’s the true America.³

Symbols and songs of unity, belonging, and the goodness of a common existence must be backed by sufficient commitment to these goods, of course, but they may serve as useful encouragement and reminders of the promise of a cooperative society.

The history of attempts to inculcate patriotism in schools in the U.S. is harder to assess. The social studies curriculum has been shaped around mythologized national heroes and triumphs, the school year has been punctuated with patriotic celebrations and pageants, children have been expected to regularly stand and pledge allegiance in regimented unison to the national flag, and school and national sporting events have been powerfully infused with nationalistic rituals and symbols. The fervor and extent of this has risen and fallen as the country has been more or less gripped with anxieties about the arrival of immigrants and the coming of war, but it has never reflected a very deep understanding of either learning or patriotism. It has been, as much as anything, a knee-jerk response to fear, and conscientious objection to the rituals has been interpreted not as a right of citizenship but as a marker of who is “them” and not “us.” When conscientious objection has coincided with religious or racial minority status, the reaction has sometimes been savage. Two cases, pertaining to religion, race, athletics, and the expression of patriotism will suffice as illustrations of the hazards.⁴

Gobitas. In October 1935, Jehovah’s Witness member Walter Gobitas told his ten-year-old son, Billy, and eleven-year-old daughter, Lillian, that they no longer needed to recite the Pledge of

³ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3syulBjkng
⁴ These are drawn from Curren & Dorn, forthcoming, and the first was researched and drafted by Dorn.
Allegiance in their Minersville, Pennsylvania public school classrooms. Encouraged by efforts that the Witnesses had taken in court to challenge the forced recitation of the Pledge as a violation of the freedoms of speech and religion, Gobitas told his children that pledging allegiance to the flag was an offense towards God. Accordingly, when Billy arrived at school the following day, he refused to join in the flag salute. The next day, his sister did the same. Weeks later, Billy submitted a hand-written statement to the Minersville School Board explaining his refusal. “I do not salute the flag,” he wrote, “because I have promised to do the will of God. That means that I must not worship anything out of harmony with God’s law.” After quoting Exodus (20:4-6), in which God warns against bowing down to graven images, Billy concluded, “I do not salute the flag not because I do not love my country but I love my country and I love God more and I must obey His commandments.”5 The following day, the Minersville School Board summarily expelled Billy and Lillian.6 By the time oral arguments began in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis (a misspelling of the respondent’s surname), Nazi armies had invaded Poland, swept through Belgium, and cornered the French and British Expeditionary Forces at Dunkirk. Ruling for the School District, Justice Felix Frankurter argued that, “National unity is the basis of national security,” and held that the Minersville School District had adequately respected the Gobitas children’s “right to believe as they please.” Some Americans responded to the news of this decision by debating it in leading newspapers, but others vented their anger at the Witnesses through beatings, acts of arson, and a case of tar and feathering.7 The Witnesses were themselves being persecuted by the Nazis and no conceivable threat to the war effort, so this made as little sense as the spate of attacks on random Muslims in the U.S. in the closing weeks of 2015, amid contemptable right-wing encouragement of hysteria about Syrian refugees. In the midst of these violent attacks on

Witnesses, and perhaps partly because of it, the Court reversed itself in its 1943 ruling in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, but the pledge remains a fixture of U.S. classrooms that may remain more potent as a litmus test of loyalty than a means of inculcating it. Inducing idolatrous regard for American leaders and conditioning children to stand and recite a pledge in unison would seem in any case to have more to do with readiness to accept the burdens of military discipline than a citizen’s devotion to country generally.

*Ali and King.* Cassius Clay was eighteen years old when he regaled the press with this patriotic rhyme after winning a gold medal in boxing at the 1960 Rome Olympics:

To Make America the greatest is my goal  
So I beat the Russian and I beat the Pole  
And for the USA won the medal of gold.  
The Greeks said, You’re better than the Cassius of Old...9

Days later in his hometown of Louisville, Kentucky he was denied service in a restaurant and he was soon drawn into the orbit of Malcolm X. In 1964, the day after he defeated Sonny Liston to become the new boxing heavyweight champion, he announced his membership in the Nation of Islam (NOI). When he then took the name, Muhammad Ali, outrage at his NOI affiliation was conjoined with refusal to refer to him by his chosen name. A black ex-champion, Floyd Patterson, soon challenged Ali, declaring,

This fight is a crusade to reclaim the title from the Black Muslims. As a Catholic I am fighting Clay as a patriotic duty. I am going to return the crown to America.

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The American male’s exposure to patriotic messages occurs overwhelmingly in the context of spectator sports, a setting sure to convey that patriotism is fulfilled in “us” dominating and beating “them.” But who is “us” and who is “them” in Patterson’s rendering of the fight? How could defeating an American, Ali, “return the crown” to an America that was never exclusively Christian or white? Patterson’s claim to being more nearly a true American than Ali rested in his willingness to accept the second-class citizenship that Ali contested and inspired countless others to contest. Ali yelled in response during the fight: “Come on, America! Come on, white America…. What’s my name? Is my name Clay? What’s my name, fool?”

When Ali was drafted for service in the U.S. armed forces in 1966 and persisted in refusing to serve and play the athlete’s assigned role in the patriotic pageant of U.S. spectator sport, he was ferociously condemned and sentenced to a far longer term in prison than customary, but his principled stand was a watershed event. When Martin Luther King announced his own opposition to the war at a 1967 press conference, he cited Ali’s view that “we are all – Black and Brown and poor – victims of the same system of oppression” (Zirin, 2005: 65). Both were subsequently harassed and subjected to illegal FBI surveillance, as if their religious objections to war and racial injustice made them mortal threats to U.S. national security. The anti-war speech of King’s for which he was widely condemned as anti-American and recklessly irresponsible was delivered at Riverside Church in New York on April 4, 1967, was ironically one in which he was at pains to defend patriotic dissent as a form of national service. “A time comes when silence is betrayal,” he declared, addressing the Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam and echoing its executive committee’s recent statement.11 “I come to this platform tonight to make a passionate plea to my beloved nation…. to my fellow Americans who, with me, bear the greatest responsibility in ending a conflict that has exacted a heavy price on both continents.”12 With these words, King identified himself as a patriot whose love of country moved him to not betray it – to not stand by in silence as

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10 What’s My Name, Fool?, pp. 63-64.
it betrayed its own ideals abroad and at home. Unyielding in the face of the death threats that ensued and under surveillance by both the FBI and U.S. military intelligence, he was assassinated one year later, on April 4, 1968.  

Concern for the good of one’s country can evidently motivate dissent when the course on which a country embarks is not in its interest. Yet, as Jane Addams observed following World War I, instincts of self-preservation make it natural “to dislike, to distrust and finally to destroy the individual who differs from the mass in time of danger.” Defensive patriots may not tolerate criticism, however important to the national interest it may be. There are clearly forms of patriotism and racialized national identity that subvert justice, and forms and manipulations of patriotism that undermine a government’s legitimacy by short circuiting rational assent to a government’s wishes, while there are other forms of patriotism that embody morally admirable expressions of national ideals.

The attachments that animate and shape patriotism are evidently varied, and do not reliably align with what is good for a country. What we must imagine, if we are to imagine a virtuous form of patriotism is one that is appropriately responsive to the value of a country, which is itself a complex corporate entity – a geographic region or land and society that continues across generations making a life for itself upon that land, subject to its more or less autonomous jurisdiction. The words “country” and “land” – as in “this land is our land” – suggest the significance of a territory and the opportunities and conditions it provides for the characteristic patterns of life that emerge. This is evident in the references to land in Langston Hughes’s poem, “Let America Be America Again,” which includes and ends with the lines:

O, let my land be a land where Liberty

Is crowned with no false patriotic wreath,

But opportunity is real, and life is free,

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Equality is in the air we breathe.

... 

We, the people, must redeem

The land, the mines, the plants, the rivers.

The mountains and the endless plain –

All, all the stretch of these great green states –

And make America again!\(^{15}\)

The poem opens with a reference to “the pioneer on the plain seeking a home where he himself is free,” and this and many other features of it suggest that when Hughes refers to redeeming the “land” – this “great land” or country of ours – he has in mind making the U.S. a place where all are free, equal, and have abundant opportunities. It is nevertheless striking that he invokes a wealth of geographical features and suggestions of human reliance on those features in depicting the making or realization of America he has in mind. What is a country, in the end, but a land we claim and make our home, its waters, climate, and the life and ways of life it sustains, from one generation to the next?

2. Virtuous devotion to the good of an individual, collective, or corporate entity involves an appropriate responsiveness to its value, where appropriateness is determined by what is actually good for it and not bad for anything else of value. Virtuous responsiveness is targeted and proportionate: it protects what is good and opposes what is bad. The value of a country is principally constituted by the intrinsic value of its people and the opportunities for living well provided by its geographic region, living and built environments, cultures and ways of life, and constitutional system.

\(^{15}\) From Langston Hughes, “Let America Be America Again,” in Arnold Rampersad and David Roessel (Eds.), The Collected Poems of Langston Hughes, pp. 189-191 (New York: Vintage, 1995 [orig. pub. in 1938]).
If the foregoing is correct, then the proper object of patriotic devotion could not be a country’s “greatness,” however that might be measured, nor the justness of its institutions (Callan, 1997), its best traditions (Blum, 2007), or unity (Nussbaum, 2012). Virtuous responsiveness to the value of one’s country would no doubt favor justice, best traditions if they contribute equitably to opportunities to live well, and unity conducive to diverse members of the society living well together, but it would begin with the inherent value of the people comprising the society, their well-being or opportunities to live well, and the necessities essential to living well – the qualities of the land itself and living systems, no less than just and opportunity-sustaining institutions, traditions, and patterns of life. Virtuous responsiveness to the value of a country would be focused on what is good for it, understood in these terms, and would necessarily be both protective and corrective as needed and feasible.

3. A country being a transgenerational population making a life together upon the land within the jurisdiction of a constitutional system, all countries with the potential to provide their inhabitants with opportunities to live well would necessarily have value worthy of protection, and bad aspects that should be opposed. Given the nature of virtue, there is surely a genuinely virtuous form of patriotism, and one that is widely applicable across jurisdictions.

There may be countries that are lost causes – countries hopelessly resistant to unitary self-rule because their borders were determined by departed colonial powers, perhaps – but unless they have been made uninhabitable and can no longer support a population in living well, they may be countries that have the potential to provide all or many of their inhabitants with opportunities to live well if they are subdivided. Callan makes the plausible argument that patriots necessarily defend self-rule (Callan, 2012), but it is not clear why love of a country could not motivate what is best for it when devolving its parts would best preserve the valuable ways of life it may still sustain. More difficult, perhaps, is the case in which the bad that virtuous response must oppose is so extensive and entrenched that virtuous patriotism would favor external humanitarian intervention or
something of the sort. There is no need to settle this, however, because my claim is only that the genuinely virtuous form of patriotism I am sketching is widely applicable across jurisdictions. Wide applicability might be ruled out if patriotism were by its nature precluded from appealing to moral ideals that are not among a country’s own ideals, but we have seen no reason to think that this is an inherent feature of patriotism. A patriot need only show, or make a good faith effort to show, that adoption of a new ideal would be good for the country.

I am arguing that there must be a morally virtuous form of patriotism animated by responsiveness to the inherent value of things, a value that is in at least some respects independent of what is perceived and pursued as valuable by the country whose good is at stake. In his 1984 Lindley Lecture, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” Alasdair MacIntyre denies this, arguing that:

Patriotism is a permanent source of moral danger because of the way it places our ties to our nation beyond rational criticism… [while impartial] morality is a permanent source of moral danger because of the way it renders our social and moral ties open to dissolution by rational criticism (MacIntyre, 2002: 56).

MacIntyre argues in essence that a person’s history of belonging to and enjoying the goods of a specific community defines what virtue is and motivates patriotic defense of the community and compliance with its norms (45, 49, 50). “So patriotism and those loyalties cognate to it are not just virtues but central virtues,” he writes. Whereas, “some motivation has to be provided for allegiance to the standards of impartiality and impersonality,” and it is hard to see what could play this role (55, 56). Much of MacIntyre’s argument depends on a careless conflation of impartiality and impersonality, however, and a failure to consider that a test of impartiality, such as Kant’s or Rawls’s, does not preclude maxims and principles that permit people and societies to favor themselves and their own within limits. Not only is the partiality of love and patriotism not ruled out by moral requirements that demand respect for others, but commitment to impartiality has been
personalized and motivated since the time of Solon and Socrates, at least, as both a requirement of virtue and hallmark of citizenship.16

4. *Virtuous patriotism would be compatible with cosmopolitan respect for people everywhere and with the fair terms of global cooperation countries are morally required to establish in circumstances of unavoidable globalization and interdependence.*

...the patriotism prevalent in many societies may be a barrier to enacting fair terms of characteristic of any form of patriotism that could be virtuous is that would sensitive not only to the value of the country of membership to which the member may have special obligations, but to the value of everything else. Virtue is a tall order, no doubt, but this is one of its basic aspects: an appropriate responsiveness to the value of all that is at stake in the context of action, beyond the jurisdiction of one’s country as well as within it.

5. *Virtuous patriotism would normally be expressed both in defense of what is valuable in a country and loyal dissent and civic action to overcome its defects and inform its policies.*

This follows, again, from the proportional and targeted character of appropriate response to value. It is also interesting to note that the problem-focused and community-based form of civic education promoted by leading Progressives, such as John Dewey, were associated with conceptions of social cooperation and “social intelligence” whereby patriotic commitment to collaborating in the solution of the society’s problems was wed to a kind of “social” or collective intelligence made possible by communicative virtues and the epistemic contributions of diverse members of society. If dissent is often unwelcome because it contests injustice, the perils of engaging in dissent are at least notionally overcome in this vision of a virtuous wedding of patriotism and intelligence.

A motivationally complicating aspect of patriotism is its association with *identity* and *belonging*. Being or identifying oneself as member of a country is an aspect of one’s identity that

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16 I address the motivational aspects of moral learning and overcoming of one’s society’s own moral limitations in Curren, 2014.
typically has motivational significance. There is a natural tendency to experience as one’s own the fates of the larger social and political entities to which one belongs, being pained by misfortune, experiencing pride in accomplishment, and denying or feeling shame in the recognition of shameful exposure or wrongdoing. Americans feel shame when they allow themselves to acknowledge America’s failings because they are American and are implicated in those failings, and shame can in this way serve to motivate dissent and reform. National pride may similarly play a useful – some say necessary – role in civic engagement and exertion, though other motives might well suffice.

6. The sources of patriotic attachment begin with an individual’s experience of acceptance, free and equal citizenship, and enjoyment of fair opportunity. The first priority in encouraging patriotism is to make the country itself worthy of every citizen’s love.

The dissent of Hughes, Ali, and King is plausibly patriotic because they were native born Americans who shared a history and aspects of a common American identity, and they were all in their own ways part of a larger movement dedicated to the good of the country, as I understand it here. For the newcomers, who lack this shared history and identity, it is all but inconceivable that attempts to instill patriotism could succeed if their personal experience of the country is wildly at odds with the ideals presented to them.

7. Schools can legitimately facilitate patriotism through a civic curriculum that presents the merits of the country’s history and constitutional system without distortion; through being good for children in ways that earn their cooperation with the values it represents, and that provide them pathways into responsible adulthood; by nurturing civic friendship across the cultural and class divides that may be obstacles to a shared devotion to fair terms of social cooperation.

Immigrants may well lack knowledge and understanding of their new country, and while it cannot be educationally sound to induce patriotic sentiments through a mythologizing of national histories and heroes (Brighouse, 2007), there can be no objection to honest instruction that would

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provide students with understanding that may lead them to form a justified appreciation of the
countries actual merits. Schools must also be good places for children to be and grow, supporting
the satisfaction of their needs for belonging, competence, and bounded self-determination, in order
for them to experience a progress in living well that will take them into adulthood. In fulfilling this
basic educational responsibility to promote learning conducive to living well, schools would
provide a favorable context for moral and civic learning that is good for both the child and the
society. A desirable aspect of both the needs-supportive context and the civic learning would be
creating opportunities for friendships that span the society’s cultural and racial divides. I will leave
it at this, having discussed elsewhere the ways in which civic friendship can build on such
foundations, both domestically and globally, in the interest of a global community more seriously
and cooperatively engaged in solving its problems.^{18}

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