MacIntyre on Character Education

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MacIntyre on character formation

‘If we listen to much contemporary discussion of ethics, we might conclude that ethics is principally or only a matter of arguments. Yet Aristotle says that rational argument in the arena of politics and morals will be ineffective with those who lack adequate character formation. And if this is true, as it is, we need to know more about what adequate character formation would be for us here now’ (MacIntyre, 2013, p 11)

In *How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia*, MacIntyre considers how Aristotle’s thoughts on character formation might be meaningfully related to ethical and political life today. Like in *After Virtue*, he maintains that contemporary institutions frequently undermine possibilities for virtuous practice and the pursuit of common as well as individual goods. He argues that four features of current Western culture make it difficult to learn how to ask, let alone answer, ‘Aristotelian’ ethical and political questions. These features of contemporary life are: the compartmentalization of human activity; the distortion of desire towards economic as opposed to genuine individual and common goods; conditions of gross inequality; the nation state having the last word on what the law is. MacIntyre firstly remarks that our everyday life is frequently divided up into different spheres such as work and family, private and public. These different spheres each have their own set of expectations and norms. When one type of conduct is expected in one context and a different type of conduct is expected in another, social malleability becomes vital to succeeding in each of the different spheres of life people are involved in. What this required social malleability increasingly precludes however is the viewing of ones life as a whole, in the sort of teleological way Aristotle thought vital for human flourishing. Today it has thus become ever harder to ask a key ‘Aristotelian’ ethical question: how can I order the activities of my life in such a way that I will be striving for genuine as opposed to merely monetary goods (MacIntyre, 2013)?

The second feature of contemporary life concerns our habits of character formation. MacIntyre maintains that to flourish as human beings we need to learn how to distinguish genuine goods from counterfeit ones. Unfortunately, ‘we inhabit a social order in which a will to satisfy those desires that will enable the economy to work as effectively as possible has become central to our way of life, a way of life for which it is crucial that human beings desire what the economy needs them to desire. What the economy needs is that people should become responsive to its needs rather than their own’ (MacIntyre, 2013, p 13). Related to this, MacIntyre thirdly suggests we live in conditions of gross inequality today where even successful economic growth ultimately only furthers inequality. Here the rich are so concerned with their self-advancement, that reasoning about the common good has become all but impossible. Again MacIntyre draws upon Aristotle to critique the status quo. He remarks that ‘Aristotle pointed out long ago that a rational polity is one that cannot tolerate too great inequalities, because where there are such, citizens cannot deliberate together rationally’ (MacIntyre, 2013, p 13). However, it is not just the rich that perpetuate gross inequality. The state actively supports it too.

Indeed, he fourthly reasons that ‘since the modern state has become so well engrained with the market, it is in fact the state-and-the-market that is our lawmaker’ (MacIntyre, 2013, p 14). However, MacIntyre argues that no theoretical critique will be able to resist the sway of these four trends unless attention is also given to character formation. This paper will therefore sketch out the type of character education MacIntyre thinks is necessary today. While he broadly agrees with a number of Aristotelian ideas including a teleological account of human personhood and a resultant need for character education he also revises and develops Aristotle’s ideas on education
and virtue in more revolutionary, Marxist directions. In order to tease out the more revolutionary aspects of his thought, I firstly revisit his well-known debate with Dunne about whether teaching is a practice. While MacIntyre may have a very specific view of teaching, he nonetheless suggests educators should induct novices into a diverse range of practices. Here I follow MacIntyre and suggest it vital that persons are initiated in to practices in such a way that they develop the virtue of justice rather than the vice of avarice. I secondly note some particular ways in which MacIntyre revises Aristotelian thinking in more revolutionary directions. I conclude that for MacIntyre, character education should help persons learn how to think for themselves and act for the common good.

Is teaching a ‘practice’? Is education?

When MacIntyre and Dunne engaged in dialogue a few years ago (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002), they disagreed about whether or not teaching is a ‘practice’. Unlike Dunne, MacIntyre maintained that ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of practices’ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 5). In order to assess why MacIntyre denies teaching is a practice it is necessary to consider in more detail his characterisation of both practices and teaching. In After Virtue, MacIntyre suggested that a practice is a complex, co-operative human activity concerned with the promotion and realisation of human goods (1984,187-203). The genuine pursuit of a practice depends on the goods in question being ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ to the practice in question. He explains the difference between internal and external goods by providing the example of a child learning to play chess (1984). He remarks that if they only play chess to get the reward of candy at the end (the external good), they will not extend their own powers towards excellence in chess by learning the standards internal to the game of chess that make chess what it is. If however the child does not merely play chess for external reward and praise and if they can come to learn the value of chess in and of itself then they begin to become a practitioner of chess who is committed to upholding the standards of excellence internal to the game (the internal goods of chess).

While persons will only be able to obtain the internal goods of chess by practicing chess, external goods such as ‘prestige, status and money’ can be obtained by a variety of means other than chess. Thus while there are a variety of possible ways of obtaining goods external to a practice, the goods internal to a practice can only be achieved through participation in that practice (1984). While the range of possible practices is wide (1984), as we have seen, MacIntyre does not consider teaching to be a practice. There are two principal reasons why MacIntyre does not consider teaching to be a practice. Firstly, he construes teaching as an activity whose goods are distinct from the actions that constitute it. According to MacIntyre, teaching does not have its own goods. As he puts it: ‘all teaching is for the sake of something else and so it does not have its own goods’ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 9). Instead, subject disciplines are the ‘goods’ of teaching. As such, MacIntyre insists that at least some subject disciplines are necessary for teaching. Secondly, he maintains that teaching, though not a practice is nonetheless an ingredient in every practice. Here he suggests that novices need to be initiated into a given practice by a more experienced practitioner of that practice, as in the example of the child learning to play chess. MacIntyre does then consider teaching to be vital to practices - he just does not think teaching is in itself a practice. Instead he suggests that education is a practice (Hager, 2011)

Dunne attempts to refute MacIntyre’s position in two ways. In conversation with MacIntyre, he firstly isolates aspects of MacIntyre’s notion of ‘practice’ and ‘tries to show’ how teaching can be included within its range (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 7). Here Dunne says that teaching (especially primary) can be conceived of as a practice, because it has its own internal standards of
excellence. He states that ‘the excellence of teachers is extended through greater realisations of excellence in their students’ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.7). He secondly, in a later paper, adopts a different tactic and instead critiques MacIntyre’s conception of teaching. Dunne maintains that while MacIntyre develops a rich account of education, he has an impoverished view of teaching (Dunne, 2003). Although Dunne eloquently brings to light some integral features of good teaching, I am not wholly convinced that either of his strategies proves that teaching per se is a practice. Instead, I am more inclined to agree with Davies (2013) who characterises school teaching as a multi-practice activity. Multi-practice because teachers should show care and commitment to the upbringing and moral formation (one practice) of the student as well as to the subject or subjects (the other practice/s) they are teaching. While Dunne and MacIntyre disagree over whether or not teaching is a practice they both seem to agree that it is crucial that educational institutions do induct novices into practices. Indeed, for MacIntyre, learning how to perform a practice virtuously is one of the main ways in which our current culture of avarice may be resisted.

Practices, institutions and virtues

‘Practices must not be confused with institutions. Chess, physics and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, universities and hospitals are institutions. Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with...external goods. They are involved in acquiring money...they are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards...the ideals and creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for the common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution. In this context the essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p.194)

While MacIntyre’s oft-cited explanation of the relationship of practices and virtues to institutions is open to different interpretations I am inclined toward the following reading. Practices are cooperative more than competitive human activities that have certain standards of excellence internal to them that make them what they are. Practices are passed on from groups to individuals, who in turn sustain and revise the cooperative practice of the group. In contrast virtues are qualities persons develop when they pursue a practice to the highest possible standard and with an eye on the goods internal to that practice rather than for external reward. MacIntyre believes practices can help to give a narrative order and unity to human life when institutions are structured according to the standards internal to practices (1984, Knight, 2013). However, he also holds that in the post-Enlightenment world, the goods internal to practices all too often become subordinate to the competitive and acquisitive drives of institutions (1984, Knight, 2013). It is also significant that MacIntyre thinks that personal vice is a cause of institutional corruption as much as the institutions themselves (1984).

He suggests that the Aristotelian vice, pleonexia (avaricious activity) has become a central virtue of persons who act (consciously or otherwise) to support the dominant capitalist way of life today (1984, 1988 & 2013b). Here MacIntyre is critical of Hobbes’s translation of pleonexia. For Hobbes pleonexia is about wanting more than one’s fair share of wealth. For Aristotle however, pleonexia involves leading life to accrue wealth without limit. MacIntyre explains the significance of this misleading interpretation as follows: ‘what such translations conceal from view is the extent of the
difference between Aristotle’s standpoint...and the dominant standpoint of peculiarly modern societies. For the adherents of that standpoint recognize that acquisitiveness is a character trait indispensable to continuous and limitless economic growth, and one of their central beliefs is that continuous and limitless economic growth is a fundamental good’ (1988, p 112). MacIntyre however wants to remind us that wealth without limit is not a fundamental good. He also wants to highlight that the virtue of justice advocated by Aristotle is radically different from today’s “virtue” of avarice. In so doing he indicates practices are all too often corrupted by the institutions of our day. Though MacIntyre believes avarice tends to prevail in advanced capitalist societies instead of justice based on desert, he does not believe that teachers should give up on the task of trying to encourage students to think for themselves and act for the common good.

Thinking for one self

In his lecture on The Idea of An Educated Public MacIntyre argues that western educators have two key purposes. They need to both 1) prepare students for a future social role, while also 2) supporting them to become able to think for themselves. He says that the first purpose of educators ‘is among the purposes of almost all education almost everywhere: it is to shape the young person so that he or she may fit into some social role or function...The second purpose is...the purpose of teaching young persons to think for themselves’ (1987, p 16). The first thing to note about MacIntyre’s defence of the idea that educators ought to encourage students to think for themselves is that he regards this as a necessarily communal process. He states that ‘it is a familiar truth that one can only think for oneself if one does not think by oneself’ (1987, p 24). MacIntyre seems to suggest there are at least two ways in which persons can so learn to think for themselves. On the one hand persons can learn to think for themselves via rational debate with others about matters concerning the common public good (MacIntyre 1987 & 2002 with Dunne). MacIntyre argues that a vital aspect of thinking for one self entails asking questions of currently dominant social and economic orders (MacIntyre 2002 with Dunne). For educators in Western culture this may mean supporting students to ask questions about why society is so geared toward the accumulation of individual wealth and the growth of a market economy rather than on the more even distribution of wealth for the overall common good. It may also mean encouraging students to ask questions about the massive debt burden being thrust upon an unprecedented number of persons today (MacIntyre 2013b).

On the other hand persons can learn to think for themselves by reading and then debating canonical texts. MacIntyre argues that close reading and debating of texts in university seminars can help provide persons with shared frames of reference that can inform debate about the common good. For if debate about the common good is to be based on reason rather than rhetoric then shared frames of reference and standards of appeal by which arguments can be judged as better or worse are needed (MacIntyre 2002 with Dunne). However, to be committed to rational debate about issues concerning the public good is not to be blind or indifferent to the reality of human diversity. Indeed, for MacIntyre it is often through engagement with texts from different traditions and persons from other cultures and backgrounds that we learn most. In this respect, though MacIntyre has been accused (see Harris, 2012) of adopting a view of community that is not open to the uncommon, I am inclined to disagree. After all, he specifies that debates in educated publics are open to the introduction of new discoveries, possibilities and points of view (MacIntyre & Dunne 2002). However, MacIntyre indicates there are two key barriers to the emergence of educated publics today.
The input-output model of education

‘There are two major threats to education now. The first is that it is not provided with anything like the resources that it needs. The second is the baneful influence of an idea of schools, colleges and universities as engaged in activities the measure of which is productivity’ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 4)

MacIntyre is very sceptical of only valuing educational institutions according to their productivity and their capacity to support students to attain high grades in important examinations. He dubs a fixation with measurement and student examination as an input/output model of education. Such a model perpetuates inequality as those with the best educational ‘outputs’ generally end up in highly paid, prestigious jobs while those with the lowest outputs generally face the opposite fate of poorly paid jobs and short term contracts. What is ‘wrong with this model is that it loses sight of the end of education, the development of its students' powers, and substitutes for this end that of success by the standard of some test or examination’ (MacIntyre with Dunne, 2002, p 4). MacIntyre’s rejects this model and instead defends the merits of a partly liberal philosophy of education. He maintains that the pursuit of different bodies of knowledge and skills ought to be regarded as intrinsically worthwhile, at least at times, in educational institutions. He avows that towards the end of formal education, educators need to be able to help students pursue practices like historical, scientific or literary inquiry for their own sake rather than for later reward.

He states that ‘part of what such students need to learn is to value, for example, the activities and outcomes of scientific enquiry for their own sake and not just for the technologies that result from such enquiry. Students who ask about their academic disciplines ‘But what use are they to us after we leave school?’ should be taught that the mark of someone who is ready to leave school is that they no longer ask that question’ (MacIntyre with Dunne, 2002, p 5). He therefore maintains that some subject disciplines are necessary in education. He says that ‘there are some things that every child should be taught...Mathematics...English language and English literature...but also including at least one Icelandic saga...and a good deal of history together with...civic studies...and of course some experimental and observational sciences’ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 14). However MacIntyre emphasises that curricula should also include less obviously ‘academic’ subjects. He remarks that children ought to learn how to appreciate the arts and how to paint, draw and sing. They should also be initiated into practical skills like how to write a computer programme or repair a car as well as various games and sports (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). Thus MacIntyre does not, contrary to Barr’s allegation (2008), hold the view that only rational argument can improve the conditions of human community. Instead a wide range of social practices can help persons learn how to think about and work towards the common good. However, the difference between persons developing just as opposed to avaricious habits of character hinges not so much on what they are taught, but how they are taught.

Practical reason and the common good

‘Practical rationality is a property of individuals-in-their-social relationships rather than of individuals-as-such...Our primary shared and common good is found in that activity of communal learning through which we together become able to order goods...Such practical learning is a kind of learning that takes place in and through activity, and in and through reflection upon that activity, in the course of both communal and individual deliberation’ (MacIntyre, 1998b, pp 242-243)
While MacIntyre thinks debating canonical texts and issues concerning the public good are ways in which persons can learn to reason about the common good, he does not think these are the only ways in which the common good may be worked towards. Indeed, in *Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good*, MacIntyre suggests that the primary common good of human persons entails collective acts of practical learning. He holds that through practical activity with others, each person can learn what it is good for them to do in their life. According to MacIntyre, working out what is good for a person to do in their life is a matter of practical reason - and each person can only learn this with others. He argues that taking part in co-operative practices (he gives fishing, farming, playing in an orchestra and being part of a team of scientists as examples) can afford opportunities for persons to think with others about what it is good for them to do in their lives. He suggests that the person of practical reason has learned how to order the activities of their life in such a way that they are able to think about more than their own immediate desires. As we have seen, he later says that young persons need to learn which of their desires are for genuine goods and which are not (2013). *Genuine goods* enable individual and communal human flourishing. Counterfeit goods meanwhile merely serve the ends of the current (consumer driven and individualistic) economic order (2013).

MacIntyre thus implies that the way in which persons are initiated into practices is crucial. If persons are only encouraged to perform the practice in a specialist and compartmentalized way with a focus on their individual desires alone then it will become all too easy for common concerns to get lost. If on the other hand persons are encouraged to consider how their performance of the practice might influence the course of their life and those of others in the longer term then it will be much easier to raise issues concerning the public good. While the dominant social and economic orders are very good at preventing such practical reason about the common good from emerging MacIntyre does not think educators should give up (2013). He argues that a ‘utopianism of the present’ is needed in respect to character formation so as to combat the ideology of advanced capitalism. While utopians of the future sacrifice the present for the future, utopians of the present refuse to sacrifice away the present. Instead, they insist that ‘the range of present possibilities is always greater than the established order is able to allow for’ (MacIntyre, 2013, p 17). MacIntyre explains that it is in situations of everyday conflict that utopian questions about the common good really matter. He argues that what is needed is ‘a transformative political imagination, one that opens up opportunities for people to do kinds of things that they hitherto had not believed they were capable of doing. And this can happen when... parents become involved in some community that sustains their children’s school’ (ibid, p 17).

In respect to character formation, MacIntyre maintains that everything hinges on the type of practices and projects persons become involved in (2013). Here he provides the example of a school that goes against the contemporary grain. He argues that it sometimes becomes possible for people in a community to reflect upon the sort of school they want their children to attend. When this opportunity for participation and decision-making about the purposes of a school emerges the ‘achievement of human goods often takes new and unpredicted forms for which the existing social order hitherto afforded no space’ (MacIntyre, 2013, p 17). What MacIntyre is alluding to here is that though many contemporary schools and communities do not provide much in the way of opportunity to help young persons think for themselves and act for the common (as opposed to the economic) good, this need not always be the case, especially if persons in communities can come together to question the purposes of their schools. Thus, for MacIntyre, it is possible for educational institutions to become places where collective action can subvert the individualistic ideals of advanced capitalism. This could entail rational debate about the common good. It could entail collective practical reasoning about what it may be good for people to do in their lives via participation in and reflection upon practices. It might also entail persons in
communities coming together to think about the purposes of schooling. MacIntyre follows Aristotle then in believing that character education should help persons learn how to deliberate together about the common good. However he also revises Aristotle’s thinking in more revolutionary directions.

**MacIntyre as Revolutionary Aristotelian**

Though MacIntyre is perhaps best known for his reconstitution of Aristotelian thought in *After Virtue*, he was at the start of his career, one of the most articulate members of Britain’s Marxist movement. MacIntyre’s philosophy has thus been held to encompass three distinct but related phases: Marx without Aristotle (during the 1950s-1960s), Aristotle without Marx (during the mid 1960’s to the mid 1990’s) and Marx and Aristotle (from the mid 1990’s to the present) (Burns, 2013). The early MacIntyre felt that Marxist theory could raise consciousness amongst the working classes of the need to break from the existing social orders of industrial capitalism. Aristotelian references are conspicuous by their absence during this phase of MacIntyre’s thought (Burns, 2013). However, during the middle period of MacIntyre’s career he became disillusioned with Marxism (Burns, 2013) and pessimistic that ‘alternative …political and economic structures...could be brought to replace the structures of advanced capitalism’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p 262). MacIntyre (2013b) concedes that Burns is ‘partly right’ to characterize this ‘middle period’ of his thought as one of Aristotle without Marx. MacIntyre acknowledges that his discussions with other Marxists had become barren by the mid 1960’s and that he instead looked to the Aristotelian tradition for resources to critique capitalism.

However, MacIntyre also maintains that certain Marxist truths pervaded the middle phase of his philosophical project. He suggests that throughout his career he has had an unshakeable belief that capitalism is an immensely exploitative system that will in the end require capital to flow in the most profitable direction rather than toward human need (MacIntyre 2013b). MacIntye has been consistent too in his view that such unjust social orders necessitate and invite resistance. Nonetheless he believes capitalism has now successfully co-opted trade unions and other socialist groups in such ways that, though their actions impede ‘capitalist growth and hegemony in the short run’ (ibid, p 316) they strengthen it in the long term. In his middle period MacIntyre therefore developed the argument that it is local communities rather than Marxist and socialist movements that are best placed to resist capitalist ideologies and activities (1984 & 1987). Thus MacIntyre does not, as Barr (2008) puts it, ignore social movements, he just feels that local communities are better placed than formal social movements be able to overturn unjust social and economic arrangements.

There can be little doubt though that MacIntyre most explicitly seeks to fuse Aristotelian and Marxist ideas in his later writings (see especially 1999, 2009 and 2013); with Knight (2013) suggesting that MacIntyre is above all else a ‘revolutionary Aristotelian’ thinker. MacIntyre’s philosophical project does seem like a ‘revolutionary Aristotelian’ one, in at least two senses. On the one hand, MacIntyre rejects outright, certain Aristotelian views, ‘for example, his treatment of women, productive workers and slavery’ (2009, p 423). On the other hand, MacIntyre argues that other core Aristotelian principles only require development and revision before they can help in the critique and active remaking of current social orders (2009). In *Dependent Rational Animals* MacIntyre offers an example of how he thinks Aristotelian principles can be developed and revised by Marxist ideas. There he argues that communities that are able to support the pursuit of independent reasoning and the common good will both 1) satisfy Marx’s formula for justice (where each gives according to ability and receives according to need) and 2) count just generosity amongst its’ central virtues (1999, p 129-130).
Independent thinking, acknowledged dependence and education

In *Dependent Rational Animals* MacIntyre attempts to amend and improve Aristotle’s characterisation of the great souled man as one who is ashamed to received benefits from others (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1124b 9-10). MacIntyre also sets out to correct what he took to be fundamental errors in his own earlier work. He maintains that the account of human rationality that he adopted in *After Virtue* neither acknowledged the extent to which: 1) some animals may share a measure of reason with human persons; and 2) the humanity of persons is characterised by affliction, vulnerability and dependence upon others. Importantly, MacIntyre also discusses the educational ramifications of his earlier philosophical error. He claims that that while any meaningful education into the virtues must seek to foster the independent practical reasoning powers of students, it must also seek to foster a further set of virtues in them, ones that recognise that human persons need each other if they are to achieve individual and shared goods. He states that ‘any adequate education into the virtues will be one that enables us to give their due to a set of virtues that are a necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence, the virtues of acknowledged dependence’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p 120). Contrary to Aristotle, MacIntyre’s point seems to be that a fair share of common goods will only be achieved if persons learn how to both give and receive according to the demands of justice and need. He describes it like this:

‘We do indeed as infants, as children, and even as adolescents, experience sharp conflicts between egoistic and altruistic impulses and desires. But the task of education is to transform and integrate those into an inclination towards both the common good and our individual goods, so that we become neither self-rather-than-other-regarding nor other-rather-than-self-regarding, neither egoists nor altruists, but those whose passions and inclinations are directed to what is both our good and the good of others. Self-sacrifice, it follows, is as much a vice, as much a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness’

(MacIntyre, 1999, p 160)

MacIntyre suggests a person is justly virtuous when they are able to give goods to others and receive goods from others and where they are committed to the pursuit of the common good as well as their own. Such commitment may entail questioning the market and social orders of dominant institutions. It may also involve an ability to make context sensitive judgements about what the needs of other persons in the community are and an ability to actively respond to others in need. MacIntyre stresses that the young, the old, the infirm and the disabled are examples of others whom may especially depend upon us for help and generosity. The help persons’ need may often first be immediate and material - it may involve the need for food and shelter. However, all persons also have a need for participative recognition in community life too. MacIntyre is not advocating pure altruism here but rather *just generosity*. The person of just generosity will recognise not only which persons in a community are most in need and what might need doing to help them. They are also able to see that the state and dominant institutions in society may not be entirely vicious either.

Indeed, because of their limited resources local communities may often need to seek support from the institutions of the state if their particular needs are to be properly attended to. He says there ‘are numerous crucial needs of local communities that can only be met by making use of state resources and invoking the intervention of state agencies’ (1999, p 142). He reasons that in order
to give to others in need communities must first have something to give. Pursuing individual goods at times, or indeed those of dominant institutions, may therefore be necessary for without the prior existence of the state and individual and common goods the community would not have any goods to give to those in need. However, MacIntyre suggests that if just generosity is absent in local community decision-making, then there is always a danger that the politics of the state and the demands of the market will subvert and corrupt the pursuit of the common good (1999, p 142-146). Just generosity is a virtue particularly directed towards the wellbeing of the common good then and, as such, it might be especially worth educating. In sum, for MacIntyre character education should (amongst other things) support students to learn how to think for themselves and act for the common (as opposed to the economic) good.

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1 MacIntyre elsewhere maintains that an education into ‘genuine’ virtues will entail the transformation of student desires from an initial immature motivation of pursuing goals for the external approval they will bring, to a mature state of pursuing goals for their own sake (1991)

2 MacIntyre does stress that virtues can be exercised outside of practices (1984, p 187)

3 For further discussion of this point see MacIntyre and Dunne (2002) and MacAllister (2015)

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