Showing Hope and Disappointment
(and another Face of War)

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Philosophers working on reactive attitudes-- the attitudes of holding others to account made famous by P.F. Strawson (1962)—have been expanding the discussion beyond the paradigmatic blaming emotions of resentment, indignation, and guilt. Gratitude, hope, forgiveness, and trust, have become a part of the current conversation. And, too, the failure of hope-- disappointment. With this expansion has also come added conceptual space for what it is to hold others to a norm. It isn’t always a “demanding” that is binding. As Adrienne Martin has emphasized in recent work, sometimes it is more an aspiration. And the communication of that aspiration can often motivate, or bootstrap progress toward the norm. In some cases, as in hoping in a person, the normative aspiration may come with an awareness of the challenges, internal and external, that the target of the attitude has in meeting norms. And in those cases we may be willing to give some slack. But if the object is recognition and uptake, just what we do or say or show is all-critical. In interpersonal relationships, we are actors, as Erving Goffman taught us long ago. We may be hardwired to wear some of our emotions, nonintentionally, on our faces. But we also leave plenty of clues intentionally through strategic emotional communications, verbal and nonverbal, in order to get uptake.

I want to consider this interpersonal, normative emotional space we operate in, particularly when we place hope in persons and are disappointed. I explore these issues with ancient texts at hand. Most contemporary scholars have seemingly missed—or at least largely ignored—what the ancients have to offer for understanding reactive attitude transactions, and specifically those that aim at moral growth and progress. The ancient preoccupation with moral development should come as no surprise. After all, Aristotle devotes a fifth of the Nicomachean to friendships, with the best friendships aimed at each party becoming wiser and finer from the relationship. And despite the stress on the sage, the Stoics, especially the Romans, are typically talking about, the moral progresor (the prokoptōn), which we all are, and the moral tutoring relationship, whether from a Seneca to a Nero, an Epictetus to young free men, or a Marcus Aurelius to himself. The conversation doesn’t begin, as it is often told, with Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment delivered in the Rolls’ Chapel in London (1726), or with Adam Smith’s reflections on forgiveness in the Theory of Sentiments (17…). The story begins earlier, and telling it widens the contours of the current debate.

While I draw on the ancients, I also draw on several decades of conversations with military men and women going to war and returning home. My most recent book, Afterwar, is about moral injury and healing in the context of war and the reactive attitudes that are part of the emotional and moral engagement of the homecoming. In thinking about moral repair, I focus in that book on positive reactive attitudes like hope, trust, and a kind of self-empathy. Though I have never deployed to a war zone, I have been an interlocutor, teacher, and close friend of many who have. And their voices and narratives weave in and out of my own thinking about ancient and contemporary discussions of how we hold each other to account.

So here’s the general plan: I want to consider a positive reactive attitude, like hope and how its expression can play a constitutive role of bringing people into normative space. Throughout my remarks, I interplay hope and disappointment, for hope involves the susceptibility to

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1 Strawson himself did, including positive emotions, but that got eclipsed in early subsequent discussion. Quote and cite.

2 On Gratitude, see Coleen MacNamara; on hope, Adrienne Martin; on forgiveness – Alice MacLachlan; on trust, Victorica McGee and Karen Jones. On moral repair and reactive attitudes, in general, see Margaret Walker.

3 [Jay Wallace; Kukla, 2000; Kukla and Lance, 2014]

4 [Adrienne Martin]

5 Ekman

6 [Trip Glazer; Coleen McNamara; Mitchell Green]
disappointment, and in many cases of disappointment, hope can be easily restored. I also, in a more limited way here, take up the case of trust, for its expression also plays an important constitutive role in bringing interlocutors into normative space. And I consider these issues, especially as they affect women service members.

2. I shouldn’t overstate the neglect of the ancients. Aristotle is often cited for his comments on praise and blame as a part of his more general discussion of the voluntary and choice (prohairesis)—that we praise and blame, in some way hold persons responsible, for action and emotion. Regarding the latter, he probably had in mind emotional behavior and not primarily states, but in so far as he thought that moral perception relies on emotional intelligence and that we are responsible for how “the end appears,” we also have some responsibility for shaping the emotions that shape our wisdom. Moral anger, through some conception of blame as vehicle, is itself a mode of seeing and evaluating, and in that sense, we’re also held to account in that practice of holding others (and ourselves) to account. Our anger via blaming has to be apt, or “hit the mean,” as he would say. In this way, we are emotional agents in complex and layered ways. And the idea that emotions are well thought of as modes of passivity, despite the fact that Aristotle calls them pathai (from pathein, to suffer or undergo), is misleading at best.

But what goes largely unnoticed is Aristotle’s prescient remarks about hope and their implications for broader ways we hold persons responsible. He reminds us, early in the Nicomachean, that we don’t accurately attribute happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia) to a child; but in calling him “happy,” we invest hope in him that he will become that: “It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity [of reason and its excellences]. For this reason also a child is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and children who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes [dia tôn elpida] we have for them.”

Calling the child “happy” misattributes to her the developed rational capacities requisite for character excellence (or virtue) that, when exercised properly, with the experience of years and adequate external goods and luck, constitutes happiness. We place hope in the child, invest certain goals and ideals on her behalf that we think worthy of her pursuing, with the implicit assumption that the normative expectation is more aspirational than strictly binding, and that making explicit the hope can be motivational. Rebecca Kukla puts it well in terms of the idea of “inducting persons into normative space”:

“Subjects get induced into normative space through an odd process of misrecognition, wherein other authoritative subjects (mis)recognize a (potential) subject as already bound by norms and capable of negotiating normative space, and in turn the subject (mis)recognizes herself as properly identified in that recognition, and as already having been the subject she is recognized as being.

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7 Sherman, NE III.5, II...
8 See Michael McKenna (2013) on the elusivity of the notion of blame. Also, Tim Scanlon on alternative conceptions of blame, including notions of blame as assessment, as sanction or punishment, as expression of a moral emotion such as resentment, as communicative of a demand for justification, or as he believes, “a modification of one’s understanding of the one’s relationship with the person blamed” (2013, 86).
9 See my work on emotional agency....
10 See Sherman, 1989, ch. 5; 1997, ch. 2.
11 1099b30-1100a; with slight translation change of ‘boy’ to ‘child,’ and ‘boys’ to ‘children’.
12 [I am deeply indebted throughout to Adrienne Martin’s penetrating work on normative, or personal hope]
13 [2000, drawing heavily on Louis Althusser, 1971]
This misrecognition plays a constitutive role; it ‘produces’ or ‘recruits’ subjects by placing them in the appropriate ways, and hence it serves to bring about its own correctness.”

In short, to return to Aristotle’s example, we use “as if” language with our children to induct them into the normative space of virtue. Calling them “happy” by virtue of our hope in them has this kind of performative function. As Adrienne Martin has developed the notion, this kind of hope is normative—or interpersonal, she now says, and, I would importantly add, intrapersonal, and in some cases, though not all, it scaffolds change.

She elaborates on the idea: There is, she says, “the hoping region” (in addition to the “demanding region”) where we “aspire on people’s behalves by hoping for conformity to principles.” “It is a way of treating a principle as worth aspiring to without insisting on compliance.” And we may think that there are “urging reasons,” as she calls them, for others to live up to those demands. “Someone who fails to meet our legitimate hopes is rationally criticizable – just not in the way that someone who fails to meet our legitimate demands is.”

Hope of this variety is conceptually distinct from nonnormative hope for eventualities and outcomes, whether of the sort where there is little control on one’s part and is more like wishing or idle fantasy— that it may rain, that the Nats will win, that I hit the lottery today, or of the more substantive sort where there is clear “agential investment” (a strong desire for certain ends) and complex planning, imagination and productive fantasizing, and cooperative endeavor involved in trying to bring about those ends. In Afterwar, I talk about this kind of nonnormative hope in the case of Army veteran Dan Berschinski. His hope was to be able to walk again after losing the entire lower half of his body to an IED in Kandahar, Afghanistan. That hope led to extensive projects in learning about prosthetics and prosthetic users who lost not just their legs but hips as he had, a massive physical rehabilitation program at Walter Reed, consultations with world-wide experts, immersions in the metrics of gait, stride and balance in “wearing legs.” This hope sustained his sense of “possibilism” and kept him from being “beaten down,” as Philip Pettit would put it, “from cascades of inimical fact.” It freed him, again in Pettit’s words “from the bleakness of beliefs that wax and wane unpredictably in level of confidence.” It was a kind of cognitive resolve, a stance toward a probability assignment, that kept it some safe distance from the fluctuating “hurly burly of belief.” If emotions set epistemic landscapes in the sense that they frame certain patterns of salience, hope of his sort certainly did.

Dan hoped for an eventuality, that he would be a walker, but he also had normative hope— he placed hope in his own perseverance and discipline and he invested in other’s good will, expertise, and interest in supporting his hoped for end. Of course, in reality, the two kinds of hope blur. It’s obvious in the case of hoping for happiness. Even if, we all agree, as Aristotle puts it, that to entrust happiness to chance would be a “very defective arrangement,” “study and care” aren’t sufficient if happiness is to be a matter not just of being good but of doing good and living well. Put otherwise, to place hope in a child with respect to her happiness is to think that there are

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14 [p.177.] Kukla has in mind recognitions that are demandings. I’m expanding that notion to include urgings, or aspiring, or hopings.
15 (Oct., 2014)
16 (2013, 130)
17 (Oct. 2014)
18 Pettit, 2004. 160. Martin (2011) objects to the idea of “agential investment,” arguing that nonnormative hope does not involve a special form of motivation. See my note, Afterwar, p. 208. She also says, usefully that nonnormative hope involves a stance taken toward the probability one assigns to the hoped—for outcome. Normative hope involves a stance taken toward the capacities and/or situations of the agent about whom one hopes (2014, 130).
19 Peter Goldie uses the notion of emotions as setting “epistemic landscapes.”
20 NE I. 8
urging reasons for her to take seriously the project of virtue. And her failure to strive toward the ends of virtue licenses feelings of disappointment in her. But to hope for a child’s happiness is also, unless you are dyed-in-the-wool Stoic, is to take a stand toward the likelihood of certain outcomes in a way that licenses feeling disappointment if things don’t eventuate as anticipated.

Bits of this are familiar ground. What is less trodden territory is how we communicate hope and disappointment, especially in cases when we are dealing not with children, but adults who we have a sense should know better. And this takes us to thinking about different ways in which reactive attitudes can be communicative.  

3. Consider the following, somewhat reconstructed case that brings into focus a complex set of reactive attitudes to gender discrimination in the military. A number of years ago I interviewed a mid-level military officer, whom I’ll call “Roberta.” She was an aviator with a remarkably distinguished record of academic achievements and military awards. She was clearly a star and got a highly coveted senior job on a base. However, when she reported to take up her new position, the base commander told her to her face that he “fought against” her appointment and would continue to do everything he could to undermine it. The tenor of his complaint was the tenor on base, and there was well-established lingo for it that Roberta parodied for me: Her very presence was “disrupting the status quo” and “tearing down heritage and tradition.” She was a threat to the entrenched and sacred culture of hypermasculinity on that base, in her service branch, and in the military, in general.

It was clear in talking to Roberta, several years after the incident that she felt then, and still, deep resentment at her superior for the mistreatment. The resentment (here assuming a widely held cognitivist account of emotion) had as its evaluative focus that she was the victim of a serious transgression by an officer who failed to comply morally and legally with norms, specifically with fair and equal treatment under gender integration in the forces. She had been wronged, demeaned and degraded, forced to work in a hostile environment where the commander encouraged sexist values, protective of the old military as a male-only club.

But she also felt miserably let down by her commander in his failing to meet the challenge of treating her as equal. The evaluation here wasn’t so much that she was wronged, but that he should have done so much better and that he failed her by disappointing her reasonable expectations for him. Her disappointment in him, in part, was that he didn’t invest hope in her in a way that showed commitment to her promise and potential. It was a failure of its own kind of moral address: he couldn’t recognize her bid (her entreaty or urging) to him to take her military service seriously on a par with that of any male.  

He wasn’t already in shared normative space and her calls to him to be inducted in it through her implicit and explicit communications fell on flat ears.

On top of this, she felt disappointment in herself—that, despite some critical distance and a fairly feminist upbringing by a mother with an elite professional career, she nonetheless internalized the male shaming, or in the Freudian language of defense mechanisms, “identified with the aggressor.” The only way to survive, as she put it to me, was to “outbro the bros.” She was

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21 I do not hold that they are themselves communicative entities, as does, in a recent defense, Coleen Macnamara (2015a, 2015b) For an excellent critique of this, see Trip Glazer, “Can Emotions Communicate,” 2015?
22 She was disappointed in his record of actions as much as his character—that he had done wrong to her and that he was such a poor leader with such poor judgment. See Macalester Bell on contempt as aretic rather than as deontic-focused condemnation. I am thinking of disappointment as having both aretic and deontic dimensions]
23 Sandra Bartky
disappointed in herself in feeling so constrained by ambient practices and so marginalized in her ability to change regressive social meanings. She felt she was going “soft” on some of her deepest principles in having to walk on eggshells about what and how she raised grievances. And that sense of compromise added to her self-disappointment, and to her disappointment in command for putting her in that position.

As the example suggests, resentment and disappointment can co-travel. And the disappointment, at least in this case, at her male boss and bros, has a more distinctly developmental dimension than resentment: the norm is aspirational, that present conditions for meeting the norm are nonideal, both personally for this male officer, and systemically, in terms of a pervasive, patriarchal military culture. It may be a “stretch” for this commander and his colleagues to get it. It’s not that they can’t get it, in the sense of fundamental moral incompetence that makes them ineligible in the role of moral addressee. It’s that they don’t get it, and won’t easily get it, in part, because so much, individually and collectively, is invested in not getting it. As moral reactor and addressee, it would be naïve for Roberta not to take that into account in a reaction that is aimed at successful uptake. And by successful uptake, I mean here simply some acknowledgment of his failure, and a commitment to do better in a way that shows an embrace of principles in question which would give her reasons, in turn, to modify her attitudes and intentions toward him.

The illustration makes clear that disappointment isn’t tamped-down resentment. It has a different evaluative message. But it also isn’t necessarily mild. It can be searing, sometimes in a way that doesn’t obliterate hope and its invitation for change, but sometimes in a way that does.

Instructive here, even if a bit tangential, is a passage from a brilliant review by Alan Hollinghurst (in the NYRB) of the British novelist and biographer, Penelope Fitzgerald. She was nee Penelope Knox. Her father and three uncles were children of an Evangelical bishop, and the superiority of the family pedigree and “code of the Knoxes” could be communicated in “paralyzing silences of disapproval and inhibition.” So writes Hollinghust, quoting internally from Fitzgerald’s biography, The Knox Brothers:

“These were class inhibitions too, no doubt. But Knox esprit de corps could be brutal. When Dilwyn’s son failed to get the top scholarship at Eton, Bishop Knox said he was “appalled.” Rawle too “knew he was a disappointment to his father; he missed his [unspoken-of] mother deeply; his stammer and his reticence settled in.”

“It’s saddening,” continues Hollinghurst, to read that in due course Penelope’s son Valpy, a successful economist, become prone in his forties to panic attacks, whose source, was found to be “a fear of being seen as a failure in his mother’s eyes.”

Such are the disappointments borne by the upper crust, but they reflect more broadly on Aristotle’s earlier point, that hold for us plebes, too. We hope in our children on credit, sometimes with aspirations that are reasonable, sometimes, with those that are all too distorted and narcissistic. And we can be disappointed, brutally. And the disappointment can then be internalized—paralyzingly so - by those who are the “disappointments.” And that kind of uptake, where one becomes the disappointment can be as annihilating as suffering the most anguished forms of shame, even if we grant that disappointment doesn’t as a matter of concomitance or constitution carry shame’s sense of being publically exposed, caught without your fig leaf, as the

26 [See Macnamara, 2015, 230, in discussing Watson 2011.]
27 [NYRB, Dec. 4, 2014 Vol. LX1, no.19, p. 10]
28 [10]
29 [Andrew Solomon, 2012, Far From the Tree]
Greek word for shame, from genitalia, implies.\textsuperscript{30} Still both shame and disappointment have in common that they are a falling short of principles `or ideals invested in one.

But what now of disappointment that isn’t quite damnation? And how do we understand communication of it that has the pedagogic function of moving an addressee toward a normative ideal that he ought to embrace or principle he ought to conform to more seriously than he does?

Let’s return to our female officer, Roberta. She felt powerless to get uptake from her superior. She didn’t think she would have the kind of authority or standing or credibility to be effective in communicating her grievances. And so she turned to a male mentor, with the same number of stripes on his epaulets as her boss, to help break into the “bro network” and plead her cause. There was no way her boss could recognize directly from her that her hope in him to accept her on an equal footing with her male peers was legitimate and something he had moral reason to commit to. She knew he had to hear it through different channels. If second-personal address is a kind of call and response trope of recognition and acknowledgment, then Roberta’s call had to come from a proxy with status and power who could call in a way that was more likely to be heard and responded to.

This is to begin to talk about reactive attitudes as communications.\textsuperscript{31} And it is to begin to explore the pragmatics of those communications and whether the communication is always just a revealing of an inner attitude.

\textbf{4.} Call and response (and its trope in Gospel singing with its famous descendant, Rock ‘N’ Roll) is one metaphor.\textsuperscript{32} But another is this: Roberta had to throw a pass in a way that could be caught. The analogy is intuitive and Seneca develops it as a part of a larger sketch of interpersonal normative transactions. His own example is gift giving and gratitude. But the sketch is suggestive for how to think about reactive attitudes, in general, when they are communications.\textsuperscript{33}

We communicate benevolent attitudes through material gifts, but also, he insists, through verbal and nonverbal expressions over which we have some control. Care in expression matters if we want our pass caught:

I would like to take up an analogy which our own Chrysippus drew with a game of ball. It falls to the ground through the fault either of the person throwing it or of the person receiving it, while it only remains in play by passing, properly thrown and caught, from one pair of hands to the other. A good player needs to send it off differently to a tall partner than a to a short one. The same principle applies to a favour. Only if properly accommodated to both the persons involved, bestower and recipient, will it leave the one and reach the other as it should. Again, if the game with a trained and practised player, we shall be bolder in throwing the ball. No matter how it comes, his hand will be ready and

\textsuperscript{30} “Shame” is \textit{aidos}, from \textit{aida}—genitals. To be ashamed is to fall short of ideals, where, as Aristotle says, “eyes are upon you,” real or imagined.”

\textsuperscript{31} Like speech acts, though I leave others to develop the analogy.

\textsuperscript{32} Not unlike what happens in Gospel singing, which influenced Rock'n'Roll, with back—up singers, often preachers’ daughters, answering the call (too often in the shadows, “20 feet from the star,” to reference the amazing documentary of these invisible singers - “Twenty Feet from Stardom”

\textsuperscript{33} I have studied this work before and written on it in. I had not quite thought of it until now as suggestive as it is for exploring the complexities of emotional agency and communication connected with reactive attitudes. For an earlier discussion of Seneca on emotional expression in benefaction and gratitude, see Sherman 2004 and Sherman 2005b. I don’t think of all reactive attitudes as communications or communicative entities, in the way some, especially Coleen Macnamara does. I think attitudes can be silent and maybe potentially communicative, but to develop the point would take me beyond the scope of this paper.
quick to drive it back. Against an untrained novice, we shall not throw it so hard or so vigorously but be more relaxed, aiming the ball right into his hands and simply meeting it when it comes back. We should use the same procedure when doing favours.

.... As it is, we very often make people ungrateful and welcome the idea that they should be so, as though our favours could only be great if we cannot be thanked for them.... How much better and more considerate it would be to see to it that recipients too have a part to play, to welcome the idea that you could be thanked...

At the end of the passage, the recipient’s participant role is specifically in terms of the “pass” back of gratitude that acknowledges a gift caught and accepted. But the more general point of the passage is that the recipient plays a role all along. We are addressing a specific person, in relationship with someone whose competence in recognizing our address matters. Obviously, doing someone a good turn is best geared to what that recipient needs and is capable of using. As Seneca goes on to suggest, giving books to a country bumpkin or a heavy coat to someone in summer will not count as a wise pass likely to be caught with enormous gratitude by the recipient! Similarly, trust given to someone who has signaled no competence or interest in the domain in which one is asking her to be trustworthy is not a wise exposure of vulnerability, nor a likely way to scaffold deeper trust in that person.

But hope in others is somewhat different from trust. We may not fully trust persons and their readiness to receive us appropriately, but we still may hope in them, and in an even more robust way than trust, hope that our hope in them makes them responsive to our call. And so, as we have been saying, hope in others can presume a strong developmental stance. We want to move a recipient along and hope he will rise to the challenge and catch the ball. Still, we are often willing to accommodate somewhat-- throw the ball, with the recipient’s limits in mind—all the while still trying to get him to catch and to stay in the game. And where we simply can’t engage the other properly (or are met with deep resistance), we may enlist others’ help to throw the ball for us.

But when you throw a pass that the recipient might have a chance of catching, how accommodating or perhaps, better, “forgiving” do you have to be of the recipient’s handicaps, especially when those handicaps involve sexist and gendered values, class blindness, entrenched race or religious bias, and other systemic factors that keep those prejudices in place? We are not talking about what people might like or need or use well in terms of benefactions for which they would be grateful. We are talking about protesting deep values, ‘calling’ someone on his failure to be in normative space that he already ought to be in. And yet we still want to get him to catch.

I suspect the answer, in part, has to do how we understand different forms of communicating or expressing reactive attitudes and their functions. A standard, though limited way of viewing emotion expression is as a sincere revealing of what is felt, a making transparent of one’s heart. We are revealing to another our occurrent emotional states. It is like avowing a belief --having the thought that ‘p’ and asserting it, but, of course, with the crucial caveat that expressing emotions through some modes, such as spontaneous nonverbal gestures (gasps at the threat of an approaching bear, or widened eyes) doesn’t preserve the evaluative content of an emotion in the

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34 On the game of call, see Seneca 1995, On Favours, II.17.3-6, p. 224-5 in Cooper&Procope. For related analogy based on the looping back of the mutual reciprocations of the Three Graces, see Seneca 1995, On Favours, 1.3.8.

35 I develop these ideas in the case of trust in Sherman 2014a.

36 A caveat on the term “expression.” Some might say, you can’t have an expression of an emotion if the person isn’t feeling it. I’m not committed to the word. If “display” works better, that’s fine with me. I thank Trip Glazer for help on this.

37 Trip Glazer. Ch. 6, p. 4
way that a verbal expression does (“that an approaching bear is dangerous to me.”). In the case of an intentional expression, it may be a “speaking of one’s mind”--say a flat out verbal rebuke or rebuff or unadulterated talking down to another that exposes one’s thorough disappointment. Here the point is to let someone know how one feels and what one’s grievances are without much attention to receiver uptake, and how easy or hard it is to hear (or “catch”) what one is expressing. We’re getting the disappointment out, making it public, venting it more than communicating it strategically. It may be that making one’s feelings known in this way can at times be an effective way of reaching someone, though probably not on a routine basis, especially if what one is communicating is disappointment or anger that can sting or bruise or quickly put the receiver on the defensive. (So a mother tells her 30 something daughter what has been brewing up inside her for a long time that she, the daughter, has really disappointed her, fallen in her estimation because of her selfish behavior and preoccupation with her own life that seems to squeeze out any real interest in the mother. The mother tells her flat out, “I am really disappointed in you. I’m hurt. I had hoped for more from you.” The daughter may only take the disapproval seriously because of just how raw the mother’s upset is. She gets it now, empathically identifies with the mother’s hurt, owns up to her wrongs, and also begins to see her failure to meet aspirations placed in her and aspirations she also, deep down, has for herself. She wouldn’t easily get there without the mother’s finally revealing her true feelings. But I suspect if the mother were always so frank in her disappointment, it would put a kibash on an enduring bond and not give the daughter much motivation to change.)

But, as Seneca’s model suggests, when we are in normative transactions with others, we are typically strategic players, trying to figure out how best to reach others and engage them in a way in which they will recognize (and accept) the norms in question. We want to keep them in the game, and in the case of disappointment and hope especially, perhaps air our grievances but also project and teach values and ends we want to encourage them to strive toward. We see ourselves as educative more than flat out punitive; we are trying to move the addressee to take up the principles we aspire for on his behalf, with some appreciation, often, that it is tough going. That is why we are aspiring on his behalf, at least in the case of underlying hope met with disappointment, and not expressing, at least through those sets of reactions, the demanding for strict compliance that comes with resentment. (To keep with the metaphor, in resentment, it’s as if I throw the ball and the ball is now squarely in your court. It’s up to you to do something to get back in the game. And I may feel I have justified reason to withhold my good will until you prove worthy of reentry into the relationship. When I am disappointed in you in a way that still holds onto hope, my initial pass to you is made in a way that can keep you in the game, or at least move you, with my help, to a new level of game. I don’t withhold my good will in the same way as I do in resentment.)

My point is that this domain, especially of hope and disappointment, requires exquisite finesse—skillful emotional reading as well as skillful emotional display. And for many of us, who aren’t especially interpersonally gifted, this may be hard work, though still part of what it is to be an emotional agent who takes up pedagogic and other performative roles in normative, social space.

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38 Trip Glazer, (Thought, 2014), critiquing Macnamara’s view: Gasping would be a natural expression of fear, while an utterance of “this approaching bear is dangerous to me” would be a speaker expression of fear. And he appeals to the Wittgensteinian view here, that in the case of emotions, “humans over time learn to replace natural expressions with speaker expressions.” Citing Wittgenstein: “The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.”

39 With thanks to Trip Glazer, ch. 6 of his dissertation, in progress, for the notion of “publicizing” a “private experience.”

40 Scanlon is suggestive here for thoughts on Strawson’s notion of withdrawal of good will that often is involved in resentment. Scanlon suggests that resentment is a reaction to another who has impaired her relationship with you.
(At times it can be hard to avoid clumsy bluffs.) The good news is that uptake from others isn’t necessarily undermined because we show to them that we have to work at how we get our attitudes across. So, for example, we may know how to recognize phony smiles but nonetheless take them at “face value” precisely because we appreciate the social effort behind them or understand that in certain professions, as being an airline steward, investing in that kind of emotional labor for the sake of the customer just is part of the job. And if someone is working hard at that job, then that may be a sign not only of commitment to her profession but a sign that she is taking me seriously as her customer. And I suspect the more general point holds that managing reactive attitude communications, so that we can convey well to someone how he has failed us or a community, while at the same showing some appreciation for the systemic challenges that may affect development in light of being part of that system, seems especially important in the expression of certain cases of disappointment.

I am not saying that we should always dissemble. Or, that we should be all out forgiving of moral failures either of aspiration or compliance. I am simply saying that we are constantly operating in an arena of public relations in mediating our emotional communication, even in the most intimate, non-public settings. And so not giving a direct readout of your inner attitude to an extremely sexist boss, in those moments when one thinks strategic uptake and reform might be encouraged by a more nuanced approach, seems unremarkable and not necessarily an expression of servility or morally problematic silencing or appeasement.

I want to say more about these communicative accommodations for the sake of moral reform. But first it’s helpful to hear Seneca, again, this time, not just on the importance of passes that can be caught, but on what we, as throwers, have to do to get the catch caught. We may have to work our faces and our tone, and also, just what we say. For what is “chosen” is not just or primarily the material gift in the case of doing a favor, but also the attitudinal gift. And this is conveyed through various signs and mots justes:

“In every transaction...not the least important part is the manner (qua modo) in which things are either said or done.”  “No gratitude is felt for a favour which has long stuck to the hands of whoever granted it...Even if some delay should intervene, we should do everything to avoid the appearance of having had to think whether to do it.” “Enormous favours have been spoiled by silence... They were promised with a look of reluctance.” Don’t think you can be benevolent with groans and haughty eyes, with “rough words and superciliousness,” grudges and “furrowed brows.” “A favour rudely granted by a hard man” is like “bread with stones in it,” “not to be forgone if you are hungry, but not good to eat.”

The message is: manage what you evince. For your addressee is reading the signs: “What strikes the eye is not the favour itself, but the trace and mark of a favor.” It’s not just the service but the attitude conveyed. And though Seneca repeats a message that might sound like it’s getting at inner attitude-- “A favour cannot possibly be touched by the hand; the transaction takes place in the mind” and again, “what matters is not the deed or the gift but the mentality behind them [qua mente]” attitude for him, as the sample passages suggest, is not a private mental state. It’s

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41 Hochshield
42 Consider this in regard the psychologists working under the Bush administration torture campaign...
44 I.6.1, 203, 214, 194
45 II.7.1, 216
47
48
49 I.6.1, 202 also animo---spirit behind the actions; also 237
facial expression and vocal inflection, the very specific words we end up using, the looks we wear and the tone we invoke that is having “attitude,” for him, as we might say. Attitude is a communication, “how” goodwill “is given.” And the same goes for gratitude. It’s an appropriately timed, apt communication back to the gift giver acknowledging uptake and acceptance. It’s one thing “to catch skillfully,” Seneca says, it’s another to effectively “return what he has caught.” The acceptance also has to aim at reactive uptake.

5. The emphasis has been on (reactive) attitude as communication, not as general broadcast. I have been focused on targeted uptake to a specific recipient with whom we are in a transaction. But sometimes, again, independent of an occurring underlying state, we are projecting a value to a larger group, to others who might also need to learn a lesson and are conveniently in earshot; sometimes we “use” someone as a recipient on whom to make that larger address, and may even do so immorally; sometimes we just address groups, even as big as nation-states, as those who regularly do in politics or human rights work; sometimes we call others to moral engagement yet don’t know just who those others are, as when we write books or opinion pieces and imagine our readers. We tailor our words, sometimes express our underlying feelings, sometimes hold back, sometimes make emotional pleas that don’t currently grip us but may have in the past, sometimes we get worked up by our own expressions and are “put in the mood” by the performance, sometime we are just imagining the best leverage points for a conversation that will have broad impact on a sensitive topic, such as the one I often deal with, civilian one-one-one obligations and attitudes to veterans. We are not in conversation with anyone in particular. But we are still trying to get normative uptake with some amorphous group of people and we are using emotional communication, specifically publically expressed reactive attitudes, like hope and disappointment, as a negotiating tool.

6. But now let’s return to the point I am circling around—disappointment in those who oppress you or fail you in morally profound ways. The injuries I have in mind aren’t just an affront to a narcissistic ego or a prick to a thin skin. They are violations of dignity, status, equal standing, etc., and so on. But if communication of reactive attitude is aimed at uptake, we need to appreciate that those who are marginalized may not have the standing to engage in normative emotional communication in the first place, or even if they do, may not have an expressive style, natural or habituated, that will have credibility for those they are trying to engage. Both points were implicit in Roberta calling in a proxy. But the point is a deeper one about the mediums available for emotionally negotiating normative space. Addressers and addresses may not be speaking the same emotional language. And it may not be just a matter of skill and emotional labor that can work toward securing the uptake. It’s power and authority. The disenfranchisement isn’t undone easily by the most fine-tuned use of emotion communication as negotiating tool when “hermeneutical injustice”, Miranda Frick’s term --injustice in who gets to set meanings-- keeps it in place. Strategy and diplomacy under-describe the pragmatics of normative uptake. And that

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50 214
51 237, 239, 241.
52 237
54 The former point, about standing, is one made by Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, in a brilliant reflection on the opening scene of the Godfather, to do with when and how you can address the Godfather in asking for a favor: “Now you come to me and you say, “Don Corleone, give me justice.” But you don’t ask with respect. You don’t offer friendship. You don’t even think to call me Godfather. Instead, you come into my house on the day my daughter’s to be married and you ask me to do murder for money.... Someday, and that day may never come, I’ll call upon you to do
they do is particularly problematic when the very point of the uptake is to bootstrap change and to entreat someone to change a point of view or invest in a worthwhile end that he hasn’t sufficiently embraced.

Consider another case that has to do more with trust than hope, but like hope involves induction of another into normative space. One of the women service members I interviewed, whom I will call “Sally,” struggled with how to report to her supervisor on a base in Iraq a repeated pattern of sexual harassment incidents that kept her on high alert, inside the wire, all day. It began at crack of dawn at the chow hall. All heads lifted when she walked in. “I felt like a deer in hunting season.” What upset her was that officers led in the staring, even though they would look down when they caught themselves ogling, “and had a look of shame, as she put it, like “I shouldn’t be doing this.” Visits to port-apotties presented another routine challenge. Some were covered with graffiti with demeaning slurs against women; but there was also the background worry about how to properly dispose of malodorous tampons in the field. (Haliburton, in setting up field plumbing, hadn’t thought about a military encampment friendly for women’s needs.)\(^{55}\) She was stalked on email, with rumors going viral about a relationship she never had. But what hit her hardest, or at least, came as the final straw, was the laundry incident: her panties and bras were stolen when she walked out for a few minutes while doing a load of wash. She felt awkward having to write to her mother not for the usual care package but for a replacement of undergarments without being explaining why.

The real communication challenge was with her supervisor. She knew she was deeply anxious as a result of real harassment. She couldn’t work well or sleep well, it was affecting her combat readiness and professional life. But she knew she also knew she was in a war zone with more global threats looming. And she didn’t think her complaints would be given credence, especially, “the weird underwear theft,” as she put it. It was embarrassing enough to have to tell your mother. But she thought that this was just the kind of testimonial that could be mocked or used against her, or though of as trivial, in the middle of a war zone.

And she had her own doubts about her entitlements to make the claims on other grounds. She worried that she might not be compassionate enough toward many of the guys who were predators: “So I’m sure in an all male-shop the sexual urge was a little more rampant and the frustration dealing with that built up…. I always struggled with whether I was compassionate enough for them…. I always struggled with how much I could put up with, and how much I couldn’t.”\(^{56}\)

Her ambivalence about what she suffered-- her minimizing the harassment both on account of being a war zone and because males might have good reason to be randy, made it hard for her to come forward. But she also incorporated a readiness to forgive into her own ability to feel resentment and disappointment. What she felt might not count as reasonable disappointment and resentment, and so she questioned the legitimacy of her complaints. All this made it hard to articulate and avow even to herself what she actually felt.

But once her feelings became more transparent to herself, she viewed the communication of them as a strategic issue about empowerment -- how was she going to get a supervisor to trust her as


\(^{56}\) See *Afterwar*, p. 106.
raising legitimate issues worthy of his taking seriously. She faced a pragmatic issue of how she was going to get uptake, given what loomed large in his world of command and what loomed large in hers. And so disclosing her sense of being betrayed by her male colleagues, her resentment at being violated, her sense of being unprotected and unsafe inside the war as much as outside, her disappointment in ogling, predatory leadership, was never her only concern in the transaction with her commander.

We can imagine her transaction as, in part, a trust overture that is tentative. If trust is a matter of a call that implicitly says something like, “Can I count on you,” her call might have to have had a strategic preamble, “Can I count on you to be someone I can count on?” She’s asking if she can trust him before she trusts him. We do this kind of thing when we make general inquiries: “Can I ask you a question.” In the trust case, we are warming up the normative space, testing receptivity and our own eligibility to be the entreator; we are setting a stage where we are helping to induct the receiver into a position where he may be more prepared to listen or hear or consider his own role in why she is so tentative.

(In this particular case, she didn’t feel she was ultimately successful in getting the right uptake. And so she resorted to her own protection in the end. She began carrying an unconcealed knife to meals, clipped to her wallet and slung around her body on a string.)

7. None of this need for emotional management and skilled performance in normative transactions is at all surprising. (Parents, teachers, psychotherapists, coaches, drill sergeants, and so on, are engaged in theses practices all the time.) But what is perhaps surprising is how close some of what we do is too highly staged ruses that manipulate emotional responses in more clearly defined play-acting roles. And what is instructive is not just how there can be uptake from the addressee but uptake back to the addressee that can substantially change underlying attitudes that break down the role playing.

An obvious case is interrogation and the manipulation of trust. (Though the case again focuses on trust, the expression of trust, like the expression of hope, plays a constitutive role in shepherding others into shared normative space.) Good interrogators (here I have in mind interrogators of POW’s or detainees to be current) are typically building rapport in order to exploit it. Through all sorts of performances and created dependencies, faked affinities and affections, manipulated erotic transferences and slowly built shared history, detainees are inducted into a space of trust and vulnerability. There’s far more that goes on, and sometimes much that is evil, but that is a simplified version of the controlled exploitation. But relationships, of course, are vulnerabilities on both sides. And not only can interrogators succumb to frustration and the brutalities to which that leads, but they also can be liable to positive feelings—real affection, countertransferences, (or reverse “Stockholm Syndromes,” you might say), deep trust and a sense of friendship that can make the manipulations hard to go through with. Just like psychoanalysts, they may feel the pull of boundary violations—moving out of role and into enactments that are a bit too real. For interrogators, the painful moral residue of the manipulations, after the fact, even when there is no harsh coercion (or unjust conduct), is another reminder of the permeability of the boundaries.

This boundary permeability in role play comes up in Sophocles’ Philoctetes. Young Neoptolemus is to do wily Odysseus’s bidding and lure from Philoctetes the magical bow that is the Greeks final hope for defeating the Trojans. Philoctetes is all too vulnerable. He was marooned by his

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57 Karen Jones 2012.
58 I give a much more extended discussion in Afterwar ch. 5 and in “He gave me his hand but took my bow: Trust and Trustworthines in the Philoctetes and our Wars 2014...
command on the deserted island of Lesbos for ten years, abandoned because the stench of his fetid wound and his wails of anguish made him too great a liability at sea in a ship with tight quarters. The very Greek commanders who betrayed him now want his sole survival tool, the divine bow. He doesn’t know that’s the scheme. He’s all too desperate for friendship (as his name suggests, “he who gains a friend”) and ripe to be manipulated by trust overtures. And Neoptolemus does just that, but he also woos his own heart in wooing Philoctetes. Staged trustworthiness becomes real trustworthiness. Mocked friendship becomes the real thing.

Neoptolemus begins with a careful rehearsal of trust that sets up the grounds for a kind of transference. In fact, they both suffered injuries by Odysseus as commander. And so he draws on that shared grievance: “Abused and insulted... Deprived of what is rightfully mine/By that bastard son of bastards, Odysseus./ I hold the commanders accountable. Philoctetes is moved as planned: We “share a cargo of common grievances.” “You and I sing the same song.”

The rapport overtures do their work. For many scenes later, Philoctetes allows Neoptolemus to hold the sacred bow on condition that he gives it back. Neoptolemus cautiously asks for the permission, “Is it ok, allowed (themis)” if I touch it. Despite a received reading, the rhetorical question is not so much a coy rehearsal, for effect, about whether touching it is compliant with divine norms, but a real reworking of the interpersonal trust between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes that has been constitutive of their relationship so far. Philoctetes is, in fact, trusting and projects back that trust onto Neoptolemus—I’m counting on you to give it back. I’m counting on you to be responsive to my dependency and to my counting on you. The twist in the play is that Neoptolemus, himself, in fact, becomes trustworthy. He doesn’t just snare his prey with his faked trust. He comes out of role and gets “ensnared” by the real trust Philoctetes shows him.

He’s converted. He is inducted into new normative space, created, in part, through the mutual transactions. He’s no longer Odysseus’s lackey, but Philoctetes’ real friend. The enactments have changed his role and the inner attitude that goes with it.

8. I want to end on the point I began with, disapproval through disappointment, and accommodations we make, sometimes in performative space, when we want individuals to take responsibility more than we want to hold them strictly responsible. One way of putting it is that we are more concerned to move them forward than to make them pay.

It may be that my interest in disappointment and underlying hope is a way to skirt the issue of outright moral anger and its retributivist tones. But unlike Martha Nussbaum, in her recent writings and talks, I’m not myself deeply anger intolerant nor have I given up my own views that the Stoics are wrong in rejecting the place of moral anger in most of our nonideal moral lives.

Her recent notion of transitional anger doesn’t in fact give up on anger, but her main point, in her preliminary writing, is that the dwelling in outrage at an offense isn’t necessarily tied to some further thought about payback: “Transition-Anger does not focus on status; nor does it want, even briefly, the suffering of the offender as a type of payback for the injury. It never gets involved in that kind of magical thinking. It focuses on future welfare from the start. Saying ‘Something should

59 See Karen Jones interesting work on trust and trustworthiness....
60 An interesting area to reflect on is the performative normative space of social media, of invitations and provocations to specific others and wider fan audiences, where the role for some is to challenge entitlement and for others to lean on it. It’s a space where people are called out and apologize for misteps or misperceptions. Messages are delivered as a part of public relations campaign, that mixes teaching and preaching and avowal. See the wonderful piece, “New Ethicists on Twitter: Nicki Minaj and Meek Miller” by Jon Caramanica, NYT, 7.25.2015
61 On transitional anger.
be done about this’, Transition-Anger commits itself to a search for strategies, but it remains an open question whether the suffering of the offender will be a strong candidate.”

I think this is consistent with the view I have been suggesting about reactive attitudes in general—that the having of certain inner emotional reactive attitudes doesn’t always mean that we make those private states public or that a communication, even if occasioned by the attitude, has a restricted repertoire of expressions, especially in the case of those expressions that are intentional. We can feel deep resentment toward another, without that being expressed in intentions to withdraw goodwill or inflict suffering on those who wrong us. And the latter, inflicting suffering may require separate justification beyond feeling resentment.

9. My main point in these explorations has been to think about the pragmatics of communicating our reactive attitudes when we want not just to express our hearts but to get people to change, where there is some (defeasible) commitment to keeping a relationship going. I think we tolerate much more strategizing than we often appreciate, and we certainly need more than we are often good at producing. Even if we are sometimes clumsy bluffers, we probably all need more practice at bluff if we are to encourage peaceful change in others, whether in personal interactions or geopolitical ones.

63 See Scanlon on needing separate justification for those modifications of intentions. He puts forth something of a “parallel” view, in which feeling resentment “involves taking oneself to have reasons for these other adjustments in attitude, reasons provided by the same faults that are reasons for resentment.” (2013, 99)
64 I am not sure what to say about moral anger directed toward oneself, as in nagging cases of what I’ve called “luck guilt” and “accident guilt” where one “beats up” on oneself for nonculpable commissions or omissions, especially to do with the unthinkable loss of loved ones on one’s watch. For many, the guilt feelings seem to come immediately with withdrawal of empathic connection to self or compassion for the awful position one finds oneself in of not being able, despite one’s best efforts, to cover for a buddy. See Tessman, 2015, for interesting reflections on automatic “alarm bell emotions” in psychological systems that operate with little control and often are out of sync with more deliberative reactions, p. 59 on Kahneman, 2011.
65 I thank Trip Glazer for encouragement in working on this topic and for reading of an earlier draft.