



## **Toward a Moral Psychology of Civic Friendship**

**Blaine J. Fowers**

This is an unpublished conference paper for the 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues conference at Oriel College, Oxford University, Thursday 4<sup>th</sup> – Saturday 6<sup>th</sup> January 2018.

These papers are works in progress and should not be cited without author's prior permission.

Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues

University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT United Kingdom

T: +44 (0) 121 414 3602 F: +44 (0) 121 414 4865

E: [jubileecentre@contacts.bham.ac.uk](mailto:jubileecentre@contacts.bham.ac.uk) W: [www.jubileecentre.ac.uk](http://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk)



## Toward a Moral Psychology of Civic Friendship

Blaine J. Fowers  
University of Miami  
bfowers@miami.edu

The fragmented body politics in many Western democracies call for serious efforts to reclaim greater cohesion and cooperation. The Aristotelian concept of civic friendship is a promising, albeit controversial, pathway to this goal. Civic friendship is the common translation of Aristotle's term *politikē philia*. One of the challenges of this topic is that Aristotle used this term quite sparingly, leaving relatively wide latitude for interpreting it. Nevertheless, it is striking just how often he referred to politics and *philia* in the same sentence or paragraph. In noticing the frequency of this coincidence of terms it becomes clear that he saw *philia* as a central feature in any successful polity. He believed that the like-mindedness, community, and justice necessary for good politics were dependent on *philia*. This connection shows up in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, the Politics, and the Rhetoric. As I will explain in a moment, I take the term *philia* to mean "affectionate or loving relationship" and see the common rendering of the term as "friendship" to be flawed. Taking *philia* to be a much broader term than friendship opens the door to a moderate understanding of *politikē philia*.

Today, I begin with a moderate version of *politikē philia* that can be appropriated into modern politics and includes three elements: goodwill toward one's fellow citizens for their own sakes, including acting on their behalf, reciprocity, and mutual awareness of the goodwill and reciprocity (Irerra, 2005). A strong version of *politikē philia* would require a significant core of personal relationships and a "thick" community in which there is substantial agreement about the good society and a well-recognized domain of the common good. The strong version

of *politikē philia* is even more debatable than the moderate version because the latter three characteristics are difficult to envision in contemporary liberal nation-states.

I do not argue directly even for the moderate version of *politikē philia* here. Rather, I focus on increasing the plausibility of *politikē philia* by discussing what I take to be a realistic moral psychology for *politikē philia*. I aim to identify and document a set of natural human psychological features that make *politikē philia* possible. If I am able to do so, then there is a reasonable basis for believing that a moderate version of *politikē philia* can be cultivated in any human society, even those that do not resemble Aristotle's polis. I proceed on the premise that the science supporting this moral psychology identifies features that partly define our human nature. This view provides a strong basis for psychological realism, but I recognize that some claim that the very idea of a single basic human nature is erroneous (e.g., Dreyfus, 1987; Gergen, 2011). Many authors have argued in favor of an evolved human nature that has underwritten a significant proportion of human throughout our species existence (Arnhardt, 1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fowers, 2015; Okrent, 2007). I rely on the latter arguments without rehearsing them here.

I also recognize that each of the particular claims I make about one feature or another of this presumed shared human nature is defeasible both theoretically and empirically. So, I am going out on a somewhat slender limb here, and each of you can decide whether to saw it off. I can only hope that my discussion will be sufficiently interesting and compelling to encourage you to make the journey with me before making a decision about my argument. I believe the payoff for this journey is substantial because, if I am on the right track, the better we understand the features of the moral psychology I describe, the more plausible it is that we

could work toward a better form of politics through a conception of *politikē philia*. That is an outcome well worth pursuing.

In all, I will address five features of human psychology that can scaffold *politikē philia* and discuss the ways in which these features of can go awry and undermine the possibility of *politikē philia*. All five features are well-documented empirically. There are four important obstacles to the overall moral psychology I present. First, four of the five features of this psychology are virtually always portrayed in amoral terms in the scientific literature. This follows from the traditional fact-value dichotomy so prevalent in psychology and other social sciences. Although I cannot argue the point here, I see this as a false dichotomy and point the skeptical reader to arguments against the fact-value dichotomy by well-regarded philosophers and psychologists (Bruner, 1990; Cushman, 1990; Dewey, 1926; Fowers, 2015; MacIntyre, 1959; Putnam, 2004; Taylor, 1985, 1989; Searle, 1964). The breadth and quality of this scholarship questioning the fact-value dichotomy indicates that it is quite defeasible and far short of an insurmountable obstacle.

If we accept the idea that psychology has the sort of moral dimension in which it can be intentionally and systematically directed toward the social good, a second difficulty arises. All five features I describe have the potential to improve individual lives and foster a better social world, but they can also lead to deleterious outcomes individually and socially. That is, the features of a *politikē philia* moral psychology can be activated for good ends (community enhancing, humanity expanding) or bad ends (domination, exploitation, needless violence). Indeed, a primary reason that contemporary politics is so fraught is that the features of human nature I describe here can be and frequently are recruited for bad ends. I recognize that

defining good and bad ends is far from simple, but I focus on what I take to be clear examples of worthwhile and destructive ends to clarify the alternatives. The more difficult cases must be addressed elsewhere.

The third obstacle to my project is that it is vulnerable to being or becoming moralistic. The primary argument against this worry is that the ethic I am describing is not based on imperatives and it is open-ended rather than absolute. Aristotelian ethics, as I understand it, focus on how to live well by acting in the best possible ways rather than following a set of rules or obligations. Therefore, when people act in ways that undermines the quality of their own lives, this may be a matter of concern, but it is not an invitation for a judgmental or self-righteous response. My view is that judgmental and self-righteous stances undermine one's own welfare and are therefore undesirable (Fowers, 2005). When someone acts in a way that is harmful to others, this harm should be minimized and, in the most serious cases, punished. On most accounts, however, the problem of moralism does not apply to harmful actions.

Finally, a morality built on scientifically documented features of human nature runs the risk of reducing morality to deterministic processes that can be traced ultimately to causal genetic and environmental forces. I have argued at length elsewhere that such a reductionism is neither desirable nor possible for human morality (Fowers, 2015), so I will not repeat that argument here.

### **A Moderate Version of Civic Friendship**

The first point to make in favor of *politikē philia* is to reconsider Aristotle's term *philia*, which is typically, but erroneously translated as friendship. The historian Konstans (1997) clarifies that the verb *philein* "signifies various kinds of love and affection, and the abstract

noun *philia*...has much the same scope as the verb” (p. 56). In contrast, the term *philos*, when used in the substantive, signifies friend. If we think of *philia* as loving or affectionate relationships, then that term can be broad enough to encompass family members and fellow citizens. Of course, most of us can think of fellow citizens for whom we hold no affection and might even consider enemies or anathema to a society. So, thinking of affectionate relationships with fellow citizens would be, at best, an ideal state of affairs, but it is one that can be imagined. One of the arguments against *politikē philia* is that it is absurd to think of having real friendships with everyone in a contemporary nation-state or large city. A moderate form of *politikē philia* dials back the required level of emotional connection between fellow citizens to a mild affection, which makes *politikē philia* conceivable and psychologically realistic.

Aristotle (1984) speaks of *politikē philia* in the context of *homonoia* (community or like-mindedness), the common good, and civic justice (1167b 2-4, 1242a 7-13). He famously sees humans as political animals who come together with those “akin” to them. Therefore, the substance and aim of *politikē philia* is the cultivation of community and civic justice rather than deep friendship. Terms like trust, cooperation, respect, reciprocal reliability, and common good describe the workings of *politikē philia*.

*Politikē philia* cannot be conflated with virtue friendship because any civic association will inevitably include people with a wide range of character. Some citizens will be virtuous, and they will undoubtedly participate in the life of the community in more worthy ways than citizens with more dubious characters. Some degree of moral excellence in the community is necessary to pursue justice and other common purposes. Moreover, if vice is widespread or

highly influential, it is destructive of community. So, there is a tension between the character heterogeneity of any sizable polity and its capacity to foster just relations and common ends.

It is also important to recognize that *politikē philia* does not have a feature considered essential to contemporary friendship: the deeply personal connections of intimate knowledge and emotional closeness (Schwarzenbach, 1996). *Politikē philia* is more the recognition of membership in a large group that affects every individual's prospects and in which everyone has common interests. Membership in the group entails following basic norms and expectations that make communal life possible. The connection among citizens is more a matter of general concern for one another's welfare than of personal closeness or intimate involvement in that welfare.

There are three central features of *politikē philia*: well-wishing, reciprocity, and awareness (Irerra, 2005). The common interest in a well-functioning polity is an important basis for a key feature of *politikē philia*: well-wishing (*eunoia*). Fellow citizens wish one another well in many ways, such as in health, prosperity, and safety. Fellow citizens can be expected to make common cause to increase the overall welfare of the community and to have the compassion to support societal and political efforts to ameliorate harms or misfortunes for fellow citizens. This well-wishing and acting on others' behalf is reciprocal. Finally, the mutual awareness of this good will and reciprocity is necessary to see one another as fellow citizens and to recognize the common ground shared in the polity.

### **A Moral Psychology for Civic Friendship**

The primary question I want to focus on in this talk is whether there is a credible moral psychology that can underwrite *politikē philia*. I explore this possibility under the three

headings for *politikē philia* already cited: goodwill, reciprocity, and mutual awareness. If there are human inclinations supportive of these aspects of *politikē philia*, then it is a psychologically realistic possibility, and this moral psychology can indicate how these psychological features can be marshalled to improve the fragmented politics of Western nations.

### **Goodwill**

It is important to remember that goodwill includes both well-wishing and well-doing on behalf of others. Although there has been an inordinately consistent theorizing of a fundamental egocentricity among psychological scientists for at least the last century, it is obvious that people exercise goodwill toward family members, friends, and others with whom one has a personal relationship. The common wisdom is that as ties to others become more distant, the efforts one will willingly undertake for their sakes diminish. But how steep is the diminishment of goodwill as emotional distance increases?

A groundswell of interest in and findings on a more general inclination to do well by others, even strangers, has emerged in the last decade or so in psychology. The common assumption of egocentricity has been repeatedly challenged in laboratory and field experiments (e.g., Dunn, Aknin & Norton, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007), as well as in single timepoint (e.g., Le et al. 2013), longitudinal (e.g., Crocker Canevello, Breines, & Flynn, 2010), and international survey studies (e.g., Aknin et al., 2013). These literatures have inspired several recent, in-depth theoretical syntheses that suggest that humans are *instinctually* prosocial (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & Saturn, 2014; Mikulincer & Snyder, 2010) or have “otherish motivation” (Crocker, Canevello, & Brown, 2017). None of the proponents of human prosociality deny that some behavior is egocentrically motivated. There is very good evidence, however, that there



are at least two generic forms of motivation and other-benefit may be as common a motivator as self-benefit. It is even beyond reasonable doubt that individuals are likely to provide at least mildly costly benefits to strangers in one-time interactions. So, the reach of prosociality is very broad.

It is important to note that benefiting strangers in one-time interactions is tenuous, in that relatively minor environmental factors or aspects of the stranger can either strengthen or reduce the likelihood of a prosocial response. This is to be expected, with stronger relationship ties supporting more reliable and extensive other-benefiting behavior, and weaker connections being more vulnerable to disruption.

This makes it clear that goodwill is a genuine possibility for humans, with stronger ties and clearer environmental supports eliciting more goodwill. The vulnerability of prosocial behavior outside close relationships places a limit on goodwill, but environmental factors can also be recruited to enhance goodwill within a polity. The experimental literature on helping behavior has abundant examples of situational factors that could be recruited to increase prosocial behavior, such as good mood, feelings of gratitude, and the gravity of the situation, and the energy commitment of helping (Lefevor, Fowers, Ahn, Lang, & Cohen, 2017).

A major factor influencing prosocial behavior is related to whether the other person is seen as a member of the ingroup or outgroup. As Hogg (2004) put it, “social categorization...produces ingroup identification, a sense of belonging, self-definition in group terms, and ingroup loyalty and favoritism” (p. 209). This social categorization is an automatic, fast, and repetitive division of the social world into ingroups and outgroups. This differentiation elicits a positive disposition toward ingroup members, encompassing trust, liking, empathy, and

cooperative inclinations. In contrast, people approach outgroup members with wariness (Brewer & Yuki, 2007). These effects are evident in scores of studies that use the “minimal group paradigm” in which participants are cued to social groupings that are often extremely minor (the other person has the same or a different college major) or arbitrary (told they like the same kind of paintings or a different kind as another person).

Social categorization is, in some ways, a major impediment to *politikē philia*.

Accordingly, a common political strategy is to use “wedge issues” to divide a polity in ways favorable to the candidacy or policy of a politician or political party. “Identity politics” can also divide individuals, as can rhetoric and policies related to immigration. Polities can be subdivided in many ways, creating ingroup cohesion and affection as well as outgroup suspicion.

It is important to correct a common misperception about reactions to those perceived to be in an outgroup. Although some authors contend that outgroups automatically activate hostility and conflict (Kurzban & Leary, 2001), this viewpoint is problematic both theoretically and empirically. If outgroup hostility is automatic, then humans would be in perpetual conflict and hostility, a state that is psychologically and physically damaging and therefore generally unsustainable. In addition, the ingroup/outgroup distinction is malleable, and the boundary can be altered relatively easily.

Empirically, a large meta-analytic review suggested that simple contact reduces intergroup wariness and distrust (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), and another major meta-analysis found that intergroup friendships render attitudes and emotions toward outgroups more positive (Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011). In addition, Stürmer and Snyder (2010) conducted a series of studies indicating that although individuals helped ingroup

members more, they were willing to help outgroup members if it was beneficial to the participant.

It is true that hostility and conflict can arise in outgroup relations, but how does the automatic response of mere wariness escalate to hostilities? The basic answer is that when the outgroup is seen as a rival for important resources, conflict and even violence become much more likely (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011; Leach et al., 2003). In extreme cases, typical prohibitions against ingroup aggression may be de-activated in intergroup competition. In these instances, aggression may be encouraged, rewarded, and required by the ingroup, if group interests are threatened (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006).

The complementary dangers of categorizing other members of a polity as outgroup members and of treating them as rivals toward whom hostility and aggression make sense are ever present. This possibility is frequently exploited by politicians, particularly demagogues. Counteracting divisive messaging is difficult and requires ongoing efforts at knitting groups together under a common cause and shared humanity.

The good news is that counteracting factionalization can be done because human evolution did not specify where the ingroup/outgroup boundary must be drawn. The placement of the boundary is determined through social interactions and decisions that identify what it means to belong to the group. The ingroup could be one's clan, city, region, nation, or continent or one can even identify with humanity as a whole. By defining the ingroup to include an entire polity, *politikē philia* can be fostered, and this can be accomplished through intelligent policy and strong citizenship. Common aims can partly define a polity. Common aims are not only material; they can be abstract or symbolic (e.g., equal treatment before the law). Thus, we

can be inspired to common action by visionary leaders, but problematic visions can also sway a community. I have more to say on common aims later.

## **Reciprocity**

Humans have very strong species-specific inclinations toward reciprocity, even toward cooperation (Canevello & Crocker, 2010; Gray, Ward, Norton, 2014). This is one of the most well-established human adaptations, and our species is, in some respects, the most cooperative on the planet. Extensive research has documented the human inclination toward cooperation (e.g., Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007). Cooperation occurs over significant timespans because humans can track benefits given and received temporally and people cooperate in small and large groups. Within ingroups, cooperation is more common than competition because cooperation tends to benefit everyone involved and provide goods that may not be available without it. For example, individuals who trade goods are better off because they can obtain something they do not have in exchange for something they have too much of. Cooperation is also necessary for large-scale projects and for mutual defense and security. Cooperation is so pervasive in human society that it is easily overlooked, but, on reflection, it is clear that virtually everything a person does involves extensive cooperation (e.g., language use, traffic, and market transactions).

The downside of cooperation is that it can be exploited. The simplest model of cooperation is that A provides a benefit to B with the understanding that B will benefit A later. The time frame for this exchange varies, of course, but even in a relatively immediate exchange, B can refuse to reciprocate. For this reason, the evolution of cooperation included a cheater detection system that identifies people who are likely cooperators and those who are likely

exploiters (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). It is not perfect, but it helps to protect individuals from exploitation (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). Cheater detection can occur through directly observing someone's untrustworthiness or through a reputation for cheating. Research suggests that a large majority of humans tend toward cooperation, with smaller groups who are either opportunistically or dispositionally exploitive (e.g., Brunell et al., 2013; Van Lange, 1999).

Thus, reciprocity and cooperation are baseline proclivities of most people and are generally beneficial. The willingness to benefit others reciprocally is moderated by social categorization and trust. Cooperation is less likely with people identified as outgroup members, but it can still occur if it appears beneficial, whereas cooperation is the default mode within an ingroup. In addition, distrust can be sown in a group such that it seems unlikely that others will be genuinely cooperative. Distrust can emerge from the presence of many exploiters or from high profile exploitation. Distrust can also be cultivated by influential sources such as the media, politicians, scientists, or other professionals who claim that humans are characterized by egocentricity, competitiveness, and untrustworthiness. For example, the prevalent ideology of individualism in psychology and other social sciences encourages this desultory perception of humans and undermines the well-established proclivity toward cooperation (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). As Crocker et al. (2017) put it, "research plumbing selfish motivations is far scarcer than research plumbing motivations for giving" (p. 313).

Just because cooperation is often individually and socially beneficial does not mean that cooperation is always recruited for good ends. Criminals, slavers, and hate-mongers often cooperate to further their ends. Unwitting or inattentive citizens are frequently induced to cooperate with problematic ends by their leaders or governments as well. Thus, cooperation

and reciprocity are good if they are enacted in the service of good ends, but not when they promote bad ends.

### **Awareness**

The third aspect of *politikē philia* is that participants are aware of the goodwill and reciprocity that they and the other citizens enact. That is, goodwill and reciprocity are intentionally and consciously performed. A very important evolved characteristic makes this awareness possible. It is the exquisite human capacity to recognize and follow social norms. Humans are extremely sensitive to the norms that govern social interactions and demonstrate powerful conformist tendencies (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). The responsiveness to norms is a key aspect of the human need to belong to a group, with norm vigilance serving to keep the individual in others' social graces sufficiently to engender inclusion and approval (Heatherton, 2010; Williams, 2007). Goodwill and reciprocity are frequently embedded in social norms, both in conventional etiquette and in formal rules and laws.

Social norms are maintained by interpersonal surveillance and enforcement of those expectations (Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). Members of social groups pay close attention to one another's actions and the indicators of norm adherence. Two enforcement procedures exemplify this. First, reputation is extremely important as social rewards are strongly conditioned by one's reputation. Status rewards are especially dependent on reputation (McAndrew, 2002). In addition to direct observation, reputation is influenced strongly by gossip, a universal human practice (Boehm, 2000). Members of groups discuss third parties' actions frequently to keep up to date about one another's behavior and standing in the group. This gossip includes both reputation enhancing

and detracting information. Gossip is also an important source of information that guides decisions about cooperation. Someone with a reputation for exploitation is often excluded from cooperative activity because the agent wants to avoid being exploited.

The second enforcement practice is called third-party punishment. Individuals who violate social expectations can be sanctioned directly by the person against whom they have transgressed (e.g., through exploitation or aggression), but they are also often punished by third parties, even if that third party has no direct stake in the norm violation. There is ample experimental evidence of third party punishment (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gaechter, 2002). Another form of evidence comes from contemporary hunter-gatherer groups. One of the most common norms in these groups is an egalitarian social hierarchy (Boehm, 2000). In these groups, no one is allowed to give others orders or to direct the group toward specific goals. All activity is voluntary and collective activity is arranged through consensus rather than directive leadership. When someone violates this norm by assuming a hierarchical superiority, members of the band punish that person to terminate the hierarchical behavior (Weissner, 2005). This punishment is generally delivered by multiple band members, virtually always including individuals whom the transgressor did not attempt to dominate. Punishment is usually mild, beginning with humor or verbal criticism, but it does occasionally escalate to violence if the transgressor persists in dominance behavior (Weissner, 2005).

This power of social norms to shape behavior and elicit conformity can be problematic as well. Social norm compliance can stultify a group and reduce its ability to detect and accept innovations and adjustments to changes in circumstances. In addition, the norms themselves

can be problematic. Just because a group has established expectations for members' behavior does not mean that those norms are beneficial. Finally, social norms are, by design, exclusionary and may contribute to excluding individuals and subgroups from a polity, thereby reducing solidarity and *politikē philia*. When people do not follow established norms, it creates tension and discomfort in the group, which can lead to exclusion even if the norm violations are appropriate or even salutary.

### **Conclusion**

In this paper, I have discussed a set of well-established, evolved human characteristics that I believe form the basis for a moral psychology of *politikē philia*. I have followed Schwarzenbach (1996) and Irerra's (2005) interpretation of Aristotle by defining the primary features of *politikē philia* as goodwill, reciprocity, and mutual awareness of those processes. General human prosociality and the powerful prosocial tendencies toward ingroup individuals underwrite the well-wishing and well-doing on behalf of other members of the polity. This prosociality is frequently impersonal in that it does not depend on a prior personal relationship or obligation. Prosociality is frequently a response to demonstrated need or vulnerability (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005) or to stereotypical features of membership in the same group (Brewer, 2008). Humans have a very strong inclination toward mutualism or cooperation, which encourages reciprocal relations. Most individuals will respond positively toward someone who benefits them in some way. The cheater detection system evolved to prevent cooperators from being exploited rampantly by individuals who are willing to do so. Finally, awareness of goodwill and reciprocity processes is a clear human characteristic, as seen



in ubiquitous social norm maintenance through mutual surveillance and accountability in human groups.

I have also described how each of these features of a species specific moral psychology can go awry, clarifying that they do not guarantee *politikē philia* in any group. The proclivities are available and can be recruited toward developing strong social solidarity and an awareness of common ground. But this raises the question of why any individuals or groups *would* recruit this set of political inclinations in the service of *politikē philia*. Why would anyone choose to pursue *politikē philia* instead of individual or factional advantage, both of which are also possible given the moral psychology I have described?

I believe the answer to this question requires adding a fourth feature to the definition of *politikē philia* that highlights the important human capacity for forging common purposes. It is abundantly clear that human beings are goal seeking creatures (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), but discussions of goal pursuit are too often limited to portrayals of individual goal seeking. Humans also frequently pursue joint goals and shared goals (Fowers, 2005). A joint goal is one that an individual could, in principle, pursue on their own, but they believe that they will be more successful if they work together. People form partnerships to build a business and parents often work together to raise children. Pursuing these goals as joint projects frequently contributes to greater success even though a sole proprietorship or a single parent can also successfully achieve those goals. Well-functioning partnerships can accelerate or enrich goal achievement, but when the individuals cannot work well together, pursuing the end as an individual goal may actually be a better option.

A shared goal is one that cannot be pursued or achieved by any individual (Fowers, 2005). There are many prominent and vital shared goals, which include friendship, justice, and democracy. One can only achieve a friendship through acting in concert with friends because friendships emerge in the interactions of individuals over time. Similarly, justice and democracy are group-level phenomena that are emergent features of a group rather than individual possessions. No one can have any of these shared goals independently. Moreover, this kind of goal is defined such that one person cannot have more friendship, justice, or democracy than the other participants. To the degree that these goals are not fully shared, they do not exist.

The moral psychology for shared goals begins in the capacity of infants to share attention toward objects and events with others (Feldman, 2007; Moll & Tomasello, 2004). This shared attention develops into shared intentionality (Burkart, Hrdy, & van Schaik, 2009; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) as toddlers develop the ability to coordinate their actions with others to pursue various goals, from shared play (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007) to coordinated manipulation of objects (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006) to pursuit of longer-term more complex goals (Fowers, 2015; Tomasello et al., 2005). The capacity for shared activity in pursuit of complex, shared goals is evident in human endeavors in the material realm, such as building Stonehenge or sending probes to Mars and in more abstract pursuits such as cultivating a just society. Human beings have the capacity to imagine and pursue goals that transcend the capacity of any individual and to coordinate our actions in ways that mesh our efforts in teamwork that can encompass very large groups of people.

Of course, the awareness of goodwill and reciprocity take us part of the way to the concept of *politikē philia* as a shared goal, but awareness of the processes that help to

constitute the overall project of *politikē philia* is not the same thing as an awareness of the overall project itself or of the inherent worth of *politikē philia*. Mutual knowledge and valuing of *politikē philia* is necessary to properly recruit the characteristics of human moral psychology that enable the development of the social solidarity and common purposes that fully constitute *politikē philia*.

It is important to recognize, however, that the fact that a goal is shared does not make the goal good. History is replete with examples of shared goals that are manifestly bad, including fraud, genocides, and the social practices of slavery. This means that reflection on what is taken to be the good is also a necessary activity because there is no determinate ultimate good for human beings. That makes the process of cultivating and maintaining a *politikē philia* open-ended because its guiding aims are never finally defined or achieved. This open-endedness can be disconcerting, but it clarifies a basic reason that human politics can never be reduced to a causally deterministic set of laws. The guiding ends of *politikē philia* are a product of deliberative agents who live and act in complex systems that defy reductionism.

Therefore, I am suggesting that *politikē philia* can and should be an intentional and conscious goal for people in free societies. By making this an explicit goal and indicating how humans are, to some degree, naturally inclined toward this end, I am suggesting that *politikē philia* is a good that is natural to humans. It is a precarious good, one that must be avidly and self-consciously pursued and protected from the many ways that polities can go wrong. But it is a beautiful good that can inspire a polity to greatness.

## References

- Aknin, L. B., Barrington-Leigh, C.P., Dunn, E.W., Helliwell, J.F., Burns, J., et al. (2013). Prosocial spending and wellbeing: Cross-cultural evidence for a psychological universal. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 104(4), 635–52.
- Aristotle (1984). *The complete works of Aristotle, Vol. 2.* (J. Barnes, Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Arnhart, L. (1998). *Darwinian natural right: The biological ethics of human nature.* Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2006). Parochial altruism in humans. *Nature*, 442, 912-915.
- Boehm, C. (2000). Conflict and the evolution of social control. *Journal of Consciousness studies*, 7, 79-101.
- Brewer, M. B. (2008). Depersonalized trust and ingroup cooperation. In J. I. Krueger (Ed.), *Rationality and social responsibility* (pp. 215-232). New York: Psychology Press.
- Brewer, M. B., & Yuki, M. (2007). Culture and social identity. In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), *Handbook of cultural psychology* (pp. 307-322). New York: Guilford.
- Brunell, A. B., Davis, M. S., Schley, D.R., Eng, A. L., van Dulmen, M. H. M., et al. (2013). A new measure of interpersonal exploitativeness. *Frontiers of Psychology*, 4, 299.
- Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of meaning.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burkart, J. M., Hrdy, S. B., & van Schaik, C. P. (2009). Cooperative breeding and human cognitive evolution. *Evolutionary Anthropology*, 18, 175–186.

- Canevello, A., & Crocker, J. (2010). Creating good relationships: Responsiveness, relationship quality, and interpersonal goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99, 78–106.
- Cikara, M., Botvinick, M. M. , & Fiske, S. T. (2011). Us versus them: Social identity shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm. *Psychological Science*, 22, 306-313.
- Cohen, T. R., Montoya, R. M., & Insko, C. A. (2006). Group morality and intergroup relations: cross-cultural and experimental evidence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32, 1559-1572.
- Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), *The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture* (pp. 163-228). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Crocker, J., Canevello, A., Breines, J. G., Flynn, H. (2010). Interpersonal goals and change in anxiety and dysphoria in first-semester college students. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98,1009–24.
- Crocker, J., Canevello, A., & Brown, A. A. (2017). Social motivation: Costs and benefits of selfishness and otherishness. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 68, 299-325.  
doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044145
- Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty. *American Psychologist*, 45, 599-611.
- Davies, K., Tropp, L. R., Aron, A., Pettigrew, T. F., & Wright, G. F. (2011). Cross-group friendships and intergroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 15, 332-351.
- Dewey, J. (1926). *Experience and nature*. LaSalle, Ind.: Open Court.

- Dreyfus, H. (1987). Beyond hermeneutics. In M. Gibbons (Ed.), *Interpreting politics*, (pp. 203-220). Washington Square, NY: New York University Press.
- Dunn, E. W., Aknin, L. B., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Spending money on others promotes happiness. *Science*, *319*(5870), 1687-1688. doi:10.1126/science.1150952
- Eccles, J. S. & Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational, beliefs, values, and goals. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *53*, 109-132.
- Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, *25*, 63-87.
- Fehr, E. & Gaechter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. *Nature*, *415*, 137-140.
- Feldman, R. (2007). Parent-infant synchrony: Biological foundations and developmental outcomes. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *16*, 340-345.
- Fowers, B. J. (2005). *Virtue and psychology: Pursuing excellence in ordinary practices*. Washington, DC: APA Press.
- Fowers, B. J. (2015). *The evolution of ethics: Human sociality and the emergence of ethical mindedness*. London, England: Palgrave/McMillan.
- Gergen, K. J. (2011). *Relational being: Beyond self and community*. London, England: Oxford University Press.
- Gray, K., Ward, A. F., Norton, M. I. (2014). Paying it forward: Generalized reciprocity and the limits of generosity. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *143*, 247–254.
- Heatheron, T. F. (2010). Building a social brain. In P. A. Lorenz-Reuter, K. Baynes, & G. R. Mangun, *Cognitive neuroscience of mind: A tribute to Michael S. Gazzaniga* (pp. 173-188). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Henrich, N., & Henrich, J. (2007). *Why humans cooperate: A cultural and evolutionary explanation*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Hogg, M. A. (2004). Social categorization, depersonalization, and group behavior. In M. B. Brewer & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *Self and social identity* (pp. 203-231). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Irrera, E. (2005). Between advantage and virtue: Aristotle's political theory of friendship. *History of Political Thought*, 26, 565-585.
- Keltner, D., Kogan, A., Piff, P. K., & Saturn, S. R. (2014). The sociocultural appraisals, values, and emotions (SAVE) framework of prosociality: Core processes from gene to meme. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 65, 425–460. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115054
- Konstan, D. (1997). *Friendship in the classical world*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Kurzban, R. & Leary, M. R. (2001). Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: The functions of social exclusion. *Psychological Bulletin*, 127, 187-208.
- Le, B. M., Impett, E. A., Kogan, A., Webster, G. D., Cheng, C. (2013). The personal and interpersonal rewards of communal orientation. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 30, 694–710.
- Leach, C. W., Spears, R., Decety, Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (2003). Malicious pleasure: Schadenfruede at the suffering of another group. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 932-943.
- Lefevor, G. T., Fowers, B. J., Ahn, S., Lang, S. F., & Cohen, L. M. (2017). To what degree do situational influences explain spontaneous helping behaviour? A meta-analysis.

*European Review of Social Psychology*, 28, 227-256.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2017.1367529>

MacIntyre, A. C. (1959). Hume on “Is” and “Ought”. *The Philosophical Review*, 68, 451-468.

McAndrew, F. T. (2002). New evolutionary perspectives on altruism: Multilevel-selection and costly-signaling theories. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 11, 79–82.

Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2010). *Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature*. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.

doi:10.1037/12061-000

Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2004). 12- and 18-month-old infants follow gaze to spaces behind barriers. *Developmental Science*, 7, F1-F9.

Okrent, M. (2007). *Rational animals: The teleological roots of intentionality*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: multilevel perspectives. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 56, 365-392. doi:

10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070141

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, 751-783.

Putnam, H. (2004). *The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Richardson, F. C., Fowers, B. J., & Guignon, C. (1999). *Re-envisioning psychology: Moral dimensions of theory and practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.



- Schmidt, F. M. H., Rakoczy, H., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Young children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language. *Developmental Science*, 14, 530-539.
- Schwarzenbach, S. A. (1996). On civic friendship. *Ethics*, 107, 97-128.
- Searle, J. (1964). How to derive "ought" from "is". *The Philosophical Review*, 73, 43-58.
- Stürmer, S., & Snyder, M. (2010). Helping "us" versus "them": Towards a group-level theory of helping and altruism within and across group boundaries. In *The psychology of prosocial behavior: Group process, intergroup relations, and helping*. S. Stürmer & M. Snyder (Eds.), (pp. 33-58). New York: Wiley/Blackwell.
- Taylor, C. (1985). *Philosophy and the human sciences: Philosophical papers*, (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of the self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural origins. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 28, 675-735.
- Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77(2), 337–349. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.337
- Warneken, F., Chen, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Cooperative activities in young children and chimpanzees. *Child Development*, 77, 640-643.
- Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. *Science*, 311, 1301-1303.

Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Helping and cooperation at 14 months of age. *Infancy, 11*, 371-294.

Wedekind, C., Milinski, M. (2000). Cooperation through image scoring in humans. *Science, 288*, 850–852.

Weissner, P. (2005). Norm enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen. *Human Nature, 16*, 115-145.

West, S. A., Griffin, A. S., & Gardner, A. (2007). Evolutionary explanations for cooperation. *Current Biology, 17*, R661-R672.

Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism. *Annual Review of Psychology, 58*, 425-452.