A Theoretical Review of Ten Discourses on Emotion Education: Hopeful Convergence or Hopeless Divergence?

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Abstract

This article subjects to critical scrutiny ten different discourses on emotion education: Aristotelian character education; Confucianism; Care ethics; Utilitarianism; Social and emotional learning; Positive psychology; Self-esteem discourse; Emotion-regulation discourse; Academic-emotions discourse; and Social intuitionism. Four differential criteria are used to analyze the content of the discourses: valence of emotions to be educated; value epistemology; general aims of emotion education; and self-related goals. Possible criticisms of all the discourses are presented. Subsequently, seven strategies of emotion education (behavioral strategies; ethos modification and emotion contagion; cognitive reframing; service learning/habituation; direct teaching; role modelling; and the arts) are introduced to explore how the ten discourses avail themselves of each strategy. It is argued that there is considerably more convergence in the educational strategies than there is in the theoretical underpinnings and assumptions of the ten discourses. Profound divergence of opinion is, therefore, bound to remain at the psychological and philosophical level.

Keywords: emotion education, self-goals, moral vs. non-moral aims, value epistemology, classroom strategies

Introduction

It has become almost a truism to say that the tide has turned in education circles from seeing emotions as interlopers in the realm of reason, and intruders in classrooms, towards acknowledging their role in the wellbeing of students – be that "wellbeing" understood in *psychological* (subjective wellbeing, psychological health), *moral* (flourishing, character cultivation) or pure *educational* (effective learning, grade attainment) terms (Shuman & Scherer, 2014). How quickly this shift has occurred can best be seen from an overview article, written as late as 1988, in which the author saw no sign of the "myth" of emotions as educational trespassers letting go, and deemed the emotional aspect of education "largely ignored" (Best, 1988, pp. 239, 245).[1] Rather than conceptualizing this as a single "affective shift," it may be helpful to think of multiple shifts having occurred at about the same time. For example, in the field of moral education, the prominent status of Kohlberg's (1981) developmental paradigm – foregrounding emotionally disengaged, rational capacities – crumbled, as a serious shortfall was found between reasoning faculties and actual moral behavior (Blasi, 1980; Carr, 2005). Instead, emotion came to be seen as implicated in moral functioning at all levels of engagement, even constituting the core of moral character or selfhood (Kristjánsson, 2010a). Similar seismic shifts have taken place in the psychology of wellbeing (Fredrickson, 2009) and of learning (Schutz & Pekrun, 2007).[2] The aim of this review article, which will be explained in more detail in the following section, is to explore (a) the theoretical undercurrents of those shifts, and (b) their education-psychological implications for classroom practice.

The ideal of the purely rational educational subject has been caricatured over the centuries in works such as Dickens's *Hard Times*, in which the tragicomic Thomas Gradgrind preached that everything apart from hard facts should be rooted out from students' minds, and Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, in which mystical creatures called the Houyhnhnms prescribed an approach based on pure reason, unobscured by emotion (see Best, 1999, and Dixon, 2012, for rehearsals). Historically,

[1] More specifically, the "myth" identified by Best has to do with an alleged strict division of the human mind into the cognitive and the affective (1988, p. 241).

[2] Despite these "seismic shifts," considerable part of the current emotion-education literature still focuses on emotions as disruptive and detrimental to learning (e.g. as sources of anxiety, confusion, or boredom), see various chapters in Part II of Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia's (2014) edited *Handbook*.

educational romanticism has provided an antidote to such rationalist aridity (Bantock, 1986). However, the recent "affective" turn in education is typically viewed not as a new incarnation of romanticism, but rather as a middle-ground position which allocates a proper role to emotions without giving them undue priority (Shuman & Scherer, 2014). Yet some theorists worry that the pendulum has already swung too far away from reason (Kristjánsson, 2016).

Strikingly, the "old" view of emotions as disruptive forces still looms large in the public consciousness. Terms such as "emotion regulation" or "emotional control" – common currency in education-psychological discourse – seem to carry connotations of "suppression" or "policing," for lay people at least. For example, when introducing the terms to first-year education-psychology students or teacher trainees, it takes a while for them to realize that those terms are meant to be neutral with regard to whether or not a given emotion is to be discouraged or encouraged: an issue that remains to be established in each particular case. Students' initial understanding of "regulation" here (probably reflecting everyday usage) has to do with mitigating emotional reactions and blunting untamed impulses; it is quite a revelation for them that effective regulation may in some cases call for the refinement of emotion or even its ebullition (see Bantock, 1986). Images such as Plato's famous charioteer–horse metaphor, of the ideal relationship between reason and emotion, may be so deeply ingrained in our psyches that shaking them off requires nothing less than a gestalt-switch.

An initial cursory glance at the rapidly growing literature on emotions and education reveals three conspicuous features. Firstly, it is incredibly disparate, representing a large variety of general stances, familiar from emotion theory, on the psychological status of emotions and their putative role in educational practice – but sometimes eliding any general stances. Although Ryther (2016) observed that the "ideal-image of pedagogically desired emotions seems almost so obvious as not to require specification," there is surprising difference of opinion on that very issue. Dunlop lamented a long time ago that there is "no unique and objectively identifiable thing known as 'The Education of the Emotions'" – with conceptualizations running rampant (1986, p. 152).

Secondly, the literature is, barring a few exceptions (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005; 2007; Elias, Kranzler, Parker, Kash, & Weissberg, 2014), non-transdisciplinary. By "non-transdisciplinary" I am

not only referring to disciplines of psychology, philosophy, sociology, and education – all represented in the field – but also to narrower discursive traditions within those disciplines. Neither of those inter-and-intra-disciplinary chasms tends to be crossed.[3] Bucking the trend, the present inquiry will be unapologetically transdisciplinary, as that is, arguably, the only way to secure a comprehensive view of the field and enable possible cross-fertilizations.

Thirdly, the literature is characterized by an imbalance between theory and practice, both in that the latter tends to be under-explored, and in that the relationship between the two is rarely spelled out clearly. Elias and colleagues argued that approaches "have come to differ more in practice than in their deeper conceptualizations" (2014, p. 272). In contrast, I see in the literature more relative harmony in the advice on classroom strategies than there is in the theoretical underpinnings (see the section "Strategies of Emotion Education" below).

Aims and Method

The original practical aim behind this study was to give a relative newcomer to the field (say, a teacher with a new-found interest in emotion education, a teacher-trainee, or a student of educational psychology) a sweeping but critical overview of the academic landscape, catching within its net all relevant approaches to classroom strategies for cultivating or managing emotion, with a special focus on their theoretical underpinnings. The second and more academically motivated aim, which gradually developed, was to explore the question of whether the great diversity of discourses in the field is symptomatic of a hopeless divergence or points in the direction of hopeful convergence. I return to that question in the concluding section.

I began with a broad search in Google Scholar, using the search terms "emotion" and "education," limited to publications from 2000 to the present day. From my previous forays into this

[3] The article by Elias and colleagues (2014) is slightly tangential to the aims of the present article as it purports to synthesize three accounts of values education, in general, rather than three emotion discourses, in particular. Maxwell and Reichenbach's (2007) aspiration in identifying the (five) different theoretical affinities of (four) strategies of emotion education comes closest to the aims of the present inquiry, and is the most explicitly transdisciplinary of the studies identified in the literature search.

territory (see e.g. Kristjánsson, 2010b), I expected the publications to bundle together under 7–8 different themes, coinciding with well-rehearsed discursive traditions. An initial content analysis of the first 250 entries, however, revealed greater diversity than anticipated. More specifically, it identified *thirteen* discourses, each with its own common assumptions and canonical writings.[4]

I decided to eschew three of those discourses for the following reasons. (1) A large discourse was identified on the educational relevance of the "emotional labor" of teachers and educational leaders. As the literature on the emotions of young people (students) is already difficult enough to cover in a single article, and because useful reviews of the emotions of teachers (Sutton & Wheatley, 2003) and educational leaders (Berkowich & Eyal, 2015) already exist, I limited my purview to the young. (2) Abundant literature exists on the essential and invaluable role of empathy in emotional development and education (Hoffman, 2000) – forming a discrete discourse. I circumvent it below, however, both because doubts have been raised about whether empathy is an emotion or a broader psychological capacity (of perspective-taking) underlying an array of emotions, ranging from compassion to schadenfreude (Kristjánsson, 2006, chap. 4), and because once empathy theorists begin to talk about empathy education, the discourse tends to morph subtly into other familiar approaches, such as Care ethics. (3) There is a rapidly growing mountain of literature on poststructuralist approaches to emotions and emotion education. Whereas most discourses take their cue from, or replicate, familiar accounts of the nature of emotion from the general psychological literature, poststructuralists offer a radically heterodox, non-psychological account, according to which emotions "are not internal states," and sources of individual difference, but "are about social life" (Zembylas, 2004, p. 187) – more specifically, about social affordances of power (Boler, 1999). As I find it impossible to do justice to this essentially sociological view and its educational implications – however interesting – under the umbrella of educational psychology, I leave it out of further reckoning here. Apart from the three *general* discourses eschewed, I also omit from the proposed taxonomy various *specific* discourses, for example about the role of emotions in the teaching of particular school subjects (such as emotions in

[4] It is in order to acknowledge here that any such taxonomies are inherently controversial, and another author – starting from the same aims – would probably have elicited a different list of core discourses.

science education, see Sinatra, Broughton, & Lombardi, 2014), and the emotional repercussions of specific features of school experiences (such as test anxiety, see Zeidner, 1998).[5]

This exclusion process left ten discourses[6] that I decided to subject to further scrutiny. Those are: *Aristotelian character education; Confucianism; Care ethics; Utilitarianism; Social and emotional learning; Positive psychology; Self-esteem discourse; Emotion-regulation discourse; Academic-emotions discourse;* and *Social intuitionism* (all addressed in separate sub-sections below). I then went back to Google Scholar and searched for canonical publications representing those discourses. Realizing that many core publications predated the 21st century, I removed the time restrictions. I searched for relevant publications for each discourse separately, continuing to search until I felt that a saturation point had been reached. For reasons of space, I am only able to cite a limited number of canonical/representative writings for each discourse.

The next step was to decide on the theoretical assumptions that would be interrogated within each discourse. I ended up with four – valence of emotions to be educated; epistemological assumptions; general aim of emotion education; self-related goals – as explained in the section "Concepts and Criteria." Following this section, I provide descriptive analyses of each discourse, according to those criteria, along with an overview of common criticisms. Subsequently, I analyze the discourses with respect to seven strategies of emotion education (as explained in the section "Strategies of Emotion Education"), also derived and distilled from the literature search. I conclude with some lessons for the field of educational psychology, learned from this enterprise.

The Elusive Consensus Constituting a "Field"

[5] Failing the test of sufficient generality to constitute a unique discourse on the nature of emotions and emotion education were various other discourses that would have merited attention in an ever broader-brush review, such as about the role of emotions in diverse (e.g. multicultural) classrooms; emotions and educational motivation; emotions and classroom management; emotions related to gender, race, and disability; etc.

[6] I toyed with using the term "paradigms" instead of "discourses" but opted for the latter. Some of the discourses identified scarcely deserve the name "paradigm" as they are not so much united by stable conceptual assumptions as by a common general subject matter. By "discourse" I simply mean here an "identifiable and separable discursive tradition."

In the original Google Scholar search, I had to discard some entries that seemed irrelevant to the field although they contained the search terms "emotion" and "education." This exclusion process offered a reminder that for something to constitute a "field" – in which different discourses can be said to be either "competing" or "complementary" – there must be some initial consensus on subject matter and characterization of the relevant problematics. In order to actualize the aims of the present study, it was necessary to cast the net wide. The general (but most often implicit) assumptions that I looked for when determining that a publication belonged to the field were simply that: (1) emotions matter for student wellbeing and impact the quality of learning; (2) emotions can be developed (taught and/or made to be caught) in educational settings, and it is worth doing so; (3) emotion education is not only about the clampdown of emotion but also about its cultivation. This third assumption is necessary to exclude a Gradgrindian view that acknowledges the need for emotion education but sees it exclusively in terms of reason-governed suppression.

Limitations

The most obvious doubt about the aims of this inquiry is that they are overly broad and ambitious is attempting to handle voluminous bodies of disparate literature and keeping too many plates spinning simultaneously. Each of the discourses explored here would have lent itself to a formidable review of its own, as Hoffman (2009), for example, conducted in the case of Social and emotional learning. I readily acknowledge that the article aims at breadth of insight rather than depth. Although that may give rise to over-simplifications and be considered a limitation, recall that the *practical* aim is to give readers a broad view of the theory and practice of emotion education, in its varied incarnations. The *academic* aim is modest: not to unearth new truths about the different discourses but simply to ask some searching questions about their possible divergence or convergence. To fulfil those two aims, a wide-angle lens is required.

More specific limitations, having to do with confines of space, will be mentioned at various junctures in the text – because of which this article cannot do justice to issues such as (a) the history of emotion education, (b) the psychological development of children's emotions, (c) instruments to

measure emotions, and (d) studies of the effectiveness of specific classroom interventions in emotion education.

Concepts and Criteria

Although it would be presumptuous to suppose that approaches to emotion education are nothing but froth on the surface of deeper theoretical currents, there is good reason to believe that insights from emotion theories inform, to some degree at least, their educational content. If that is the case, the question arises of which concepts and criteria, bequeathed from general emotion theories, we should we use for interrogating the different educational discourses to illuminate their varying assumptions and foci. Below I elaborate on the four I chose, summarized in Table 1 (and one not chosen).

Table 1
Discourses on Emotion Education, Analyzed according to Four Criteria

	Valence of emotions to be educated	*Epistemological assumptions about emotion and value*	*General aim of emotion education*	*Self-related goals/Technologies of selfhood*
Aristotelian character education	Positive and negative (or distinction transcended)	Soft rationalism	Moral: intrinsic	Self-understanding and self-respect
Confucianism	Positive and negative	Soft rationalism	Moral: intrinsic	Self-relations and self-extension
Care ethics	Mainly negative	Soft sentimentalism (or soft rationalism)	Moral: intrinsic and instrumentalist	Self-relations
Utilitarianism	Positive and negative	Soft rationalism	Moral: intrinsic and instrumentalist	Self-gratification
SEL	Mainly positive	Soft sentimentalism (or soft rationalism)	Non-moral and moral: instrumentalist	Self-awareness and self-regulation
Positive psychology	Positive	Soft sentimentalism	Non-moral and moral: instrumentalist	Self-gratification
Self-esteem discourse	Positive	Hard sentimentalism	Non-moral	Self-esteem and self-gratification

Emotion-regulation discourse	Positive and negative	Soft rationalism (or soft sentimentalism)	Non-moral and moral: instrumentalist	Self-regulation
Academic-emotion discourse	Mainly positive	Soft rationalism (or soft sentimentalism)	Non-moral	Self-regulation and self-efficacy
Social intuitionism	Positive and negative	Hard sentimentalism	Non-moral	Self-understanding and self-revisions

The Nature of Emotion and Emotional Valence

Theories on what emotion is are too various to be adequately placed by reference to any single gross distinction (for an overview, see Deonna & Teroni, 2012); indeed, one theorist identified more than 90 different definitions of emotion (Plutchik, 2001). Yet, at the risk of undue simplification, one could argue that two broad and contrasting paradigms inform the field of emotion theory, harking back to the trail-blazing figures of Darwin and Aristotle. According to a Darwinian *physiological* perspective, emotions are understood as natural kinds, residing in the hardware of the human brain. More specifically, they are conceptualized as bodily processes, constituted by certain unique modes of attention, sensation, and expression (especially through characteristic facial features).[7] On an Aristotelian *cognitive* perspective, in contrast, emotions are viewed as *cognitions* (of value); each emotion is taken to have unique representational or propositional features that set it apart.

Both the physiological and cognitive theories are beset with problems. The former have a hard time explaining the epistemic role emotions play in the formation of evaluative reasons (Brady, 2013), as well as how changed beliefs about the world often change emotion. The cognitive theories face the challenge of explaining frequent cases of "recalcitrant emotions": emotions such as fear of common spiders felt in default of a belief that common spiders are harmful.[8] This has led cognitivists to revise their conception of "cognition" from that of a full-blown belief or judgment, endorsed by the agent, to a more free-floating imagining or thought, or even to a perception/construal (Brady, 2013). Cognitive

[7] Some "Darwinians" limit their theories to so-called "basic emotions" (such as fear) and acknowledge the existence of other, cognitively layered, emotions (such as guilt). However, the very idea of "basicness" is a highly contested one in emotion theory (Solomon, 2002).

[8] One possible explanation is that the belief is felt sub-consciously, although it is not consciously endorsed. However, recourse to subconscious beliefs is typically considered in contemporary psychology as a last-ditch resort (Brady, 2013).

theorists are also commonly accused of under-playing the affective side of emotional life: the actual "feel" of the emotion. At all events, whatever theory one subscribes to in the end, it must do justice to the fact that emotions are not mere feelings, but rather have representational content and involve epistemic discrimination and discernment.

Out of the ten discourses under survey here, only two (Aristotelian Character Education and Social Intuitionism) assume a distinct, unambiguous stance on what – fundamentally – an emotion *is*. Because the other discourses disagree extensively in other ways on *why*, *how,* and *which* emotions should be educated, one must conclude that the cognitive–physiological dichotomy is not – somewhat surprisingly perhaps – a crucial differential criterion to account for the varying assumptions of emotion-education discourses.[9] I leave it out of consideration, therefore, except as a background concern, in order to concentrate on another fundamental attribute of emotion that does seem to play a role in setting educational discourses apart: *valence*.

Almost every theorist agrees that emotions essentially include feelings of pleasure and pain. Here a note of warning must be struck, however. It is standard practice in psychology to refer to emotions simply as "positive" (meaning "pleasant") or "negative" (meaning "painful") with respect to their phenomenological valence (for misgivings, see Solomon & Stone, 2002). This often confuses newcomers to the field, for in ordinary language, "positive emotion" seems close to the meaning of "positively evaluated" or even "morally justifiable" emotion. It usually takes a while before students get used to referring to, say, the highly-praised emotion of compassion (pain at another's undeserved misfortune) as "negative," and the much-maligned emotion of schadenfreude (pleasure at another's undeserved misfortune) as "positive." To avoid this clash with linguistic intuitions, I will talk about "positively valenced" and "negatively valenced" emotions when referring to the pain–pleasure

[9] This fact may reflect the way in which views on what an emotion "is" seem to cut across academic disciplines and other theoretical stances. So, although physiological theories are understandably prevalent in biology and cognitive ones in philosophy, psychologists tend to be divided between physiological theories (see e.g. Ekman, 1989) and cognitive theories (see e.g. Lazarus, 1991), or offer views that transcend the distinction between the two.

difference. This distinction does have purchase as a differential variable, and I invoke it for that purpose in the first column of Table 1.

Emotion and Epistemologies of Value

Surely, emotion education can be recommended only to the extent that it is *valuable* (for students), and it is, arguably, valuable to the extent that emotions help students negotiate their *relationship with value*. But how, if at all, do emotions relate to value? Are they essentially "value-recorders" (helping detect objectively existing values) or "value-donors" (imparting subjective values to their objects)? Four traditional philosophical theories on this question can be summarized briefly as follows (see further in Kristjánsson, 2010b).

Hard rationalism holds that values exist independently of our emotions, and that such values can be tracked by human reason, whereas emotions hinder rather than help reason's quest for values. Hard rationalism (seen e.g. in austere forms of Kantianism, Platonism, Stoicism, Buddhism, and Kohlbergianism) does not animate any of the ten discourses. Indeed, it falls afoul of one of the inclusion condition for the relevant field – that emotions are to be deemed worthy of cultivation, not just repression. For educational purposes, we could therefore call hard rationalism "Gradgrindian." *Soft rationalism* holds that emotions are conducive to wellbeing if and when these track moral value correctly and are infused/guided by reason. However, rather than just being handmaids of reason, emotions are seen as indispensable guides towards understanding values and may even, at times, be constitutive of value themselves; hence transcending the objective–subjective value dichotomy.[10] For example, a young student's sense of shame in the classroom might be acknowledged to track the (dis)value of shame, simply in virtue of her construal of the situation as shameful, although an objective adult onlooker (such as the teacher) would not deem the situation to be "objectively shameful." *Hard sentimentalism* holds that emotions are the (sole) donors of value and are, as such,

[10] Soft rationalism comes in different forms, all the way from holding that (a) emotions have an important developmental, educational, and exploratory role in accessing value, although value could in principle be accessed without them, to (b) certain emotions are constitutive of value, and to (c) all value is partly constituted by emotion.

self-justifying and incorrigible – although we may have pragmatic reasons for letting one value override another. A further explanation of this view awaits the discussion of Social intuitionism. *Soft sentimentalism*, finally, holds that although emotions are the sole donors of value, they often get things wrong (e.g. when they are not in internal harmony), and are essentially corrigible in order to ensure fittingness. Emotions therefore only donate true value when the emotional reaction is not just felt but is merited, authentic, and endorsed by a coherent, reflective agent. For example, a teenage student's emotion of affection for another student might not be considered truly value-creating if it were felt when she is high on drugs.

These are quite abstract philosophical positions, and it is not always obvious how (if at all) they are instantiated in the different discourses on emotion education. However, some of those discourses take a clear stand on the epistemology of value, and others can be hypothesized to endorse one position or another through a process of elimination. The second column in Table 1 thus differentiates between the relevant discourses on the grounds of their value epistemologies.

General Aim of Emotion Education

Fortunately, all ten discourses are relatively clear on how emotions matter for students and why they should be taught. The initial answer is often along the lines of "promoting student wellbeing," but as there are many competing accounts of what wellbeing is, the discourses differ considerably on general aims.

The first relevant distinction is between *moral* and *non-moral* aims. Some discourses prioritize or fasten exclusively on moral aims and consider emotion education to be a sub-set of moral or character education. Others highlight the role of emotions in facilitating non-moral aims such as school attainment. Those who favor moral aims can be divided further into those who understand the aims in *instrumentalist* or in *intrinsic* terms. The moral instrumentalists usually hail from social science and conceive of morality, in Weberian terms, as a set of social norms conducive to peaceful co-ordination ("pro-sociality") in a world of scarce resources. These theorists typically invoke the

term “moral emotions” for the emotions in which they are mostly interested: namely, emotions instrumental for producing pro-social ends. However, the term “moral emotion” is a highly polysemous one, with at least five different understandings (Cova, Deonna, & Sander, 2015). The intrinsic-moral-worth theorists are typically philosophers with virtue-ethical sympathies who conceive of morality as a set of dispositions constitutive of (rather than just conducive to) human flourishing. As they consider all emotions potentially flourishing-constitutive, they typically see the term “moral emotion” as superfluous (unless understood as an antonym of “immoral”).

These differences can best be illustrated with an example of a single positively evaluated emotion: *gratitude*. Fredrickson (2004) found gratitude, like other positive valenced emotions, to be “broadening and building” with respect to general personal resources (e.g. study-related ones). Hence, for Fredrickson, gratitude should be coached in young people for its non-moral benefits. McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, and Larson (2001) argued that gratitude has a moral function via three discrete instrumental (pro-social) benefits: *qua* moral *barometer*, moral *motivator*, and moral *reinforcer*. As a barometer, gratitude records a positive moral change in the environment; as a motivator, gratitude promotes contribution to the wellbeing of the cherished benefactor (or third parties); as a reinforcer, gratitude makes benefactors more likely to repeat their benevolent acts at later junctures and in different contexts. Finally, Morgan, Gulliford, and Carr (2015) took both non-moral and moral-but-instrumental accounts of gratitude to task for indiscriminately wanting to “boost” gratitude in young people, for the sake of external benefits, without considering the conceptual and moral subtleties of the emotion and its constitutive function in the moral lives of the young. The third column in Table 1 differentiates between emotion-education discourses with respect to the two above-explained distinctions.

Emotions and Self-Related Goals

A fashionable research topic on emotions is how they impact upon moral and psychological selfhood and how they promote or undermine self-related goals (cf. Hoffman, 2009, p. 542). This function is sometimes referred to (especially by skeptics, drawing on Foucault) as “technologies of the self”

(Neophytou, 2013). The problem is that no consensus exists in academic circles on what selfhood is or whether it really exists objectively, either as a discrete entity or process.

Two common but contrasting theories, underlying many psychological and educational discourses, are *self-realism* and *anti-self-realism* (Kristjánsson, 2010a). According to the former, the self exists as a deep, underlying emotion-imbued entity/process in the human psyche, forming the core of personhood. The quality of our self-concept (the set of beliefs we harbor about the self) then depends on how accurately they "mirror" this underlying reality.[11] Self-realists are typically concerned with goals related to the strengthening of the moral fiber of the underlying self (e.g. via self-respect) and with improved quality of self-concept (via self-understanding). According to anti-self-realism, on the other hand, no such underlying self exists; what we call "selfhood" is just the same as our socially constructed self-concept. Anti-self-realists are typically concerned with bolstering self-concept in various ways, not least in young people, by increasing self-esteem and self-confidence. However, other theorists resent the individualist orientation in both self-realism and anti-self-realism and argue for the heteronomous interdependence of human selves – hence redirecting attention to the improved quality of self-relations. The fourth and final column in Table 1 attempts to make sense of the somewhat disconcerting variety of ways in which emotion education is meant to impact positively upon students' self-related goals.

History

It would be enlightening to detail how the emotions have (re)entered educational discourse in general and the ten specific discourses in particular. As there is no space for such an inquiry here, it is fortunate that useful texts exist, charting some of this territory (see e.g. Bantock, 1986; Dixon, 2012).

[11] To complicate matters, there are those self-realists (called "soft") who consider the "mirror" part of the furniture in the room that it mirrors; hence self-concept also belongs to actual full selfhood. Others ("hard" self-realists) make a strict distinction between self and self-concept and are typically only interested in the former. "Soft" and "hard" forms of anti-self-realism also exist (see Kristjánsson, 2010a, chap. 2).

Yet it would be amiss to fail to mention three landmark publications that changed the educational landscape.

In 1972, the respected British education theorist R. S. Peters published a piece on the education of the emotions: a highly prescient text, opening with the unambiguous statement: "The purpose of this paper is to confine myself to getting clearer about what is involved in the task of educating the emotions." Peters argued that what had previously been considered "emotion education" in psychological circles was not really "education" but simply behavioral (re)conditioning, but that the situation had now changed with the cognitive revolution in psychology, in the wake of which attention could serviceably shift to the cognitive, reason-responsive core of emotions. Coming down heavily on the side of a moral reading of emotion education, Peters (1972) observed that such education is "inescapably a moral matter," although "it may sound almost indecent to mention it in the company of psychologists." Peters finished his article by discussing some practical strategies of emotion education. Five years later, educationalist I. Scheffler (1977) published a similar watershed article in the U.S.A., in which he argued against the common conception of emotions as reason-derailing and educationally pernicious feelings, from which cognition and knowledge could be clearly sundered. Yet he acknowledged that the term "cognitive emotion" still evoked "perplexity and incredulity" in educational circles.

It might seem anti-climactic to mention, in the same breath as these two scholarly articles, a bestseller by D. Goleman (1995). However, the impact of Goleman's work, as a popularizer of the idea of "emotional intelligence," should not be under-estimated, as it influenced a whole generation of parents and teachers and helped spawn the movement of Social and emotional learning – still the most powerful paradigm of emotion education in schools, at least in the U.S.A. Goleman claimed that the aim of his book was nothing more than to retrieve Aristotelian emotion-cognitivism for 20th century purposes: take on Aristotle's "challenge" to "manage our emotional life with intelligence" (1995, p. xv). Although Goleman ended up departing considerably from Aristotle's moralized justification of appropriate emotions (see Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 5), it is easy to see where he was coming from. The resuscitation of cognitivism in late 20th century psychology had given tonic to the troops of

potential emotion educators, in the form of a simple argument: If emotions are cognitive, they are reason-responsive. If they are reason-responsive, they are educable. And if they are educable, they are most likely teachable also (but not only amenable to self-education). Cognitivism thus formed the platform from which many of the ten discourses analyzed below were launched. That said, cognitivism is not a precondition of a belief in the efficacy of emotion education. For example, as we see presently, the Emotion-regulation discourse is partly rooted in an earlier behavioristic paradigm, and the Social-intuitionism discourse is explicitly leveled against inflated beliefs in the reason-responsiveness of emotions.

The Ten Discourses Analyzed

The aim of this section is to offer a compact analysis of the core tenets of each of the ten identified discourses on emotion education. For each discourse, one paragraph is dedicated to a broad characterization and another to how the discourse "scores" with respect to the four differential criteria delineated above. A summary of those "scores" is found in Table 1. A final paragraph then surveys some actual or possible criticisms. Systematic critiques of particular discourses are often not available in the literature, although misgivings about all forms of emotion education are (see the sub-section "General Misgivings" below).[12] Recall that this long section, with ten sub-sections, is devoted to a review of theoretical issues. More practical issues, about the nuts and bolts of emotion education, are reviewed in the later section, "Strategies of Emotion Education."

Aristotelian Character Education

A distinctive feature of Aristotle's virtue theory, underlying its call for character education, is the assumption that emotional reactions constitute essential ingredients in virtues. Emotional dispositions

[12] As criticisms are often just hinted at or suggested from within the discourses themselves in response to anticipated/possible objections, I only provide references in the third paragraph when an actual objection has been presented by a critic. A discussion of divergence or convergence among the discourses awaits the final section of the article.

can, no less than action-dispositions, have an "intermediate and best condition [...] proper to virtue" – when emotions are felt "at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end and in the right way" (Aristotle, 1985, p. 44 [1106b17–35]). If a relevant emotion is "too intense or slack" for its present object, we are badly off in relation to it, but if it is intermediate, we are "well off" (1985, p. 41 [1105b26–28]), and persons can be fully virtuous only if they are regularly disposed to experience emotions in this medial way. The purpose of moral inquiry "is not to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry would be of no benefit to us" (1985, p. 35 [1103b27–29]). Helping the young become good assumes most distinctively, in the early years at least, the form of emotional sensitization – "the ordering of the affective springs of human action" (Carr, 2005, p. 140); hence the need for extensive and systematic emotion education (Kristjánsson, 2007; 2015).

With respect to the differential criteria, Aristotelians[13] think that both positively valenced emotions, such as pride, and negatively valenced ones, such as compassion, need to be cultivated. Their take on this issue is unique in that they tend to downplay or reject the valence-distinction altogether by claiming that most, if not all, emotions include both pleasant and painful features. For example, anger involves pain at an unjustified "slight," mixed with pleasure at the anticipation of retaliation (Aristotle, 2007, p. 116 [1378b1–9]). Aristotelian character education assumes a soft rationalist position, with reason tracking value but guided by (reason-infused) emotions. The general aim of emotion education is to develop moral dispositions that are intrinsically valuable for the flourishing life of the student. Self-goals involve strengthening morally the underlying self as the core of character, by promoting self-respect, and facilitating correct self-understanding (Kristjánsson, 2007; 2010; 2015).

Aristotelian character education has been subjected to a myriad of objections, some of which focus explicitly on its view of emotion education (see Kristjánsson, 2015, chap. 2, for an overview and rejoinders). However, many of those represent misgivings about certain conservative and

[13] A distinction is often made between Aristotelian *exegeses* and *reconstructions*. The latter are conducted by latter-day Aristotelians who follow Aristotle's naturalism in incorporating state-of-the-art social scientific findings into "Aristotelian" character education. However, for present purposes, this distinction will be ignored.

behaviorally driven forms of character education that developed in the U.S.A. in the 1990s but have little to do with *Aristotelian* character education. Yet the Aristotelian variety is also liable to criticisms, for instance regarding the sketchiness of its account of the methods of emotion education to be employed, especially with regard to the development of the meta-virtue of *phronesis*, which is meant to mediate and adjudicate emotion-and-virtue conflicts (Kristjánsson, 2015, chap. 4). Some critics have also complained about an early-years determinism in Aristotle, with emotion-education not seen as having much traction beyond early childhood (Kristjánsson, 2015, chap. 5).

Confucianism

After decades of repression, Confucian moral philosophy is undergoing a strong revival in the Chinese speaking world. Virtue ethical at its roots (like Aristotelianism), Confucianism also offers an explicitly emotion-focused education program, set out by Confucius's disciple, Mencius. Best known for his theory of the innate goodness of human beings, grounded in the moral "sprouts" (incipient virtue traits) of benevolence (*rén*), righteousness (*yì*), propriety (*lǐ*), and wisdom (*zhì*), Mencius argued that each of the sprouts had a root/germ in a specific emotion (2009, pp. 21, 72 [2A: 6.4–6.5, 6A: 6.7]), for example benevolence in the emotion of compassion. The main role of moral education is to nourish those emotion-cum-virtue ("heart–mind") seedlings, without pulling on them too hard and thereby uprooting them (2009, p. 17 [2A: 2.16]). Mencius offered an account of emotional learning *qua* emotional extension (*tuī*). On this account, the trick is to help the student settle on an understanding of why an emotion is on target in a paradigmatic situation (e.g. by modeling it on a sage) and then to learn to extend this understanding gradually to non-paradigmatic cases – hoping that the feeling accompanies the cognition in extending the boundaries of the whole emotion (Kim, 2008).

With respect to the differential criteria, Confucianism emphasizes the internalization of both positively and negatively valenced emotions, depending on the situation. As far as can be seen, Confucian epistemology of value is soft rationalist (in light of the focus on emotions as "germs" and the heart–mind synthesis). The general aim of emotion education is clearly the development of intrinsically valuable emotion-virtues. However, the focus is slightly more collectivist than in

Aristotelian character education, with individual selfhood seen as standing in need of explicit extension to a collective human selfhood and the "way" (*dào*) of the whole universe (Kim, 2008; Flanagan, 2014).

Confucianism is often taken to task for its ritualized view of moral education in general and emotion education in particular. For example, in Mencius there is little advice on emotional cultivation that goes beyond a rather narrow habituation picture of enculturation and socialization (Kim, 2008, chap. 6.3). We learn to extend the boundaries of our emotions by emulating and reflecting upon moral exemplars. However, even this reflection seems to be reliant upon the acceptance of basic assumptions, picked up from authoritative sages as role models, leaving us none the wiser about the precise methods to be used to facilitate such learning in a non-indoctrinatory way. Doubts persist, therefore, about the feasibility of applying Confucian emotion education constructively in contemporary liberal societies.

Care Ethics

Understood by some as just a variety of virtue ethics (Curzer, 2007), Care ethicists are concerned to carve out a niche of their own, philosophically and educationally (Noddings, 1984). They offer a view that highlights emotions typically associated with the gendered role of women, at least in traditional societies, as providers of the emotions of care and compassion (Gilligan, 1993). The (ethical) role of education is to nurture caring relationships and help develop "moral emotions" that sustain such relationships (MacKenzie, 2013). While stopping short of writing Aristotelian character education off as self-centered, Care ethicists worry that it fails to grasp the relational nature of care and of (ideal) moral selfhood as essentially interdependent (Noddings, 1999).

With respect to the differential criteria, Care ethics foregrounds the educational salience of negatively valenced emotions, considered to reside under the umbrella of care, especially compassion (MacKenzie, 2013), while also mentioning positively valenced emotions such as love (Pulcini, 2016). The underlying epistemology tends to be developed out of moral-sense theory (soft sentimentalism),

but sometimes in combination with moral naturalism, which falls under soft rationalism (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2007, p. 150). The focus is almost entirely moral, but no clear distinction seems to be made between the intrinsic and instrumental role of the "moral emotions." It is considered good to develop kind and caring students, both because of the internal value for themselves and the external value for a caring society (MacKenzie, 2013). In general, there is reluctance in Care ethics to separate the individual too distinctly from larger society. That is also why the self-related goals in Care ethics are about enhanced self-relations (Noddings, 1984).

Care ethics can be criticized for being unduly selective of the emotions it upholds. Why focus only on care and compassion when other emotions are surely relevant also to the moral goals endorsed in this discourse? What about the self-conscious emotions of pride and shame, for example, or the desert-based ones, such as righteous indignation? This complaint is a specific version of the general one about Care ethicists cherry-picking a small set of emotions from the standard virtue ethical emotion-and-virtue repertoire and inflating its importance, without seeing the bigger picture (Curzer, 2007).

Utilitarianism

Utilitarians are often caricatured as detached bean-counters of utility: rational and non-emotional calculators. If we look at what many utilitarians themselves consider their core text, however, J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism*, what is on offer is an ethics that is essentially virtue ethical, with much attention to the educational nourishment of noble feelings, moral and aesthetic – a tender plant, easily killed in youth by want of sustenance (Mill, 1863). Indeed, it was through those "softer" sources that Mill liberated himself from the depressing Gradgrindian upbringing by his father (Dixon, 2012). Sympathy with other sentient creatures is nothing less than the core virtue in Mill's utilitarianism – and an emotion-based one at that. Utilitarianism is rarely explored in the emotion-education literature; conversely, the scholarly literature on utilitarianism seldom addresses the salience of emotions or their education (see, however, Crisp, 1997, chap. 6, for an exception). I would not have counted

utilitarianism as one of the discourses to be analyzed here if not for the extensive influence it has had on general educational policy and curriculum design.

With respect to the differential criteria, Millian utilitarianism foregrounds the value of the negatively valenced emotion of sympathy, whereas other varieties (such as Benthamite utilitarianism) remain focused on pleasant experiences and their maximization. Mill's value epistemology, at any rate, is a soft rationalist one, and he is equally interested in the moral effects of appropriate emotion-virtues on the character of the agent herself as those upon society at large. The main self-related goal in utilitarianism could be called "self-gratification," but "gratification" here refers not only to hedonic pleasures but the self-cultivation of a good moral character and the satisfaction that comes with it (Crisp, 1997).

Given the scarcity of writings about Utilitarian emotion education, at least of the Millian kind, one can only conjecture that, if made explicit, those would replicate standard concerns about utilitarianism making psychologically unreasonable demands upon moral learners (in subjecting their whole attitudinal repertoire to the value of overall utility maximization), and in potentially victimizing individuals (with sympathies towards a lone sufferer, for example, having to be eliminated for the sake of the greater societal good). However, as those play out in the literature, most objections are not directed at a Millian form of utilitarianism, but rather at a crude and cheapened form, which has remained lodged in our collective imagination, of utilitarian emotion education as Gradgrindian (Dixon, 2012).

Social and Emotional Learning (SEL)

Rooted in the paradigms of emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995), on the one hand, and positive youth development, on the other, this discourse aims at integrating emotion with thinking and behavior so that students become more self-aware and self-controlled, have better relationship skills, and are more likely to make responsible decisions. The specific emotional skills to be developed have to do with recognizing, understanding, labeling, expressing, and regulating emotion (Brackett &

Rivers, 2014). School interventions tend to be aimed both at individual students and overall school climate; moreover, there have attempts of late to complement such interventions with insights from cognitive-behavioral therapy (Elias et al., 2014). SEL seems to have lent itself more readily to classroom applications than any of the other approaches under scrutiny here, with more than 200 types of classroom-based SEL programs being used in U.S. schools alone (Hoffman, 2009). SEL tends to uphold a very capacious conception of what an "emotion" is, grounded in diverse conceptual models (Neophytou, 2013), and often does not make clear distinctions between emotions and general attitudes, desires, and moods (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 6), insofar as it aspires to a holistic conception of (young) people's emotional make-up.

With respect to the differential criteria, SEL focuses on the enhancement of positively valenced emotions (Goleman, 1995), and the control of negatively valenced and disruptive ones (Hoffman, 2009). There is usually no mention of any underlying epistemology of value, but by a process of elimination one can divine that the assumptions here are either soft sentimentalist or soft rationalist. The general educational aims are instrumentalist: better school attainment and better pro-social integration (CASEL, 2016). As already indicated, the primary self-goals are self-awareness (of one's own emotions) and self-regulation.

The standard objection to SEL is the "Machiavellian" one: that the criteria for what counts as an "emotional skill" are not informed by any moral constraints and that a calculated crook could score as high on those skills as a paragon of moral virtue (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 6). Just as the corruption of the best becomes the worst, it could be argued that the affective gentrification of the bad – by equipping them with emotional skills – becomes worse still. In response, SEL theorists may point out that SEL is not only about emotional intelligence but also pro-social integration. However, as the latter goal is framed instrumentally, someone could, in principle, achieve it in a cynical and self-serving way, without her "heart" (i.e. her emotions) being in it. On a different note, Hoffman's (2009) extensive critical overview focuses on an individualist bias in SEL: of seeing emotional defects as individual afflictions that require person-centered remediation rather than the remediation of relational contexts, for example in the classroom. However, those concerns are not specific to SEL

but hit, rather, potentially at most of the discourses analyzed in this article. I shelve further discussion of them until the sub-section "General Misgivings" below.

Positive Psychology

Positively valenced emotions are one of the original pillars of positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and its recent educational incarnation as "positive education" (Seligman, 2011). Most fully developed in the work of Fredrickson (2009), she has found that that such emotions – specifically joy, gratitude, serenity, interest, hope, pride, amusement, inspiration, awe, and love – *broaden* a person's thought-action repertoire (attention, working memory, verbal fluency, openness to information) and that a broadened repertoire *builds* enduring personal resources, not least resources to do well at school. Positive psychological experiments induce pleasant or painful feelings in subjects (e.g. by showing them sad or happy film clips), subsequently measuring their performance or function in some area (e.g. their creativity or imagination) or asking them to complete questionnaires about their wellbeing. The findings tend to be consistent. Those who have had happy experiences exhibit a broadened thought-action repertoire and experience greater subjective wellbeing than control groups, as long as those experiences stay within an ideal 2.9-to-1 ratio of pleasant over painful (Fredrickson, 2009).[14]

With respect to the differential criteria, Positive psychology tends to focus exclusively on the educational salience of positively valenced emotions. Their experience is not filtered through reason, though some internal regimentation may be called for to avoid emotion conflicts: a view indicative of soft sentimentalism. The educational aims are purely instrumental: non-moral in the case of Fredrickson herself, but morally instrumentalist in the case, for example, of many other gratitude researchers in the field (McCullough et al., 2001). The ultimate self-goal is to reap hedonic rewards

[14] The statistical credibility of the positivity ration has been challenged (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013). However, I focus on more substantive criticisms below.

from the emotions themselves, or subsequently through the attainments that they promote: a goal categorized in Table 1 as "self-gratification."

Positive psychologists' one-sided interest in positively valenced experiences has been attacked both on conceptual grounds and for being under-supported empirically. Indeed, there seems to be empirical evidence for the opposite view: that at least some negatively valenced experiences broaden and build personal resources (Forgas, 2013; Tamir & Gross, 2011). Positive psychology may also be marred by what we might call a "replaceability dilemma." Would a positively evaluated emotion such as gratitude by replaceable, in principle, if another emotion were found which better built and broadened personal resources? If the answer is no, there must be more to emotions than just their instrumental value; if the answer is yes, that seems to fly in the face of prevalent moral intuitions about gratitude being an indispensable part of an intrinsically valuable moral life (cf. Morgan, Gulliford, & Carr, 2015). Somewhat impishly, Dixon suggested that with their "scientific interventions" and rigorous "emotional metrics," positive psychologists are "Gradgrind's true heirs" in modernity (2012, p. 492).

Self-Esteem Discourse

Most vocal in the late 20th century in psychological and educational circles, but still not entirely out of steam, is a discourse on the promotion of self-esteem (global as distinct from domain-specific) in students as a fundamental aim of all education (Branden, 1969). If we rely on William James's (1890) original definition of (global) self-esteem as the self-perceived ratio of one's accomplishments to one's aspirations, we might understand self-esteem to be unrelated to emotion, insofar as it seems to be about self-*beliefs* only. However, that would be a misunderstanding, for educational efforts at boosting self-esteem are meant to work on students' emotional repertoires also: inducing background emotions of pride and self-satisfaction that may then serve as a buoying descant to everything they aspire to in life (Brown & Marshall, 2001; Kristjánsson, 2010a, chap. 4).

With respect to the differential criteria, the Self-esteem discourse is obviously about positively valenced emotions only. Rarely is there any mention of rational constraints to be placed

upon the content of one's self-beliefs or self-conscious emotions; hence the value epistemology seems to be hard sentimentalist. Morality is not addressed separately; rather, the value of pride and other positively valenced emotions is specified as instrumental with respect to life achievement in general, including grade attainment (Kristjánsson, 2010, chap. 5). It goes without saying that the self-goal prioritized in this discourse is self-esteem; but other hedonic benefits of self-gratification are meant to supervene upon it (Branden, 1969).

The Self-esteem discourse (which at that time had turned into something of a cottage industry in the self-help world) suffered a serious, and possibly irreversible, setback when a meta-analysis by Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, and Vohs (2003) revealed that high self-esteem has more pernicious psychological and social consequences than low self-esteem, perhaps owing to the inflated sense of invulnerability it creates in young people. Prior to that finding, this discourse had come under heavy attack for promoting the mere perception of attainment without any necessary actual attainment; for instance, boosting pride of *x* in people who had no *x* to be proud of – hence, devaluating the currency of pride (Kristjánsson, 2010, chap. 5).

Emotion-Regulation Discourse

This discourse distinguishes itself sharply from most of the others through its practical, theory-averse (or at least theory-neutral) stance (Shuman & Sherer, 2014, p. 24). The aim is not to replicate or add backbone to theories of what emotions are and why they are important, but simply to offer a helpful taxonomy of the strategies people actually use to regulate their affective lives, and help them get better at influencing the timing, experience, and expression of emotions (Gross, 1998). The strategies are roughly divided into situation selection, situation modification, attention deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2009). Some of those will be returned to in the section "Strategies of Emotion Education" below; for present purposes it suffices to note that they draw unapologetically on an eclectic mixture of theoretical assumptions, from Freudianism, behaviorism, and stress theories, to cognitivism (Jacobs & Gross, 2014, p. 185).

With respect to the differential criteria (given the theory-aversion in this discourse), an analysis of those will be reduced to educated guesses. The strategies discussed seem to incorporate both positively and negatively valenced emotions. The tendencies of Emotion-regulation theorists towards accommodation indicate a penchant for soft forms of sentimentalism or rationalism. The aims are explicitly practical, in an instrumentalist sense, with no stand taken on what constitutes an intrinsically good life. As the name suggests, the self-goal foregrounded is self-regulation.

The main worry about the Emotion-regulation discourse is that, through its deflationary stance towards theory and its efforts to sweep away all value-epistemological lumber, this discourse may have opened emotion education up to potential abuse, in which emotions turn from true values into value parasites. Moreover, by allowing space for purely behavioral methods, the distinction between education, on the one hand, and conditioning or social control, on the other, may have been lost (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2007).

Academic-Emotions Discourse

Although slightly less accommodating theoretically than the Emotion-regulation discourse, the Academic-emotions discourse is unified more by a common subject matter and a closely-knit group of advocates than a common theoretical stance. The subject matter is classroom emotions; more specifically, classroom emotions useful for, or detrimental to, learning/school attainment, and how the useful ones can be enhanced. For example, Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) proposed a conceptual model linking affect in classroom settings to achievement goal theory, a prominent social cognitive theory of motivation. Linnenbrink and Pintrich's model posited that affect and goals are reciprocally related to each other; that perceived classroom mastery is linked, as both as cause and effect, to positive emotion; and that failure to live up to perceived classroom performance causes negative emotion. Meyer and Turner (2006) explored findings about classroom emotions in the light of various motivational theories, and they concluded that engaging students in learning requires "consistently positive emotional experiences." What is called "positive classroom environment" reflects, in part, the re-creation of such positive experiences. Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, and Perry (2002) divided "academic

emotions" (sometimes referred to in this discourse as "achievement emotions") into positively valenced emotions such as enjoyment, hope, and pride, versus negatively valenced ones such as boredom, anxiety, and shame/guilt, foregrounding the value of the former for learning.

With respect to the differential criteria, the focus here is mainly on positively valenced experiences as conducive to learning attainment. Extreme theoretical stances on the nature of emotional value are avoided; hence, this discourse occupies the middle-ground position of either soft rationalism or soft sentimentalism. There is very little, if any, talk of the role of emotion education for moral development; the proffered aims are rather non-moral, having to do with more traditional achievement goals of schooling. Self-goals center on self-regulation and on developing self-efficacy in the domain of learning, by turning students' emotional make-up into a learning resource rather than a learning obstacle.

Misgivings raised about the Academic-emotions discourse in many ways replicate those lodged against Positive psychology above. For instance, it has been pointed out that negatively valenced emotions may also play a "positive" role in the learning process. Such emotions can induce strong motivation to cope with negative events; shame, in particular, may induce student motivation to avoid failures by investing effort (cf. Turner, Husman, & Schallert, 2002). The emphasis on the role of emotions in promoting quantifiable learning outcomes – without particular interest in moral development – is also questionably Gradgrindian (Dixon, 2012).

Social Intuitionism

In contrast to the two previously mentioned discourses, there is no theory-shyness in Social intuitionism. Motivated explicitly by recent neuroscience and various radical philosophical and psychological theories, such as moral situationism, emotional perceptualism, evolutionary psychology, and a view of values as essentially modular, automatic, and innate (although modified by one's social environment), lying mostly outside of the reach of reason (Haidt, 2001), Social intuitionism has come to be known as the "New Synthesis" in moral psychology (Haidt, 2007). At

once widely popular and highly controversial, this discourse has set the cat among the pigeons in research on emotion education, especially with its contention that so-called moral education is completely inert in changing fundamental sentiments, underlying moral reactions, and that such education mostly consists in causally ineffective confabulations (see a response in Sauer, 2012). Nevertheless, Social intuitionism allows for *some* post-hoc emotional correction and reform. Emotions can be assessed with respect to consistency, coherence with facts, stability, ease of implementation, and welfare – and such assessments may lead us to the conclusion that one emotional norm is "better" than another and should be encouraged (Prinz, 2007, chap. 8). Importantly, however, these standards are not moral standards but "extra-moral" ones (2007, p. 292): more precisely, standards of pragmatic convenience – "pale shadows" of standard moral criteria (2007, p. 303).

With respect to the differential criteria, Social intuitionists are interested in both positively and negatively valenced emotions and in how those can be (modestly) modified through environmental cues, for example in the classroom. They offer an uncompromising position of hard sentimentalism and are only interested in pragmatic, non-moral modifications of emotions (insofar as hard sentimentalism posits that what is felt as right is morally right for that person, full stop, see Prinz, 2007). Social intuitionists provide suggestions on how emotion education can help students get more control over their intuitive reactions if they first recognize that it is the intuitions that are driving the reasoning process, not the other way around (hence, the self-goal of self-understanding), and also enable them to adjust their expression of emotions to satisfy pragmatic concerns (self-revision).

Social intuitionism is perhaps, at the present point in time, the most heavily controversial and criticized of the ten discourses.[15] It has been urged that a framework which makes emotional judgments self-justifying, relegates reason to a motivational handmaid, and considers modular moral foundations unamenable to rational arguments, may have potentially debilitating educational ramifications (Kristjánsson, 2016). More specifically, the critics accuse the Social intuitionists of

[15] Some of those harsh reactions may not be motivated as much by the substantive claims of the discourse as by the calculated brashness by which those are typically expressed, for example when Social intuitionists propose that "it is better for social scientists to ignore philosophers and just examine morality as an empirical phenomenon" (Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008, p. 271).

under-estimating the extent to which emotional traits are malleable. The Social intuitionists do so, for example, mainly by focusing on emotional reactions of adults, whose reactions admittedly often arise automatically from stable traits. That does not mean, however, that there was never a time when those traits could have been educated or self-developed, or that they necessarily have innate origins (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Sauer, 2012). The mistake is similar to that of enthusing over the wonders of the autofocus mechanism of a camera without realizing that it took years of engineering and rational thought to develop this mechanism.

General Misgivings

Apart from the specific animadversions directed at individual discourses of emotion education (rehearsed above), general doubts about the whole field remain. While those doubts cannot be settled here, it is worth pausing to give them some thought. I leave out of consideration misgivings about the effectiveness of interventions in the field – as such misgivings exist about almost every set of educational interventions and can only be assuaged empirically (see e.g. Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011) rather than theoretically. Let us concentrate rather on two theoretical objections, one about paternalistic and/or sinister motives behind emotion education and another about its implicit individualist bias.

According to the paternalism objection, the systematic inculcation of emotional traits in classroom contexts may not be compatible with the prime task of education – in Western liberal democracies at least – to equip children for independence and self-government (explored in Dunlop, 1986), and that it is liable to perversion into illegitimate manipulation (discussed and partly answered in Roebben, 1995; Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005).[16] A stronger version of this objection exists where the worry is not so much about anti-liberal tendencies in emotion education as about much more severe state intrusion into individual selfhood, where children's selves are seen as essentially

[16] Because of their focus on philosophically motivated literatures, Maxwell and Reichenbach (2005; 2007) may over-emphasize the persisting "taboo status" of emotion education, hamstrung as they claim it is by the paternalism objection. Much of the most vocal mainstream literature, for example within the SEL and Emotion-regulation discourses, seems to run its course, however, without paying much attention to this objection.

fragile and standing in need of constant monitoring and invasive self-technological control (Ecclestone, 2011; Neophytou, 2013).

These objections may, at first sight, appear easily rebuttable, simply by pointing out that children's emotional development cannot be put on hold during their school years, and that the choice is not between emotion education taking place at school or not, but simply between this happening in an "intentional, conscious, planned, pro-active, organized and reflective" way, or "assumed, unconscious, reactive, subliminal or random" (Wiley, 1998, p. 18).[17] Yet the counter-argument could be launched that there remains a significant moral difference between unintended but foreseeable consequences of educational activities, on the one hand, and intended consequences, on the other – and that the latter, in the case of emotion education, might be considered more sinister. The question remains, however, of why – if we know that students' emotions will be formed through educational experiences in schools – this is better left to luck than design. If emotions are *amenable* to education, what makes them unique in the sense of not being deemed *fit* for education?

The second objection relates to a concern that tends to emerge in connection with any school program aimed at the formation of individual character: the concern about an individualist bias. Hoffman (2009, p. 542) correctly observed that all models of emotional competence are deeply intertwined with cultural norms about ideal human selfhood. In Western liberal democracies, the reigning model of selfhood is of an independent, autonomous entity; hence the obsession to correct personal and social ills by "fixing the kids" while ignoring social forces and other features of students' habitus (Hoffman, 2009). The standard response to this objection – that this is a chicken-and-egg issue, with emotional deficits having to be tackled *both* at the individual and social levels but practicalities dictating that it is easier to start with individual students (see e.g. Kristjánsson, 2013, chap. 2.5) – may seem lame and disingenuous. The different discourses above are variously well-equipped to deal with this objection head-on. Confucians and Care ethicists, who understand the self-goals of emotion education explicitly in terms of improved self-*relations*, may have the strongest weapons in their arsenal. Aristotelian character education is also a close contender, although Aristotle

[17] Wiley (1998) is here talking about the development of all character traits, not only emotional ones.

did think that human character must be cultivated at the individual and family-level first before extended to society at large (Kristjánsson, 2015, chap. 2). All in all, the general misgivings about emotion education might be more persuasive if they were directed at particular forms or strategies rather than hitting at all such education – which seems to be an over-reaction.

Strategies of Emotion Education

Simultaneously to analyzing the theoretical assumptions behind the ten discourses, the literature was also analyzed with respect to the specific educational strategies it proposed (see Table 2). In this section, I explicate seven main strategies (or, more precisely, strategic themes) that were identified: *behavioral strategies; cognitive and/or attentional reframing; ethos modification and emotion contagion; service learning/habituation; direct teaching; role modelling; and the arts*. Notice that those strategies occupy two levels of analytical generality and complexity. The first three are the most general ones, whereas the latter four may be considered particular instantiations of the three. As the seven are often dealt with separately and independently in the literature, however, I opted for this seven-item taxonomy for accuracy of theoretical analysis. Before delving into the strategies and how these are represented in the ten discourses above, a few remarks are in order about developmental issues.

Table 2
Discourses on Emotion Education, Analyzed according to Employment of Educational Strategies

	Behavioral strategies	*Ethos modification and emotion contagion*	*Cognitive and/or attentional reframing*	*Service learning/ Habituation*	*Direct teaching*	*Role-modelling*	*Arts*
Aristotelian character education		x	x	x	x	x	x
Confucianism		x		x		x	
Care ethics		x	x	x		x	x
Utilitarianism		x	x			x	

SEL	x	x	x		x		x
Positive psychology			x				
Self-esteem discourse			x				
Emotion-regulation discourse	x	x	x				
Academic-emotion discourse	x	x	x				
Social intuitionism	x	x		x			x

Children's Emotional Development

Arguably, in an ideal world, strategies of emotion education would draw on findings from developmental psychology on the natural development of children's emotional repertoire, in line with the old philosophical mantra that "ought" implies "can." More specifically, there would be no use in utilizing a particular emotion-educational intervention if it presupposed a level of emotional maturity that the intended recipients were not capable of reaching yet. For example, if it is true that before the age of 7–8, children normally do not anticipate negatively valenced or mixed emotions after moral wrongdoing (Krettenauer, Colasante, Buchmann, & Malti, 2014), it would be futile to try to implement a strategy aimed at instilling such emotions in children of a younger age.

In the real world, however, the discourses canvassed in this article are rarely motivated directly by findings from developmental psychology; at least such findings are sparsely cited. One reason for this could be the general one mentioned earlier: that the current literature tends to be non-transdisciplinary. Another reason, which I have picked up anecdotally from emotion educators but did not find evidence of in the literature, is that some think of it as getting hold of the wrong end of the stick to explore emotional-cum-moral development prior to educational interventions, insofar as the course of the development is taken to depend much on the quality of the educational resources on

offer. After the demise of the Piagetian/Kohlbergian stage theories of development, there seems to be skepticism in educational circles that any "normal" trajectory (let alone a stage-divided one) of young people's emotional or moral development exists: rather "development" itself is considered an inherently normatively regulating concept (Carr, 2002).

As an antidote to this skepticism, there is obviously a large body of literature on children's emotional development that emotion educators would at least be well advised to consult, if not take on board, before they decide upon a relevant strategy to use for the age group they are teaching. This literature points to various statistically significant tendencies in areas of emotional development in general and the development of "moral emotions" in particular; to links between Big-Five profiles and emotional development; and to patterns in the way in which emotions gradually come to inform moral identity in adolescence at increasing levels of sophistication (Malti & Ongley, 2014; cf. Bloom, 2013). Although there is not the space to pursue those issues further here, there is reason to highlight the lack of rapport between emotion education and developmental psychology as a curious lacuna in the literature.

Behavioral strategies

Behavioral strategies span a wide terrain, all the way from situation selection (e.g. where a child might be advised to stay away from the part of the school playground where the bullies hang out), to the administration of behaviorally motivated discipline programs at school, to response modulation (e.g. muscle-relaxing techniques taught to lessen the intensity of undesirable emotions), and to bootstrapping (being taught to act out an emotion one is not feeling in order to internalize it). In general, behavioral strategies involve ways to regulate emotions by changing behavior (see further examples in Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 5).

Maxwell and Reichenbach (2007) spoke rather disparagingly of such strategies as conflating the distinction between social control and emotion education, or at least, in the case of the latter, between "pedagogies of autonomy" and "pedagogies of control." They refused to grant mere conditioning

techniques the status of *éducation sentimental* (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005). This position is faithful to the landmark philosophical study by Peters (1972), who defined the field of emotion education as an antithetical to the mere behavioral control of emotion, insisting that emotion (or, more specifically, the cognition underlying an emotion), rather than just behavioral reconditioning, is needed to control emotion. A more conciliatory stand was taken by Dunlop (1986) who objected to a "top-heavy" understanding of emotional life that refused to give credence to the more earthbound, material facets of the human condition. One thing to note here is that the distinction between the behavioral and the cognitive may sometimes be porous. For example, while bootstrapping is a behavioral strategy, it is meant, ultimately, to modify cognition (see also the below sub-section on ethos modification).

As can be seen in Table 2, which charts instances of behavioral strategies recommended in the ten discourses, the more philosophically oriented discourses tend to take the moral high ground by not invoking pure behavioral strategies. SEL occupies a middle-ground position in that it does make use of some strategies of this sort (reviewed critically in Hoffman, 2009, pp. 542–543) without giving them pride of place. The discourses that are more explicitly non-moral and instrumentalist have less compunction about including behavioral strategies in their arsenal. Most conspicuously, Social intuitionism elevates the teaching of such strategies to the driving seat. As Social intuitionists consider children to be at the mercy of their innate emotional dispositions and the social situations in which they find themselves, they understandably favor teaching them strategies by use of which they may avoid getting caught up in situations that are likely to elicit undesirable emotions (Prinz, 2007).

Cognitive and/or Attentional Reframing

As the name suggests, these strategies involve a reframing or change in the cognitions that underlie emotions. Constituting a broad umbrella, specific strategies here include exercises in alternative thinking and deliberate attentional redirection, discussion classes/stories about emotions, and lessons on conflict resolution, cultural differences, and cooperation (Brackett & Rivers, 2014). Jacobs and Gross (2014) found those to be the most effective ones in the Emotion-regulation literature, and they

are also a mainstay of SEL and many of the other discourses (see Table 2). Recently the spotlight has moved to ways in which such strategies can be made even more effective by complementing rumination on emotions that one would like to avoid with a clear implementation intention (an "if-then plan") to use if the emotion nevertheless begins to rear its head (Gallo et al., 2009).

Another recent development has been an increased focus on the study of meta-cognitive, or meta-emotional, strategies (Norman & Furnes, 2016), whereby children are taught to use one set of emotions they already possess to evaluate – in order to activate or deactivate – another set of emotions. In contrast to earlier studies indicating that young children cannot use such strategies, Davis, Levine, Lench, and Quas (2010) found that 5-and-6-year old children could. These findings are particularly salient for Aristotelian character education which sees the ideal regulation of emotion occurring through an application of the meta-virtue of *phronesis*.

As can be divined from Table 2, cognitive strategies are the bread and butter of contemporary emotion-education discourses. The only significant omissions there are Confucianism (for which direct textual evidence of such strategies could not be found, although these are probably employed in practice) and Social Intuitionism. The latter gap stands to reason, as Social intuitionists reject a cognitive view of emotion.

Ethos Modification and Emotion Contagion

Reluctantly, I ended up with this category (see Table 2) of mixed strategies that somehow straddle the distinction between behavioral and cognitive ones. The emphasis here is on how a slight modification of the ethos or natural environment can "nudge" people in the right emotional direction. For example, sitting in front of a mirror can reduce emotions triggering moral hypocrisy; being exposed to the company of calm people may induce calmness (for a review of such strategies, see Miller, 2014, pp. 237–238). Just as "nudge" interventions in the field of social policy seem to integrate insights from the contrasting political paradigms of paternalism and libertarianism (Sunstein, 2014), so emotion-education interventions in this category incorporate both cognitive and behavioral components. I

admit to having placed in this category suggestions about strategies that I found it difficult to specify as either behavioral or cognitive; and as Table 2 indicates, instances of such strategies were found in most of the discourses. Confucianism is a prime example, as it often unclear in that discourse (Mencius, 2009) whether "emotional extension," through contagion from the company of sages, implies a cognitive shift, an extension of behavioral reactions to the elicited emotion, or a mixture of the two.

As already noted, the three strategies that I have now explained occupy the most general level of analysis, whereas the remaining four constitute applications of insights from the "big three," either separately or in tandem.

Service Learning/Habituation

This strategy is about developing emotional traits as a result of exposure to situations triggering them on a regular basis in youth. At a general level, it constitutes an instantiation of systematic ethos modification (or, rather, a mediation of the student–ethos relationship) and emotion contagion. Habituation is not a purely behavioristic strategy, like bootstrapping,[18] because the exposure is meant to be guided by an emotion educator who takes the student through the steps of the emotional experience, offering explanations and feedback (Steutel & Spiecker, 2004). As this is nothing less than the chief strategy recommended by the historic discourses of Aristotelianism and Confucianism, it was enthusiastically and optimistically taken up by U.S. character educators in the 1990s, under the banners of "service learning." However, service learning did not seem to enact lasting changes in the emotional make-up of most of the students who underwent those programs (e.g. participating in charity work). Kahne & Westheimer (1996) suggested that the reason might be that the reflective

[18] As an example of the difficulty involved in characterizing some of the strategies recommended in the literature, consider the standard Positive-psychology method of letting students write gratitude or forgiveness letters. One way to understand that would be as an exercise in bootstrapping, or in habituation (if guided by a feedback-giving mentor). However, as the Positive-psychology literature seems to identify this as a pure cognitive strategy of emotion induction, I do not tick the behavioral or habituation boxes for Positive psychology in Table 2.

element was missing in many of those programs and, hence, also the opportunity for the young people to digest and make sense of the experiences they had gone through.

In the historic discourses, habituation is mixed in many ways with role modelling. In Aristotelian character education, in particular, there is insufficient explanation of how both these mentor-guided strategies are meant to morph into a process of independent reflection and adjudication – represented by the intellectual virtue of *phronesis* – during adolescence (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 3). In general, the psychology of emotional internalization through habituation – and how habituation is meant to interact with reason – is under-explored. That gap has been exploited by Social intuitionists who like the idea of emotional dispositions based on habits but who give habituation much less of a rationalist spin, foregrounding rather the origin of habits in innate, modular domains – only slightly modified and adjusted by the environment (Graham et al., 2008).

Direct Teaching

Somewhat surprisingly, I found few examples of direct classroom teaching about emotions being used as a strategy. When mentioned, it seemed to serve one of two purposes. One is to facilitate emotion literacy in children in a rudimentary sense: simply explaining to them what certain emotion concepts mean as a precursor to more advanced strategies (Carr & Harrison, 2015). The other is to complement experiential learning with some theory about why certain emotional dispositions are parts of a good life (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 11). However, there seems to be general skepticism in the literature that mere theoretical knowledge about the emotions ever suffices to regulate them.

Some of this skepticism may be unfounded. A recent meta-analysis of 19 studies aimed at emotional understanding showed such procedures to be effective in a number of ways, including the enhancement of reflective aspects of emotion (Sprung, Münch, Harris, Ebesutani, & Hofmann, 2015). A specific study of the effects of emotion-understanding training on 110 seven-year old children found the training group to outperform a control group on emotion comprehension, theory of mind, and empathy, with the outcomes remaining stable over six months (Ornaghi, Brockmeier, & Grazzani,

2014).[19] However, in some of those studies it is difficult to evaluate to what extent the effectiveness is due to the direct teaching about what emotions are and to what extent to the application of more complex literacy methods (see e.g. Carr & Harrison, 2015), discussed below in the sub-section "Arts."

Role-modelling

Role-modelling tends to be favored by discourses that highlight the moral value of emotion education – perhaps owing to the long-standing tradition of regarding role modelling (or learning from moral exemplars) as a pillar of all moral education (Damon & Colby, 2015). Role-modelling is standardly questioned in that field for the danger of degenerating into mere hero-worship and uncritical groveling at the feet of the presumed exemplars. Another possible objection concerns the threat of moral inertia, whereby the moral exemplars are seen as standing so high above the learner that idolizing them becomes disempowering rather than motivating.

Maxwell and Reichenbach (2005) discussed role-modelling as a strategy of emotion education under the heading "imitation," offering insights about its pros and cons. As already mentioned, Confucianism is specifically criticized for understanding role-modelling as little more than imitation in a narrow sense (Kim, 2008). However, in ideal forms of role-modelling, the student engages critically with the emotional life of the exemplar and is ultimately swayed by the exemplar's exemplarity rather than by her personality (Kristjánsson, 2007, chap. 7 on role modelling as "emulation"). In these ideal forms, then, "imitation" is understood to include reason-responsiveness.

Arts

[19] Although I generally refrain in this article – for reasons of space – to report on effectiveness studies, I consider it necessary to make an exception here, as these findings seem to go against received wisdom.

A fundamental strategy in Care ethics (MacKenzie, 2013) and a salient one in Aristotelian character education and SEL, the arts (in particular literature and music)[20] are often seen a unique resource to exercise the perspective-extending imagination (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005) of students, by enlarging their sensibilities, and engaging them psychologically in emotion-informing critical reflection (Carr, 2005). A standard intervention will include reading literary narratives (e.g. derived from classical sources, or fairy-tales) and entering into a discussion with students of the emotional reactions of the characters and the extent to which these are appropriate. The aim is typically not the enhancement of mere emotional understanding but rather "emotional literacy" in the wider sense of being better able to apply emotional explanations and justifications to one's own life (Carr & Harrison, 2015).

The alleged impact of music for calming and balancing emotion has been discussed since antiquity (e.g. by Aristotle, 1941, pp. 1311–1312 [1340a19–41]). To complicate matters, however, no clear distinction exists in ancient sources between "music" understood as tones without text and as tones with a text (e.g. in singing). It is, therefore, moot whether the ancients thought the effect of music occurred through its cognitive impact or not. Social intuitionists have, however, seized on music as an emotion-education strategy for its presumed non-cognitive effects in particular. Their experiments involve inducing emotions such as anger or happiness through music and then exploring the impact of those upon moral judgment (Seidel & Prinz, 2013). Although soft rationalists, such as Aristotelians or Confucians, might be interested in the same sort of experiments, they would probably interpret their findings differently, as for them a shift in emotion – say, from happiness to anger – is first and foremost a cognitive shift rather than a shift of perception or valence. This is an example of how the "same" strategy of emotion education can be motivated by, and interpreted via, contrasting theoretical assumptions.

[20] Drama does also get a mention (see e.g. Levy, 1997). For some reason, however, gaining emotional inspiration from the visual arts is rarely mentioned as a strategy of emotion education. Yet, for centuries, a fundamental role of the visual arts was precisely to sway people emotionally in particular spiritual directions.

Concluding Lessons

Despite the substantial length of this article, it offers but a brisk tour of the discourses on emotion education – given their richness, density, and sheer quantity. I toyed with various possible expansions and contractions of the criteria for inclusion, and also of the theoretical criteria for interrogating the discourses, but decided in the end to be relatively accommodating, bearing in mind the practical aim of giving newcomers to the field a sweeping view of it.

Although this "tour" may seem to have taken readers in a somewhat bewildering variety of directions, some areas of the field have had to be left out, simply for reasons of space. I have mostly ignored studies of the *effectiveness* of specific strategies or interventions. The abundance of those studies is such as to merit a review of their own. Nevertheless, it must be noted that most of those are studies of the effectiveness of specific interventions in specific schools; few whole-discourse studies exist (with the notable exception of Durlak et al., 2011, on SEL), and I could not find any that aimed at comparisons of the effectiveness of programs grounded in radically different discourses. Another area of the field – perhaps a "Pandora's box" would be a more felicitous characterization – bypassed here is about *instruments* to "measure" emotions and their development. It is arguable that researchers' love affair with self-report instruments – handy but essentially flawed because of (young) people's lack of self-transparency – seems to be coming to an end. A lively discussion is underway in academic circles – mostly mirroring more general debates about measurements of character (Kristjánsson, 2015, chap. 3) – on what can replace self-reports, with suggestions ranging from experience-sampling methods, vocabulary analyses (e.g. of Facebook or Twitter statuses), and implicit-association tests, to MRI brain scans. The problem with many of these new methods, however, is that whereas they are academically exciting, none of them lends itself easily to administration by individual teachers in individual classrooms, and "quick and dirty" versions of them have yet to materialize. While the search is on for "more fine-grained, longitudinal, and holistic" measures of students' emotions (Turner & Trucano, 2014, p. 656), the best current bet for individual teachers, who want to track the effects of emotion education, seems to be some sort of a triangulation of existing measures, combined with a large dose of their own good sense.

An initial observation about the apparent lack of transdisciplinarity and transdiscursivity in the field of emotion education was borne out in this review. Skimming through hundreds of contributions to debates about such education leaves one with the sense that too many people are paddling their own little canoes, without much interest in what fellow-travelers are doing.

The recently published *International handbook of emotions in education* (edited by Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2014) is unusually accommodating in incorporating insights from three of the discourses identified above (Academic emotions; Social and emotional learning; Emotion regulation), but its approach might more aptly be described as "interdisciplinary" than "transdisciplinary," insofar as the exploration of the discourses runs on parallel lines in the book without significant interaction.

So is this a case of hopeless divergence – or can the diverse discourses somehow be made to run in harmonious, synergic adjustments to one another? Elias and colleagues (2014) offered hope of symbiosis, at least at the theoretical level, though different set of practices would remain. My findings run in the opposite direction. I have found less variety in the actual (classroom) strategies on offer than in the underlying conceptualizations and theoretical assumptions. For example, an educational psychologist on a school visit who observed children writing gratitude letters would be hard put to determine whether this exercise was being done under the auspices of Positive psychology, SEL, Aristotelian character education, or indeed a number of other approaches. Yet even the apparent similarity of practical strategies may be specious, for if we inquired deeper into the purpose of the exercise, and what sort of psychological mechanisms it was supposed to trigger, the different theoretical assumptions would quickly come to the fore and divide opinion. Are the gratitude letters meant to broaden and build resources for doing well at school, or facilitate pro-social coordination, or cultivate an intrinsically valuable moral trait? That said, the overlap of strategies does offer some hope that a consensus might be reached, at the individual-school level, on a set of strategies of emotion education that will be useful to students, although teachers may continue to disagree on *why* they are useful.

Healing schisms at the theoretical (psychological and philosophical) level is a much taller order. Incipient theoretical tensions may easily transform into absolute antagonisms. Consider the

debate between soft rationalism and hard sentimentalism at the value-epistemological level. Soft rationalists of the Aristotelian and Confucian kind would, for example, applaud the words of Milan Kundera, the famous Czech writer, who said: “Man cannot do without feelings, but the moment they are considered values in themselves, criteria for truth, justifications for kinds of behaviour, they become frightening” (cited in Roebben, 1995, p. 188). Social intuitionists, in contrast, would pour scorn on this claim, pointing out that there is no alternative to considering feelings “values in themselves,” as we simply have no other source of ultimate value to consult. Nothing shows better than this claim how radical the recently fashionable discourse of Social intuitionism in moral psychology really is, and how it involves a complete rupture with historically prevalent rationalist (and, indeed, also soft sentimentalist) assumptions. There is simply no way in which such radically divergent epistemological assumptions might be reconciled.

The debate about the intrinsic versus the instrumentalist value of emotion education may be slightly less intractable, because of possible complementarity. Consider different emotion educators who favor the discourse on Academic emotions, on the one hand, and those who favor Aristotelian character education, on the other. There seems to be no good reason why a program of emotion education cannot, at the same time, cultivate emotions conducive to positive learning outcomes and emotions that are constitutive of the morally good life. When scholars within the discourse on Academic emotions focus on the former sort of emotions, they can charitably be interpreted as not competing with, say, Aristotelianism. They may thus also consider emotions intrinsically related to human flourishing, but simply hold either that (a) the goal of cultivating emotions for that purpose is better achieved outside of classroom contexts, or (b) although it can be achieved within classroom contexts, the fundamental role of schooling is to promote attainment in traditional subjects and that this goal must therefore be given pride of place in emotion education at school. Yet even if the general aims in these two discourses can be seen, in principle, as complementary rather than competing, hard choices are bound to emerge, in practice, because schools have limited time and resources and need to make tough decisions of priority. Making such choices explicit also sends a signal about the ethos and aims of the school to parents. Is this a school that prioritizes emotion education in the service of moral

virtues or performance virtues?[21] A pragmatic but uneasy alliance between two discourses is, therefore, not tantamount to full theoretical synthesis.

Because of the lack of transdisciplinarity, many of the divergent assumptions that have been teased out in this article often fail to come to the surface or result in (potentially healthy) confrontations. The cloistered attitude within the discourses thus masks theoretical divisions and may create a false sense of hopeful convergence in the field. A contributing factor is also the constant struggle of all emotion educators to rebut the skepticism of the detractors who deem all such efforts misguided or even sinister (recall the sub-section "General Misgivings" above). When confronted by a common enemy, the tendency is to tighten the ranks rather than to break them. However, some of the efforts at parrying counter-arguments bear the mark of a forced assimilation to a common project where there perhaps is none, except in the platitudinous sense of cultivating emotions in the service of student wellbeing (whatever that is, then, taken to mean). Some of the discourses seem to be over-theorized at the expense of the necessary gathering of empirical data. There is a reason why the theoretical analysis of the assumptions of the ten discourses occupies more space above than the analysis of practical strategies of emotion education; the latter have been under-researched in some of the discourses and would benefit from serious input from educational psychology.

Some other issues that would benefit from further discussion within and between the discourses remain hidden in the subterranean regions of the field. First, some sort of cognitivism seems to be taken for granted in most of the discourses, but what precise variety is rarely spelled out. Second, there is a surreptitious slide in many of the discourses between the claim that emotions are educable and that they are teachable. Perhaps, for all we know, some (or all) emotions are better suited to self-education than teaching by others. Third, whereas the necessary individuation of emotion education to the needs of the particular student is sometimes mentioned (see e.g. Flanagan, 2014, p. 61), this point is rarely elaborated upon in sufficient detail. The problem here is not only the

[21] This is also the reason why Aristotelian character educators are wary of recent reconceptualizations of character education as training in so-called (but misnamed) non-cognitive skills, such as grit and resiliency (see e.g. Kristjánsson, 2015). It is not so much that moral character virtues and performance character virtues are incompatible, but rather that there is danger in schools focusing on the latter that the former will be squeezed out.

common pedagogical one of one-size-fits-all interventions for a whole class, but rather that there may be something about emotion education that makes it particularly ill-suited to whole-class strategies, given the enormous variety in the emotional make-up of individual students. Fourth, questions of the role of emotions in identity-formation and the actual motivation of behavior often remain off the agendas; yet precisely those issues are salient concerns in moral psychology (see e.g. Teper, Zhong, & Inzlicht, 2015).

On balance, then, whereas the tide has helpfully turned away from views of student emotions as disruptive cries from the depths of troubled hearts, academic writings about emotion education remain an eclectic patchwork, badly in need of further exploration, reflection, and discrimination. Perhaps it is not realistic or even desirable that there would be a convergence around a single discourse or theoretical framework of emotion education. So perhaps there is a third option available to "hopeful convergence" and "hopeless divergence": chaotic but happy plurality. At all events, there is need for educational psychologists to pay greater attention to the theoretical nuances separating discourses on emotion education than they have done in the past. There is also need for them to help teachers understand the importance of emotion education and develop training on a broad range of principles and strategies that can be drawn upon to suit particular contexts and students in diverse classrooms.

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