



## **Integrating Suffering and Flourishing Through Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Case of *Moral Abduction***

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In my talk I would like to share two main ideas:

First, a methodological idea: I suggest that the process of *moral abduction* is a promising way of dealing with an integrated and interdisciplinary moral research, which connects theoretical and empirical studies by placing at the root of both (of them) a Moral Explanation to the Best Inference.

Second, an example case: I suggest that a traditional but actually fast growing problem, that is, the bearing of diverse pains within human life (physical, mental, spiritual, and so on) can be successfully addresses by applying to a triplet of virtues. The joint development of courage, hope, and practical wisdom appears to be a *morally abductive* hypothesis which might explain why some people cope with suffering better than others.

### 1. *Moral abduction* in science and morality

The pioneering work of Peterson and Seligman (2004) attempted to merge anthropological inquiry, philosophical conceptualization, and empirical research, by operationalizing character strengths and virtues mainly inspired by Aristotelian ethics, and at the same time implementing measurement tools designed for the psychological assessment. Their lead, although criticized for being either too practical or too theoretical, has been followed by many virtue-ethicists, as still one of the most fertile interdisciplinary virtue programs. More recently, positive psychology and philosophy have found a new common ground by means of its possible declinations into moral psychology, which integrates philosophical moral reasoning and experimental studies, especially within cognitive science (Hen, 2014).

Notwithstanding this, the two fields – to which the educational field should actually be added – often work separately, eventually combining their respective results as components of a joint research design. Traditionally, in interdisciplinary research philosophy takes care of the theoretical definitory part, while psychology transfers it into empirical studies. However, psychology frequently has to rely on simplified versions of philosophical concepts and definitions, in order to measure them properly; also, the experimental settings have to be artificially manipulated so to control them better. As a result, much philosophical work might be perceived as redundant or vague by psychologists, whose research questions must be practically assessed and technically analyzed. To be sure, any empirical assessment has to preliminary rely on a sort of intuition – though based in scientific literature –, guiding the ideation of any experimental design and new hypothesis, and this intuition is not itself an empirical step, although it might derive from factual observations. Indeed, the creative moment of a study, according to Charles Peirce, is an *abductive* act, which is fundamentally philosophical (Peirce, CP 5.172 ). In this paper, I maintain that the capability of realizing this Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) of a fact, often a surprising fact, also applies to ethical discourse and does entail a virtuous process, which I have called *phronetic abduction* (Navarini, Indraccolo, & Brunetti, 2021). An integrated interdisciplinary research, therefore, might be conducted by elaborating robust theoretical explanations for moral facts that must be empirically inquired, not only by offering a conceptual framework for empirical studies.

To justify that, I refer to the psychological notion of Halo Effect, which can be defined as the tendency to use the evaluation of unrelated aspects to make judgments about something or someone (Asch, 1946; Thorndike, 1920). Previous studies have shown that someone's facial appearance can affect the evaluation of their personality (Naumann, Vazire, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2009), "moral beauty" (Cui, Cheng, Lin, Lin, & Mo, 2019), trustworthiness (Wilson & Eckel, 2006), and intelligence (Talamas, Mavor, & Perrett, 2016; Zebrowitz, Hall, Murphy, & Rhodes, 2002). My colleagues and I have therefore considered whether there is a Halo Effect linking nonmoral judgments to moral ones (Navarini, Indraccolo, & Brunetti, 2021). Our

experimental results have confirmed that our moral judgments are easily based on irrelevant aspects: moral judgment about someone's virtues is affected by nonmoral aspects, like emotional expressions or facial appearance. Indeed, one of the clearer and global results of our experiments shows us that expression, independent of other aspects like gender or attractiveness, increases the participants' evaluation of someone's morality for all the virtues tested. Even if we might think that some virtues, could take advantage of a neutral emotional expression, results clearly show that all of the virtue evaluations in our experiments are favorably affected by a smiling, "happy" face (Navarini, Indraccolo, Ricci, & Brunetti, 2021).

The judging mechanism after this extension of the Halo effect is theoretically consistent with a generalizing moral attitude, according to which we basically tend to consider a situation or a person *globally*, also from a moral point of view, independent of the amount of information or knowledge we have about them. This tendency has the potential of leading to the perpetuation of stereotypes and prejudices (Doris, 2002 ; Bell, 2013), unless we find a way to defuse these "incorrect generalizations" and reach the ability to see "correctly" the larger picture. Actually, some accounts implicitly seem to admit that we can grasp the overall moral goodness (De Caro et al., 2018; De Caro & Vaccarezza, 2020; Rozmarynowska, 2019) by means of practical wisdom. If practical wisdom were employed in moral generalizations, then this "overall perception" of one's morality could be highly preserved from biases. What we abductively hypothesized, consequently, is that practical wisdom can preserve moral judgments from stereotypes and prejudice due to Halo's "incorrect generalizations," therefore *phronesis* should be developed as a preventive and protective factor against them.

Referring again to De Caro-Vaccarezza's account, I can resume the analogy between the generalizing attitude of moral abduction, mentioned here, and the *molecular* quasi-unity of virtues, under the Principle of Phronetic Charity, proposed by them. In their reading of practical wisdom, they consider how people frequently attribute agents, displaying a specific virtue, an overall goodness, as if a courageous action, or a gesture of generosity, or a just choice derived from a good (read: practically wise) character as a whole. The reason De Caro et al. (2018) hypothesize is that "[w]hen we deal with someone, we tend to unify our epistemic access to his/her moral character" (p. 301). In short, we see someone's morally good dispositions (either specific virtues or even just seemingly virtuous acts) as *situated* instances of their (probable) underlying practical wisdom or ethical expertise. We could also say that we *need* to posit something beyond the observable fact/act to give reason of the fact/act, but this *something* (practical wisdom) is not necessarily implied in the fact/act experienced, and actually it might be wrong. However, it does make sense, because we realize that (1) if a person were practically wise, (2) they would behave like that, therefore (3) they might be wise. To attribute at least a minimal level of practical wisdom to our counterpart can be seen as an abductive hypothesis. To paraphrase the late Peirce, again, this abductive step would precede the deductive and then the inductive steps – which might confirm and stabilize the abductive hypothesis – while representing a crucial and unique path to the ethical understanding of other people. In the next future we would like in fact to empirically explore the correlation between higher levels of practical wisdom and lower levels of "incorrect generalizations" to test this moral abductive hypothesis.

## 2. Flourishing and suffering *via* virtue development

As mentioned above, in some recent works my colleagues and I have maintained that taking a hypothesis which reasonably, and at the same time creatively, explains a combination of specific facts is common both

in moral science and in everyday moral life. In the three empirical studies we have conducted we have demonstrated the existence of incorrect moral generalizations, especially regarding people's virtuosity, and abductively claim that a practical wise attitude might prevent or mitigate those generalizations, by either replacing them with most likely correct ones or suspending the generalizing judgement.

Now I would like to venture another possible application of this methodology: Starting with an abductive explanation, I will formulate a hypothesis that calls for an inductive experimental design and stimulates further theoretical (eventually deductive) articulation. In this respect, I distance myself from the Peircean idea that abduction induces first a deductive process and then an inductive one. The two derived processes might follow without a predetermined order, while it is necessary – according to this view – that the moral abductive explanation precedes inductions and deductions, as a light illuminating both of them.

The moral abduction I wish to illustrate here concerns the relationship between suffering and flourishing (Fowers, Richardson, & Slife, 2017). The issue whether it is possible to flourish despite suffering, in fact, might be given a full answer if moral philosophy and moral psychology work together *via* moral abduction. Quite obviously, it is not possible to deduce the connection between suffering and virtue development, inferring through a top-down process if and which virtues eventually promote a better management of suffering. There might be, at the most, a premise assuming the co-existence of suffering and happiness, which in turn makes it possible to flourish despite suffering. Unfortunately I do not have time here to illustrate this inference in detail; suffice it to say, suffering and flourishing are not contradictory concepts, therefore it makes sense to search for the sufferer's virtues, or also the patient's virtues. This has two possible meanings: a) to search for the virtues which better help the sufferer bearing their burden; b) to search for the virtues more frequently allowed or induced by suffering. In the first case, we begin from the reality of suffering as a fact, and interpret the virtues as a means to promote flourish in any case. In the second, we might interpret suffering as a means (optional or necessary) to obtain the virtues. In what follows, I will adopt the first perspective, thus distancing myself a little bit from accounts such as Michael Brady's and James Kidd's.

Not only the relationship between suffering and flourishing through virtues cannot be derived deductively, it also cannot be induced by simply observing practical examples of people handling their pains more successfully. Some factual co-existence between one's character traits and "resilience to pain" are unlikely to appear sound enough to be taught as a safe pathway to suffering management, since the individual and situational variables are almost impossible to control. In addition, the statistical frequency of some virtues in pain-resilient persons is very unlikely to be detected if we have not already hypothesized which dispositions to pick. In other words, we need a preliminary Moral Explanation to the Best Inference to test.

In line with this, a few ethical models have underlined a positive relationship between suffering and flourishing, suggesting the first be mediated by virtue development in general (Miles 2019; Wright, Snow, & Warren 2020), or by specific clusters of virtues, such as the triplet of courage, hope, and practical wisdom. This intriguing cluster was originally suggested by Karen Lebacqz (1985) and subsequently resumed by Campbell & Swift (2013). The proposal can be abductively suggested as the best explanation to a number of "surprising" ethical facts, namely, the different moral reactions of people to their own suffering experience. It might also explain why some people are "better sufferers" and how they can often preserve some joy and peacefulness within suffering, as Miles (2019) puts it: "why do some people flourish despite their chronic illness while others languish?" (p. 141). The moral abductive explanation to test would be that

certain virtues play a decisive role, contributing to facing tough times. This hypothesis is generated by the plausibility of its explicative power: It would be a reasonable interpretation of relevant facts.

### 3. The triplet of courage, wisdom, and hope

To describe the plausibility of this cluster, a powerful starting point is Miles' assertion that "Virtuous patients adjust their expectations and find ways to continue flourishing even when their prior state cannot be recovered" (Miles, 2019, 147). I believe these words summarize the entire program of a virtue ethics applied to the condition of illness and pain, which Elena Ricci has recently addressed as *illfuness* (Ricci, forthcoming). Indeed, this definitory sentence synthetically represents the possibility of human flourishing despite suffering through virtues, and specifically through certain virtues. I argue it has the form of a morally abductive explanation, because it constitutes a plausible hypothesis in light of the surprising fact that some people cope with suffering successfully. The hypothesis is plausible because the conceptualizations on those three virtues account for their synergic and explicative potential when suffering is at stake. Let us examine the triplet of courage, phronesis, and hope in their general mutual relationships, and with respect to the multifaceted experience of suffering. To support the idea that they work as a cluster, I will consider the three possible matches: courage-phronesis; phronesis-hope; hope-courage.

Such a description aims at justifying the cluster as a reasonable explanation of one's ability to cope with suffering, in the light of self-regarding virtues, but without excluding the role of other-regarding ones which in this paper I cannot deal with.

A preliminary objection should also be discussed. One might object that practical wisdom is a meta-virtue and for this reason cannot be part of specific clusters: according to a broad Aristotelian-Thomistic account, practical wisdom is essential to develop any virtue, therefore it would be tautological to include it in a group. However, there is a twofold reason to keep it in the cluster, thus preserving the original Lebacqz's virtues of the patient. On the one hand, the identification of phronesis as a "virtue supervisor" is still a theoretical proposal and not an evidence, therefore does not imply its exclusion from clusters in which appears to have an essential function; on the other hand, the event that phronesis belongs to any group of virtues does not neutralize the particular meaning and role it may have in different combinations.

### 4. Phronesis and Courage

In his essay on *Fortitude and wisdom* (2018), Angelo Campodonico noticed that these two virtues are strictly connected, and that their deep interaction allows to comprehend each of them better. Commonly speaking, the virtue of "prudence" is often understood as "being cautious", so reducing one of its more traditional meanings, namely, the *recta ratio agibilium*<sup>1</sup>. Aristotle mentioned this aspect when he stressed the phronesis ability of choosing the right means to an end, although this action surely involve also some knowledge and choice of the end(s).

Since such a function necessarily requires an experiential and applicative dimension, namely, the ability of adapting moral strategies and values to the situation *hic et nunc*, it is obvious that that phronesis cooperates with more or less all the virtues. Vaccarezza (2018) highlighted this concept by saying that practical wisdom is a "moral and existential integrator" or "ethical expertise" (De Caro-Vaccarezza, 2021) coordinating the other virtues, while Snow attributes it with the property of selecting the most suitable virtues in the specific situation. In addition, I have already ventured that phronesis may have an explicit

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<sup>1</sup> S. Th., I-II, q. 57, a. 4, co.

abductive character itself, enabling it to innovate and create moral meanings and reason for acting, which may diverge from either a deductive or an inductive argument. The typical creativity of practical wisdom is therefore an opportunity also to reinterpret suffering by adding new cognitive and behavioral criteria.

Taken together, adaptability and creativity characterize *phronesis* functioning also within illness or suffering: they show its ability to attribute novel meaning to life experience, which is so important for the sufferer. To put it another way, the practically wise person does not act within rigid moral schemes, but develops flexibility and open mindedness (Campodonico, 2018), which in turn render them keen to humility, as an attitude of seeing themselves objectively without focusing solely on limitations. As recognized by Havi Carel, facing the complex challenges and novelties posed by suffering is crucial for the sufferer. For this reason, practical wisdom might become a key tool in dealing with any kind of pain, including pathologies, by encouraging the adaptative process to disease progression and by creatively generating new priorities in life, according to the patient's increasing needs at all levels: physical, psychological, moral, spiritual.

Not only practical wisdom highlights the *particular* good to achieve, but - after Campodonico - it supervises the acquisition of it, while securing both the object and the end(s). In this respect, courage encounters wisdom and "helps" it by fostering perseverance in good actions. The trait of perseverance can be therefore interpreted as a common feature of courage and wisdom: as stated by Lebacqz, courage implies both resistance or perseverance, and the audacity or fighting spirit to pursue the "best good". Courage contributes to wisdom, making it stronger when the particular good is difficult to achieve.

On the other hand, *phronesis* enlightens courage. Campodonico argues that courage - or fortitude - is more articulated than grit, precisely because of the contribution of practical wisdom. Without wisdom, indeed, courage might become even obsessive, addressing unreasonable or improper objects. On the contrary, the virtue of courage implies the acquired disposition to practically achieve a hard good, not the mere firm disposition to accomplish one's will. In other words, strong will is certainly an observable feature of courage, however, courage has to identify specific objects - connected to overcoming fears or obstacles - which constitute specific perceived goods. This dimension is crucial for the sufferer, as stated by the founder of palliative care, Cicely Saunders, who observed that many terminally ill patients developed simultaneously the qualities of courage and wisdom (Saunders, 1967).

In the end, *phronesis* makes courage more focused and "not obsessive", while courage makes practical wisdom perseverant and active. This relationship, however, avoids a fundamental aspect: courage requires not only the identification of the hard good to achieve (through practical wisdom), but also the conditions of feasibility of this good. That is to say, courage has to consider both the end, as the motivational background of action, and the concrete possibility of reaching it, namely, its actual accessibility.

## 5. Courage and Hope

To deal with the accessibility of a good is indeed a prerogative of hope, which is typically a transcendent virtue, for being directed towards the future (beyond the present) and towards the "other" (beyond the self). In turn, these aspects have been classically described in terms of desire and perseverance. As a matter of fact, the hopeful person strives to overcome the obstacles and aims at a positivity which goes further than probability calculations. Transcendence allows hope being strictly connected to courage, and consequently to *phronesis*, by means of perseverance, which is precisely the quality of remaining directed towards the objective despite unsatisfactory results.

Moreover, perseverance permits the distinction between hope and optimism: while optimism is the confidence to achieve a goal, hope is wider and not necessarily related to good results, because it can be employed even if the aim is not accomplished, so showing its similarity and complementarity with courage. Aristotle differentiates the virtue hope from hybrid forms like optimism, defining the latter a pseudo-hope, which corresponds to pseudo-courage, that is, to naïve self-confidence. Examples of naïve self-confidence are: the acritical certainty that “everything will be fine”, blindly trusting one’s good luck, the ignorance of perils, and so on. It is not coincidence that Aristotle introduces hope precisely with reference to courage, showing how the first contributes to the second.

Fröding, interpreting Aristotle, clarifies that the hopeful is not necessarily courageous, because they might be only emotionally hopeful (as opposed to virtuously hopeful), whereas courage would always entail hope, since the courageous person must be confident regardless of fear and danger. In short, apparently Aristotle claims that hope implies courage, through the mediation of “confidence” or “trust”, which could work – as G. Scott Gravlee (2000) suggests – as the medium term of the following syllogism: “courageous ones are confident. Confident ones are hopeful. Therefore, courageous ones are hopeful” (p. 465). Importantly, this confidence does not descend from certainties, but rather from the opposite, namely, from uncertainties transformed by virtue hope. As Adam Kadlac (2015) synthesizes it, hope “represents a corageous response to an uncertain future” (p. 342).

Simultaneously, courage has a protective role against despair and hopelessness, as Simon Wein argues: “A courageous state of mind is a powerful antidote to loss of hope” (p. 42). This allows me to conclude provisionally that courage has the prerogative of mediating between opposite emotions (scare and lack of fear), although the *medietas* of courage is not an arithmetical centre between them, but a middle position tending more to recklessness than to cowardly, as the first sounds more akin to audacity, which is an emotion often associated to courage.

At the same token, fear is co-essential to courage (Navarini & De Monte, 2019). In this respect, the courageous continues to be afraid while they exercise this virtue, however, for being virtuous, they generally overcome their fears without too much effort. Consequently, the disposition of courage is not primarily qualified by objective dangers, rather by the perceived fear by the subject. To take an example, a claustrophobic will have to activate the virtue courage to enter into a lift, as much as a paratrooper for a complex parachute jump.

The experiences of illness and pain induce a constant elaboration of fear, from the diagnosis all along the history of the pathology, involving sub-fears like the fear of a surgery, fear of pain, fear of losing the hair, of losing autonomy, of being forever unable of doing certain things again, of dying. Each sub-fear calls for the virtue courage that, when it is full-blown, may represent a protective factor against the anguish typically associated to the late phase of disease. The interaction of hope and courage can lead to innovative articulations of failure experience, thanks to moral imagination, which finally becomes – as Mavis Biss claims - imaginative excellence (2013, p. 949).

### *6. Hope and practical wisdom*

Hope, for its projective dimension, might sound inappropriate to a condition like suffering or illness, which frequently narrow one’s potentialities and perspectives. However, several palliative care studies have demonstrated that hope is one of most wished dispositions among seriously ill or even dying people. This finding is shared by the thanatologist Elizabeth Kübler-Ross, who have always maintained that hope is the bulwark that never yields completely during the patient’s disease history. The discovery of a new treatment, a medical error, a miracle, or a terrific reaction of the body to the therapy: every remote hope

can be a foothold for the sick. Even if these hopes might be seen more as emotion hope than as a virtue hope, it is nevertheless interesting that this feeling does exist in so many sufferers' experience, because this might be the ground on which a program of moral development for the patient might take place, in order to help them optimize their resources and goals. Although hope, in this case, can't be directed towards a full recovery, it can point at other relevant objectives, such as the highest possible wellbeing, life after death, the good of the beloved ones, a renewed ability to better comprehend oneself and the others, etc. The sick might, in other words, work on themselves in order to become a better person, thus gaining deep satisfaction e intimate peace.

Not surprisingly, a lot of psychological and psychiatric research associates the lack of hope to death wish and risk of suicide. Indeed, many studies suggest that the lack of hope correlates with depressive tendency and disengagement towards life more than the disease itself, and that hopelessness seems to be tied to defying or absent early palliative care. Also, Yechiel Michael Barilan underlines that – particularly in terminal illness – hope is crucial element, although in this stage of life it would not be any more a matter of projection towards the future, but rather the aspiration to realizing some personal important value.

The tendency to self-fulfillment which stems from hope can be, in this respect, independent of time-projection – as it is typical of youth and healthy people - , and be instead compatible with suffering and serious illness, since it might regard an “interior projection”. Therefore, this virtuous attitude can be characterized by the ability to develop certain fundamental traits, enabling the sufferer to better grasp their ultimate goals and overall flourishing. In her studies about hope in terminal illness, Kaye Herth, also author of the still widely used *Hope Herth Scale* - has hypothesized that the deepest component of hope is something stable and unchanging, whereas particular hopes might be changing and engage over the core hope.

This characterization of hope, together with other conceptualizations that either within psychology or philosophy have been elaborated, reinforces the idea that hope entails a constant reference to transcendence, which also implies the ability to search for different solutions when our way of reaching the goal is unsuccessful, as already clarified. Hence, the disposition to look for alternative ways when the foreseen path is not available, as stated in the programmatic quotation of Miles, represents a constitutive aspect of this virtue, displaying its essential components of tenacity and perseverance in approaching the end.

Moreover, the virtue hope circumscribes the legitimacy of its objects, that is, it differentiates them from mere illusions, since the object of hope requires a wise, reasonable deliberation. The question whether it is legitimate and possible to hope an impossible object requires the intervention practical wisdom. Some kinds of physical impossibility can be legitimately hoped, because they apply to different orders of reality, such as a metaphysical perspective or a new scientific paradigm, which make the physically “impossible” hope something extraordinary but far from nonsense. This is why, for instance, a very sick person can hope until the very last moment that a new therapy might health them, or that a supernatural divine power might make a miracle. On the other hand, hope for something contradictory, such as a change in something that already happened or a totally unreasonable object like launching without a parachute, would be unwise and pointless.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Barilan sembra negarlo risolutamente: “Noi non dirigeremo mai le nostre speranze verso l'impossibile; nemmeno ci impegnamo a dirigere le nostre speranze a ciò che è più probabile o meno difficile. Abbiamo bisogno di ragioni per



To be sure, the certainty about the impossibility that a fact occurs is quite rare. More often, the subject *fears* it is impossible, but within uncertainty hope can live and flourish, since it does surely coexist with something which is not likely. The unlikeliness even represent a typical context for hope: for example, a promising athlete might be unlikely to breaking the world record in their sport, but being uncertain of that, they will keep on training while cultivating that hope. When disease and suffering are at stake, this idea becomes crucial. Hence, the disposition to read the situation and act accordingly, typical of practical wisdom, apply to the ability of activating the virtue hope in order to achieve future goals.

Stepping back to Mile's statement about the virtuous patient, I find it remarkable that, although it refers to practical wisdom, it suits well the concepts of hope, and indirectly also of courage, presented here. This reinforces the connection between hope and phronesis (and also courage). As I have argued before, hope involves the subject's agentivity and far looking sight, while phronesis the choice of the right object to hope and the means to reach it. Indeed, practical wisdom might regulate the emotions motivating one to accommodate their concrete choices towards the good or even the best.<sup>3</sup>

Conclusion: phronetic abduction as a way of fostering an empirically plausible moral philosophy

The three virtues actually share important traits, and taken together appear to be particularly significant when someone is facing suffering and hardness (Navarini, forthcoming). Consequently, the moral abduction beneath the hypothesis of the virtues cluster, which helps coping with suffering, would represent the necessary and sufficient philosophical step towards a founded empirical assessment.

In this particular case, it would mean giving an abductive explanation to the fact that some patients and sufferers to better cope with their hard times, by suggesting that they have or develop a triplet of virtues (courage, hope, and practical wisdom). This Explanation to the Best Inference is born thanks to the knowledge of the literature on the topic, the philosophical reflection, and the creative intuition of what seems to be a good idea, which has turned to be consistent with the principles – if I can call them like that – or better the methodology of virtue ethics. In this respect, I contest the Percean need of the deductive phase after the abductive generation of the hypothesis, because – as I explain in a joint work earlier this year – within morality, *moral abduction* is enough to ground the legitimacy of the hypothesis without applying to moral principles or rules. What has to follow, then, to confirm and eventually expand the model, is an empirical – obviously inductive - part of the research, testing the triplet in selected people (first in a pilot study, and then more largely). At the European University of Rome, as part of Aretai research group, we are now working at the design of this study.

My proposal is, in conclusion, that taking into account this methodological perspective of may contribute to a more successful cooperation of philosophy and empirical sciences within virtue ethics, while representing a virtuous way of doing research.

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credere; abbiamo bisogno di scelte libere e di senso di coerenza per sperare" (Y.M. Barilan, *From Hope in Palliative Care to Hope as a Virtue and a Life Skill*, cit., p. 172).

<sup>3</sup> C. Navarini, *Cure palliative simultanee e sviluppo delle virtù*, cit., p. 135. Non si tratta tuttavia qui del fine ultimo. Esso, in una prospettiva eudemonistica di stampo aristotelico, corrisponde alla piena realizzazione della persona, cioè alla felicità e/o allo *human flourishing*. E questo fine, per Aristotele, non è oggetto di deliberazione in quanto è ciò a cui l'uomo tende sempre e comunque "per natura".

