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Antecedents to Professional Integrity

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Professional integrity should be understood in the context of the aims, values, and standards of specific professions, rather than just in relation to professions generally or to some broader notion of personal integrity. However, we will argue, attainment of some degree of personal integrity *prior* to preparing oneself for any particular profession is essential to becoming a professional with integrity. Thus, the path one takes that ultimately leads to professional integrity needs to be undertaken long before one has begun to prepare for any specific profession. Such a path, however, is traversed largely with others, not alone. That is, it is a *social* path. Advancing on this path in the direction of integrity requires developing such character traits as honesty, fairmindedness, self-respect and respect for others, and commitment to fulfilling ones responsibilities with dedication, competence, and thoroughness. These character traits are valued in anyone, not just those who are preparing to enter a particular profession; but, as we will urge, they are especially needed in professional life.

However, consider the challenge posed by the sort of individual 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume invites us to imagine, the sensible knave. Such a knave does his best to *appear* to be honest, reliable, and supportive of general social order. Yet, says Hume:¹

[A]ccording to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

The knave, says Hume, seems willing to trade his *integrity* for ‘worthless toys and gewgaws’. As long as he does not undermine the appearance of being above reproach, he has no problem positioning himself to gain personally from making himself an exception to the rule.

Of course, despite his exclusive interest in personal advantage and gain, a sensible knave, like others, navigates his way along a social path in life. He is very much tuned into what others expect from him. But, having the appearance of being cooperative, reliable, and trustworthy is all that he requires of himself. Although, like all of us, the knave wants the services and protections a well ordered society can provide, he is quite willing secretly to make himself an exception to the rules and practices if this does not threaten to undermine the social order that all of us want.

Extending this sort of knavery into the professional world, consider this recently reported story.² Dr. Aria Sabit, a neurosurgeon in the USA pled guilty to convincing patients to undergo spinal surgery requiring the use of costly stabilizing devices. However, he did not actually use these devices. He fraudulently billed insurance companies for this work, as well as for implants that were tissue rather than implants. Owner and operator of Michigan Brain and Spine Physicians Group, located in various places in the metropolitan Detroit, Michigan area, Dr. Sabit successfully engaged in such practices for several years. He admitted to unlawfully billing the government and private insurance companies for \$11 million for performing unnecessary and possibly harmful spinal surgeries on patients. U.S. Attorney Barbara McQuade commented: “This case of health care fraud is particularly egregious because Dr. Sabit caused serious bodily injury to his patients by acting out of his own greed instead of the best interests of his patients.... Not only did he steal \$11

¹ David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (in *Hume’s Enquiries*), edited by Paul Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 282-3.

²This account is based on article by Tresa Baldas, *Detroit Free Press*, “Surgeon Pleads Guilty in 11M Fraud Case: Admits to Unnecessary Procedures on Patients,” Saturday, May 23, 2015, 8A.

million in insurance proceeds, but he also betrayed his trust to patients by lying to them about the procedures that were medically necessary and that were actually performed.”

Dr. Sabit was a qualified neurosurgeon, fully licensed to practice. However, his sense of how to conduct himself in this professional role was a radical departure from the norms of his profession and the expectations of his patients, colleagues and the public. To succeed for several years as he did required him cleverly to conceal his activities from others—patients, fellow surgeons, and the public. Like Hume’s sensible knave, he made himself the exception to the rules and commonly accepted practices while publically appearing to be supportive of them. Ultimately, Dr. Sabit’s knavery was discovered, but not before it caused serious harms.

William F. May’s reflections on the opportunities for at least limited success at professional knavery should give us some cause for worry. In his “Professional Virtue and Self-Regulation,” May expresses concern about our increasing dependence on professionals to provide us with competent, reliable service:³

Few others—whether lay people or other professionals—know what any given expert is up to. [They] had better be virtuous. Few may be in a position to discredit [them]. The knowledge explosion is also an ignorance explosion; if knowledge is power, then ignorance is powerlessness. Although it is possible to devise structures that limit the opportunities for the abuse of specialized knowledge, ultimately one needs to cultivate virtue in those who wield that relatively inaccessible power. One test of character and virtue is what a person does when no one else is watching. A society that rests on expertise needs more people who can pass that test.

Although May does not explicitly spell out what passing this test requires, it is clear that Dr. Sabit would fail. He lacked the sort of professional integrity that would have rendered him trustworthy. Still, he passed all of the tests required to qualify him as a licensed neurosurgeon. So, although having professional integrity is regarded by May to be a fundamental prerequisite for being a trustworthy professional, licensed entry into the profession of being a neurosurgeon does not require passing May’s test.

May’s test concerns what a professional does when no one is watching. This is a test for all professionals, not just neurosurgeons (or dentists, or lawyers, or engineers,....). In fact, it is a test for anyone who is entrusted with responsibilities, whether or not he or she either is or will ever become a professional. We need baby-sitters to pass this test; for a period of time they are entrusted with the care of younger children, but without themselves being watched. We need children who are taking examinations to pass this test. We need children who are given tasks to complete without immediate supervision to pass this test. Of course, as May points out, the stakes for all of us are quite high when it comes to professionals. But, even though May’s test can be passed (or failed) in some settings even as a young child, one does not become a neurosurgeon, lawyer, or engineer as a child. The settings in which one works as a neurosurgeon, lawyer, or engineer are obviously not the same as the home, the playground, or the classroom. Time, experience, and specialized learning are needed to ready oneself for commitment to the particular responsibilities of this or that profession. But appreciating the importance of accepting and fulfilling responsibilities is as fundamental to readying oneself for commitment to professional life as developing math skills is for those who eventually will become accountants, engineers, or scientists.

³ William F. May, “Professional Virtue and Self-Regulation.” In *Ethical Issues in Professional Life*, edited by Joan Callahan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 408.

Let's now turn for a moment to the once popular comic strip *Calvin and Hobbes*. Six-year-old Calvin seems to be in the early phases of sensible knavery. On a spectrum of responsibility, ranging from 'minimalist' at the lower end to 'exemplary' at the upper end, Calvin resides at the minimalist end. Occasionally he makes his bed, winning effusive praise from his mother. He explains to his stuffed tiger buddy, Hobbes, that he operates this way in order to impress his mother by, as he puts it, fulfilling the *least* of his obligations. We can imagine that he doesn't fuss over rumpled sheets under the smoothed over blanket. She'll never look, and never be the wiser—or so he thinks. His motto is: "Look out for No. 1." Take on the appearance of being good, but be on the lookout for opportunities to take shortcuts, avoid or minimize responsibilities, break the rules for personal gain, and so on when you can get away with it. Imagine Calvin gradually working out the complexities of becoming a successful, adult sensible knave. Now he is 24, about to launch his professional career—and still living by his motto, "Look out for No. 1." What kind of a professional will he be?

Alternatively, imagine that by the time Calvin is ready to enter the professional world, he has changed into a young man ready to commit to his professional role in ways that exemplify professional integrity. That is, he now has the sort of character and virtue that May says we need professionals to have. However, let us imagine not only that Calvin has dropped his "Look out for Number 1" motto, but let us also imagine *how* and *when* these changes might have occurred. What sorts of social and educational factors might help account for this? Here, Adam Smith, Hume's contemporary and friend may be of some help.

In his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith presents an account of moral development that emphasizes the dependence children have on others—parents, teachers, and other adults, as well as other children—for self-awareness and self-assessment.⁴ Others serve as "mirrors" for us. Smith acknowledges that we have a natural tendency to favor our own well-being and fate over others. This natural tendency is with us throughout our lives. However, as we move from early childhood to adulthood, most of us learn, through interaction with others, to regulate this tendency in ways that others find more or less acceptable. Smith comments:

[T]hough the ruin of our neighbor may affect us much less than a very small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that small misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin. We must, here, as in all other cases view ourselves not so much according to that light in which we may naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally appear to others. Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant part of it. Though his own happiness may be of more importance to him than that of all the world besides, to every other person it is of no more consequence than that of any other man. Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to them. When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with. They will indulge it so far as to allow him

⁴ References in this draft will be to the Kindle edition, printed for A. Millar, in the Strand, and A. Kincaid and J. Bell in Edinburgh.

to be more anxious about, and to pursue with more earnest assiduity, his own happiness than that of any other person. Thus far, whenever they place themselves in his situation, they will readily go along with him. In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should jostle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other, and cannot go along with the motive from which he hurt him. (TMS, pp. 69-70)

So, let us imagine that in his efforts to make his way into the social world, Calvin finds enough resistance to his early championing of “Look out for No. 1” that he eventually comes to see himself as others see him, and he tries to adopt the constraints placed on him by the perspective of an “impartial spectator”. He sees these constraints as reasonable and fair. How this will work itself out in professional life for him depends on the profession he chooses and the specific challenges that come with that choice. However, we may suppose, by the time he is preparing to become a professional, he has already abandoned “Look out for No. 1” as his sole and guiding principle. He is readying himself to enter a profession whose primary end is to provide services to others. As he is developing his abilities to provide those services, he already recognizes that others can reasonably expect him to commit to using them competently, fairly, and in accordance with the professed aims of his profession. This, Calvin realizes, is what is required of a responsible professional. Such a professional can be said to have professional integrity.

However, important as having professional integrity is, this is distinguishable from being an exemplary professional. In addition to being committed to their professions and the values they profess to support, exemplary professionals are often seen “going the extra mile,” even making personal sacrifices—seemingly for the sake of those they serve. Few professionals may be exemplary in this way. But neither are the professions filled with sensible knaves. This leaves most professionals somewhere in between the knavish and the exemplary on a spectrum of responsibility: acting responsibly for the most part—not merely minimally, but not to an exemplary degree either. Thus, there seems to be much room for the *good* professional—a professional who exhibits the sort of character and virtue that May says is needed in a society, like ours, that is highly dependent on the knowledge, expertise, competence and commitment that professionals are expected to have.

To illustrate this, let us consider the following fictional scenario: Alex has come to the office of Dr. Alicia Forbes for a dental examination. He fills out forms concerning his medical history and his acceptance of the standard dental procedures that will be used in Dr. Forbes office. Just six months earlier his teeth passed inspection with flying colors. Although he has been experiencing no dental discomfort, Alex is told that his bridge, installed more than 10 years ago, needs to be replaced. He is shown an x-ray of the bridge, the teeth supporting it at either end, as well as an area associated with the bridge that, Alex is told, indicates some minor decay. Left untreated, the decay will increase, a root canal may be eventually needed, and the bridge itself will fail to be supported. Alex understands the basic picture being presented to him, but not as the dentist does. He lacks Dr. Forbes’s expertise. At the same time, he trusts her judgment, and he has confidence in her ability to correct the problem. An appointment is made to have the bridge work done.

Alex is a compliant patient. He opens his mouth wider when instructed to do so. He gratefully accepts Dr. Forbes’s administration of whatever pain-numbing ingredients she offers. He sits

quietly and remains as calm as he can while Dr. Forbes probes around in his mouth with instruments he cannot see. Although Dr. Forbes has access to drills, mirrors, and other instruments that aid her in proceeding, Alex cannot peer into his mouth as Dr. Forbes can and does. From time-to-time Dr. Forbes gives Alex a “progress report”, indicating that there is just a little more decay to remove, that a small clamp is going to be put here or there, and so on. Alex has some grasp of what is going on; but, again, he cannot see what Dr. Forbes is doing—and even if he could, his understanding of what she is doing, and why she is doing it, would be quite limited.

For Alex, what he is undergoing is anything but routine. It has been years since the bridge was installed. He had no better understanding of the process than he does of the current repair work. Brushing his teeth is routine—a daily task. He can even watch in the mirror as he brushes if he wishes. It is good that he has this routine—and that it is a routine for him. It is straightforward, takes relatively little time, keeps his teeth reasonably clean and healthy, and refreshes his breath (at least for a few minutes). Allowing someone to work on his bridge is unusual, and not something he looks forward to.

For Dr. Forbes, working on other people’s teeth *is* routine. She does it nearly every day. Much of this work is quite repetitive, but some of it presents her with special challenges—surprises, delicate maneuvers, difficulties in determining which is the better option, difficulties in helping patients decide what to do. But dealing with such challenges also has its routine aspects (e.g., standard ways of going about addressing them, not skipping important steps, asking relevant questions). She has much experience repairing bridges, removing decay, and the like.

Question: Can we sensibly say that a professional who is conducting herself “routinely” may be exhibiting *professional virtue*? Can routine behavior on the part of a professional be understood in terms of virtue? It would seem that May’s answer is, yes. If dentists were to carry on their work as Dr. Forbes does, they would be trustworthy in just the ways that May is commending.

But it is important to realize that May is not necessarily focusing attention on *exemplary* professionals; nor is he focusing on *extraordinary* challenges in professional life. His point is as applicable to the everyday, ordinary life of professionals as to extraordinary circumstances.

What might we expect from ordinary, responsible professionals?

- Knowledge, competence, skills
- Commitment to make good use of the above—consistent with the professed purposes of the professions in question
- Rejection of “look out for No. 1” as one’s first, and only, principle
- “Routine” behavior (standard procedures, reasonable care) consistent with the above—marked by minimal struggle with this for the most part. [Contrast this with Dr. Sabit, who was not only seriously tempted to do questionable things, but actually did them—things that most neurosurgeons, we hope, would not only not do but to which they would not give serious thought.]

So, assuming that no stories are circulating about our fictional Dr. Forbes falling short in any of the above, is it reasonable for us to conclude that she exhibits, to at least some significant degree, moral character and virtue as a professional—that she has professional integrity? We believe that it is. This does not imply that she is an exemplary professional, nor that she is in any way extraordinary as a professional (although further observations might suggest that she is).

Attributing moral character and virtue to ordinary, but responsible, professionals might be thought to trivialize professional virtue. Virtue, it may be objected, should be restricted to excellence, a much rarer attribute. Something like this would seem to be Smith’s view when he says: “The

amiable view of humanity requires surely a sensibility, much beyond what is possessed by the rude vulgar of mankind. The great and exalted virtue of magnanimity undoubtedly demands much more than that degree of self command, which the weakest of mortals is capable of exerting. As in the common degree of the intellectual qualities, there is no abilities; so in the common degree of the moral, there is no virtue. Virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary.” (TMS, Sect. I, Ch. V, “Of the amiable and respectable virtues,” 16.) But, we reply, “routine” professional behavior is no mean accomplishment, combining, as it does, competence, skill, sensitivity, dedication, and the acquisition of reliable habits that can be expected to come with professional experience.

Surprisingly, elsewhere Smith advances a position about professional virtue inconsistent with the above and which, in fact, seems much closer to ours. There Smith says:

In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and that to fortune, at least, as men in such stations can reasonably expect to acquire, are, happily in most cases, very nearly the same. In all the middling and inferior professions, real and solid professional abilities, joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success. Abilities will even sometimes prevail where the conduct is by no means correct. Either habitual imprudence, however, or injustice, or weakness, or profligacy, will always cloud, and sometimes depress altogether, the most splendid professional abilities. Men in the inferior and middling stations of life, besides, can never be great enough to be above the law, which must generally overawe them into some sort of respect for, at least, the more important rules of justice. The success of such people, too, almost always depends upon the favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and without a tolerably regular conduct these can very seldom be obtained. The good old proverb, therefore, That honesty is the best policy, holds, in such situations, almost always perfectly true. In such situations, therefore, we may generally expect a considerable degree of virtue; and fortunately for the good morals of society, these are the situations of by far the greater part of mankind. (TMS, 50)

Some may object that our more inclusive account of professional virtues flies in the face of empirical evidence that casts doubt on the significance of virtues in any form. However, William Damon and Anne Colby’s recent *The Power of Ideals: The Real Story of Moral Choice* (Oxford, 2015) criticizes recent attacks on the virtues by “neuro-ethics” experimentalists such as Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene, and Joshua Knobe. Their approach, Damon and Colby say, is to present participants in ethics experiments with troubling scenarios, many of which would fail a ‘reality test’ (the various hypothetical trolley problems, for example). As the details of these scenarios vary, the participants’ neurological brain patterns are mapped. Various conclusions about moral decision-making, as well as moral character and the virtues,—are drawn from these mappings. Character and virtue do not fare well in such empirical studies.

However, Damon and Colby note that the idea of ‘moral commitment’ does not seem to be featured in these studies, only our responses to, hypothetical episodes—episodes that are both disturbing and unusual. In short, object Damon and Colby, unrepresentative, hypothetical examples are used as the basis for concluding that, in general, moral character and virtues are ineffectual or absent. In contrast, moral commitment is best approached over an extended period of time, rather than episodically. So, Damon and Colby chose as their field of study the lives of several well-known, widely admired people regarded as moral exemplars. Evidence of their moral commitment was extracted from biographical accounts of how the exemplars conducted themselves over a lifetime.

In his discussion of the virtues, Aristotle is famous for saying that “one swallow does not a summer make.” He adds, “nor one fine day; similarly one day of brief time of happiness does not make a person entirely happy.” What he says about happiness applies as well to his view of the virtues. Virtues are associated with habits—which extend over time and therefore cannot be understood in terms of single (or even a few) episodes in which this or that does or does not occur. So, it seems fair to ask what would be the neurological markers of either the presence or absence of moral commitment—or of the presence or absence of the various virtues associated with moral commitment.

Further, what kinds of circumstances might best exemplify opportunities to show the presence or absence of moral commitment? Damon and Colby rightly note that observing the on-going brain activity of someone asked to share his or her reactions to hypothetical scenarios of unusual moral dilemmas or “disgusting” behavior provides a very slim basis for concluding anything about the presence or absence of moral commitment in more ordinary circumstances.

If we narrow our focus to the day-to-day life of professionals at work, the same objection applies. We suggest our own neuro-science experiment—something that we offer only as a fictional thought experiment. Imagine hooking up a set of surgeons (or other professionals) with individual, unobtrusive MRI mechanisms that record the brain activity of these surgeons over a significant period of time while they are engaged in their daily professional activities. At the same time they are accompanied by an unobtrusive, tiny drone or some other mechanism that records visually and auditorily what they are doing during this time. Thus, correlations between MRI readings and overt activities can be made. However, since, as May urges, we want to know what professionals do when no one is watching, somehow the surgeons need to be kept in the dark about the presence of the MRI mechanisms and the mechanisms recording overt behavior, lest they realize that they are being watched.

Now imagine this study being conducted with a group of spinal neurosurgeons being the subjects observed. If there is a Dr. Sabit among them, should we expect his MRI readings to be significantly different from those who are like Dr. Forbes? Of course, if no significant differences can be found, it might be concluded that this just shows that, despite behavioral grounds to the contrary, there are no significant differences in moral character or virtue to be found. However, the absence of neurological signs of significant differences does not warrant such a conclusion, for that would require us already to accept the view that neurology has the answers we are seeking. But what reason have we for accepting that view at this time?

Let’s explore further the professional life of an ordinary, responsible professional—not an exemplary one, but a good, reliable professional. Consider a surgeon discussing possible options with one of his patients. It is near the end of his ordinary workday, he is tired, anxious to get home, have a relaxing dinner, and then spend the evening watching his favorite basketball team with friends at the local university. He knows of several options that patients might select if they are given the opportunity to consider the procedures involved, the likely outcomes in terms of recovery time, the expected completeness of recovery, the cost of the options, and so on. Our surgeon has observed that once these options are explained to patients, nearly all elect option #2. He strongly agrees that option #2 is best for this patient. But he takes the time to discuss all of the options with his patient and takes the time to allow his patient to ask questions. Why, his friends ask, did you take so long with this patient? Why not skip mentioning some of the options, particularly since so few select them? Instead, it’s no wonder he’s tired, thank his friends. No wonder he is suffering from a little indigestion because he rushed through his meal to get to the game on time. And no wonder he is having some difficulty following the game with his usual enthusiasm.

What if our surgeon responds, “That’s not how I do my work. I’m the doctor, but patients have a right to know and decide for themselves. Even if ‘doctor knows best,’ this does not entitle me to decide for my patients.” This is not exemplary. It is routine. However, it exemplifies how he goes about his work, even when “no one is watching” (i.e., no one else is present to observe how he discusses matters with his patients). Unlike six-year-old Calvin, he “makes his bed” well.

Our point here is that much of a professional’s work is “unwatched”. Much of it could be approached in a ‘minimalist’ manner without any noticeably unfortunate consequences. But this is not given serious consideration by the conscientious professional who is committed to the right of patients to be well informed and decide for themselves. Furthermore, there doesn’t seem to be any obvious way to ‘measure’ this by observing neurological activity. For this surgeon, it is simply routine “business as usual”—not the sort of ‘moral test’ presented by the neuro-ethics experimenters who concern Damon and Colby. In these more ordinary professional circumstances, the hope is that professionals can be counted on to do their work well.

However, we maintain, professionals can be counted on to do their work well only if, even as children, they showed signs of developing dispositions that would contribute later to their professional integrity. If the sorts of virtues that come into play in professional life are thought to have their first vestiges only once one has committed to entering a particular profession, this would seem hopeless. Calvin has to move past his ‘minimalism’ long before that if he is ever to become the sort of professional we can rely upon.

We will not attempt here to offer a satisfying account of what might encourage the moral development of children that would ready them for professional responsibility. However, it should be noted, there is no special moral track for children who will end up being professionals. Morality is for everyone; and, although particular responsibilities that apply only to members of a profession may arise, in part, from special features of that profession, the virtues that support meeting those responsibilities have a broader base than that, or any other, profession.

In regard to that broader base, some general observations should be made. Adam Smith pays special attention to the virtues of justice and beneficence. Justice, he says, is largely a negative virtue—focusing on not breaking the rules of justice. , Smith says of justice:

[T]he observance of the rules of that virtue seems scarce to deserve any reward. There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice, and it merits, upon that account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no real positive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbor. The man who barely abstains from violating either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfills, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfill all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing. (TMS, 68)

However, abstaining from harming others by “sitting still and doing nothing” does not address what, even for Smith, is a central area of justice—bartering. Furthermore, although bartering is reciprocal, presumably bartering is entered into with the bartering parties hoping for some “real positive good.” In the professional realm, it is expected that professionals will provide useful services to others. Again, this is much more than abstention from hurting others.

Professional service can certainly include beneficence, which Smith contrasts with justice. Beneficence is not merely a negative virtue; it does positive good. However, unlike justice, Smith

says it should not be demanded of others, nor should its absence be punished. Professionals, it seems, can be praised for their beneficence; but it should not be expected as a matter of duty.

Similar distinctions can be made in the world of the child. Children, too, should abstain from injuring others, abide by rules of bartering, keep their promises, follow through on commitments they make to others, and the like. A child wants the family to have a dog. Will the child help feed the dog, clean up its messes, take it for walks? Yes, says the child. The hope is that the child is ready and willing to take on these responsibilities—and will respond positively to reminders and appropriately to criticism when falling short of the agreed to expectations. Furthermore, the hope is that the child is ready to assume these responsibilities without having to be constantly monitored. The child wants an allowance. In return, he or she agrees to certain chores. Will he or she sweep or vacuum the floors and rugs once a week—or will he or she sweep the dust and crumbs under the rugs when no one is looking (as Calvin might)? It is unrealistic to expect the child meet these expectations well without some initial monitoring and encouragement. But if the child adheres to a Calvin-like attitude of minimizing responsibility throughout childhood, through adolescence, right up to the point of preparing for a professional career, what could now move him in the direction of acquiring a sense of professional responsibility? Attending to the antecedents of professional integrity long before education and training for a specific profession is as fundamental for becoming a professional as that more specialized education and training.