



Toward Civic Virtue Through a Vocational Story

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Abstract

In this paper we present humanistic conceptions and psychological theory of vocation. Drawing from these humanistic conceptions, we emphasize the relevance of station, relating to one's social role, and deep calling, relating one's innate potential. Psychologically we briefly present vocation and related concepts such as meaning, purpose, and transcendence. We then present a structural model of personality, with three levels: traits, characteristic adaptations, and narratives. Emerging from this, we consider vocational narrative and vocational identity. Vocational narrative and identity are then explored as they relate to civic virtue, using four examples.

Introduction

As psychologists engage more deeply with theories and research on virtue, a number of questions arise. Among these is how to disentangle a 'general' perspective on virtue, one which aligns with something like a psychological trait theory (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004) with a more particularistic and personalized theory of virtue. As challenges to this trait perspective arise (Fowers; Kinghorn, 2017), new theories of virtuous personhood must be developed. This paper seeks to articulate a novel vision of virtuous personhood, the vocational story, emerging out of 'humanistic'¹ and psychological perspectives on virtue, vocation, and personality development.

We posit that the vocational story can serve as the vehicle organizing a virtuous personality. As such, we will begin with a humanistic exploration of vocation and its relation to virtue. Next we will consider the potential of recent research, especially within career development, on vocation and calling to provide an empirical justification for this possibility (e.g., Duffy & Dik, 2013). Following this, we will draw on McAdams (1996) theory of personality, especially work on narrative, in exploring the relevance of this work to understanding personality

¹ We mean 'humanistic' here to include work in disciplines like philosophy, theology, and history.

and the characteristics of a vocational story. The paper will present a model of vocational stories, based on an integration of the humanistic and psychological work examined. It will close by describing the implications of such a model for research on virtue, especially in the domain of science.

Calling

Callings have two components. Firstly, and less central to the subject matter of this paper, general callings are about human people and the kinds of actions and dispositions appropriate to being human qua human. We have specific ends and goods that are intrinsic to our species and we experience flourishing when these activities are done well. But to complicate matters, and this is the second component, how one achieves these ends and goods will vary. The ends and goods may be the same for humanity as a whole, but each person must make their way towards that end in a way particular to them and which have direct implications for the achievement of social flourishing. This second idea is close to what we typically conceive of when we think of particular callings.

As theologian William Perkins wrote in the sixteenth century, callings, in this more particular sense, belong to particular people, “as the calling of a magistrate, the calling of a Minister, the calling of a master, of a father, of a child, of a servant, of a subject, or any other calling that is common to all” (Perkins, 1603, p. 13). It is the responsibility of a person along with the communities that they are a part of to discern what callings and talents one possess and how to develop and implement them into the achievement of broader social goods. In this way, callings give us a sense of our prosocial motivations. Perkins writes, “every man must judge that particular calling... *to be best of all calling for him: I say not simply best, but best for him*” (Perkins 1603, Emphasis Mine). What is being described by Perkins here is that each person has particular callings that relate to their natural talents as well as their immediate social surroundings and it is their responsibility to discern these callings and implement them for the broader social and common good.

An emphasis that was developed in the reformation after Martin Luther is that a person can possess multiple callings simultaneously. A person can be called to have a particular job as well as being called to be a mother. Both of these callings can exist in a single person at the same time.

Here, again we would like to make a further distinction. The first is what we are calling a deep calling. What we mean by this is that there are callings that are related to natural character traits and dispositions toward one activity or another. This can be a kind of conscientiousness that allows one to be an excellent administrator, or the keen ear that allows one to learn a musical instrument with little effort. What is being emphasized here is that the deep calling is the particularization of the virtues in a specific moral agent. What we are describing can be thought of in terms of a 'trait fit.' These callings are related to personality traits like 'extroversion' or 'guilt-proneness' for example. Thinking of calling in this way introduces two important ideas. First, that the ability to function effectively as a person with a particular set of loves, interests and natural abilities involves key dispositions that are not present in every individual to the same extent. Some people despite a passing interest in science, for example, are unsuited to the practice of scientific research, and lack the requisite combination of interests and abilities.

A second distinction in particular callings that we would like to make are those callings that are not intrinsic to us, but are situational and contextual. They are related to our 'station' in life and concern our immediate surroundings, such as the calling to be a mother, daughter, neighbor, or co-worker. This more contextual calling manifest itself on a number of levels from one's civil responsibilities all the way down the treatments of one's nuclear family.

What is being expressed above is that we take callings to be of two kinds one situated within the other. Deep callings are significant accidental intrinsic properties which exist alongside a person's significant relations to other people, places, and the times. Deep callings are situated within the social contexts of situational callings.

Because calling is a particularization of general dispositions, in conjunction with particular situational factors, this allows for its character not to be the same in all cases. We take it that callings are goods that all people ought unconditionally to pursue, but that such pursuits are contextually sensitive and determined by the character of the person in whom it is instantiated. Callings give us a sense of purpose, they are activities and relationships that organize how we pursue what matters to us. They organize our definitions of ourselves as individuals and how we think of ourselves in the context of societies and social groups.

Above we made a distinction between two aspects of calling, the general or universal and the particular, which can further be distinguished between deep calling or situational calling. In order for one to experience true and robust human flourishing both the universal and particular aspects of calling must be attended to, nurtured, and fulfilled. In fact, they mutually inform each other. A calling is individually substantiated at an ontological level, within humanity generally and in each person specifically, while also maintaining an emphasis on one's 'station' in the world. We need to reiterate at this point that we always have a station; we are never without context.

Psychology of Calling: Vocation, Purpose, and Self-Transcendence

Research on calling, vocation, and related concepts has been on the rise in psychology, especially in the last decade. Other relevant concepts include purpose, meaning, and self-transcendence. All of these ideas find their psychological source largely in the writing of Victor Frankl (1959, 1966). However, they are pursued primarily by scholars in different subfields. Calling and vocation is a recent focus of work in career development and organizational behavior (see Duffy & Dik, 2013; Hall & Chandler, 2005). Purpose, in contrast, has been a focus of research primarily in adolescent development and the transition to adulthood (Bronk, 2014; Moran, Bundick, Malin & Reilly, 2014), though some work on purpose has also been conducted with adults (e.g., Ryff, 1995). Self-transcendence has been emphasized largely in work directed toward counseling psychology, continuing in the tradition of Frankl's work, though it is also a

dimension of Schwartz (1994) human values model. Much of this work is rooted in a focus on meaning in life, which has been defined as “the sense made of, and significance felt regarding, the nature of one's being and existence” (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006, pp. 81).

Calling and vocation research in career development describes a number of possible components of calling: (1) an external summons, (2) meaning/purpose, and (3) prosocial motivation - as well as sources of calling: (1) external summons, (2) sense of destiny, and (3) perfect fit (Duffy & Dik, 2013). This research finds calling to be generally related to adaptive outcomes like maturity (Duffy & Sedlacek, 2007), work satisfaction (Duffy, Allan, & Dik, 2011), and meaning in life (Steger & Dik, 2009). Nonetheless, there are also some indications that calling contributes to individuals being open to exploitation (Bunderson & Thompson), susceptible to foreclosure (Dobrow & Tosti-Kharas, 2012), and overcommitted to the work domain (Cardador & Caza, 2012). Much of this work relies on the four item Brief Calling Scale (Dik, Eldridge, Steger, & Duffy, 2012) which relies on participants' conceptions of calling.

Purpose has emerged only recently as a focus for research in developmental psychology, using a similar set of components to the more career-focused concept of vocation. One common definition of purpose was proposed by Damon and colleagues (2003) “a stable and generalized intention to accomplish something at once meaningful to the self and of consequence to the world beyond the self.” Since this time, scholars have contended that a purpose should also be actively engaged, with a plan for continuation into the future (Damon, 2008, Bronk, 2014). Recent work also ties purpose directly to virtues like gratitude and compassion (Malin, Liauw, & Damon, 2017). The beyond the self aspect of the definition of virtue overlaps with conceptions of self-transcendence to which we turn next, and provides some scope for purposes that are not primarily prosocial, but transcendent in some other way.

Self-transcendence emphasizes the way an individual relates to the world, seeking to be part of something larger than the self, often in explicitly spiritual terms (Wong, 2014). It is hypothesized that individuals only experience meaning through self-transcendence, rather than

through pursuits focused primarily on narrow self-interest. In fact, Wong's (2014) writing on calling mirrors the humanistic distinctions of general call (he focuses on the call to serve others) and particular call (which he describes as an individual's 'unique' call).

Taken as a whole, there is clearly increasing interest in topics related to calling and vocation among a wide array of psychological researchers, but little attention has been given to a more robust conception of calling itself. Such a conception benefits from at least two concepts developed by theoretical psychologists, strong relationality and strong transcendence (see Nelson & Slife, 2017 for more). Strong relationality posits that the conceptual atomism common to much psychological research, given its focus on individual outcomes, is deeply misleading given the socially-embedded nature of human life (for a similar claim from developmental psychology see also Overton, 2013 on relational developmental systems theory). Strong transcendence goes beyond with weaker conceptualizations of transcendence which characterize the individual's unidirectional and incremental involvement in transcendence. Strong transcendence, in contrast, emphasizes the transformational consequences of self transcendence. *Psychology of Narrative and Personality*

Personality psychologists increasingly describe personality as functioning in a three-tiered structure (McAdams, 1996; Emmons, 1999). The foundation of this structure is personality traits, which lead to personal concerns (contextualized enactments of one's traits), and finally narratives, which integrate and synthesize identity over time, through coordination of various personal concerns. Vocation, purpose, and self transcendence, as discussed above, function largely on the levels of traits and personal concerns, with much less research relating them to narratives.

Out of this theory two primary conceptions to understanding human flourishing as organized by narrative have emerged. These are generativity narratives (McAdams & Guo 2015; McAdams, 2015; Pratt, Arnold, Lawford, 2009 - Handbook chapter), emphasizing an individual's contribution to future generations, and growth narratives (Bauer, McAdams, & Pal)

describing individual's changing in order to live a better life. Growth narratives include redemption narratives, a narrative form common in the United States emphasizing the way that one has grown in response to a challenging experience or challenging circumstances. Both types of narrative have also been demonstrated to be more prominent in the life stories of some kinds of moral exemplars (Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010).

In recent writing, McAdams and his colleagues (2015; McAdams & Guo, 2015) emphasize five characteristics of the life stories of those who score highly on self-report measures of generativity. They find that these individuals tell their stories in ways that emphasize (a) early advantage, (b) sensitivity to others suffering, (c) having developed a clear moral framework, (d) transforming negative scenes into positive outcomes (e.g., redemption narratives), (e) prosocial goal pursuit. This captures some important aspects of development pertinent to flourishing: receiving the service of others seeking to promote the flourishing of future generations (through early advantage), an awareness that others may be deprived of what they need to flourish more fully (suffering), engagement in a moral tradition (clear moral framework), a capacity for moral transformation (negative scenes to positive outcomes), and the pursuit of moral (prosocial) goals.

All of this serves to provide a model of a life in which one seeks to be generative, that is to contribute to future generations (Erikson, 1968; McAdams, 2015). However, at this level of generality, no account of the 'fit' between this story and one's personality is necessarily articulated. Further, the relation of this story to one's developmental context is important as well. Different contexts are likely to 'summon' different callings and expressions of virtue (MacIntyre, 1981) even within the same tradition. All of this is perhaps implicit in current narrative research, but is relevant to vocational considerations, especially given the claims of some scholars that there are costs to acting 'against' traits (see Little, 2008).

Integrating calling and narrative in a vocational story

Persons live in particular times and places, have particular traits, and the intersection of these leads to particular encounters. All of this must inform a theory of calling and vocational stories. For instance, someone who engages in a boisterous and energetic style of relating to others, despite low trait liveliness and expressiveness may drain themselves and so be unable to sustainably engage a calling (see Little, 2009). Further, defeating the Nazi's might have been a compelling vocational story for many soldiers in the 1930's and 1940's, but that calling doesn't have a clear relation to military involvement in a world without Nazi regimes (though it might be closely related to vocations to resist other fascist and authoritarian regimes). Even in the 1930's and 1940's, however, the vocation of defeating Nazi's would have made little sense to a Brazilian aborigine who had never had contact with anyone outside of the Amazon rainforest. Further, this vocation had vastly different expressions for those in different social roles, with soldiers on the front lines participating in very different ways than their commanders, and with politicians engaging in the war through different means as well.

Before embarking on an attempt to develop a theory that captures all of these nuances, we would like to note the relatively straightforward relation of psychological conceptions of calling to these other models. Calling as "fit" seems to correspond closely with the humanistic concept of deep calling and with Little's (2009) conception of traits, described above (as well as psychological research on person-environment fit, see Su, Murdock, & Rounds, 2015). Other psychological conceptions of calling, drawing on external summons, meaning, purpose, and prosocial motives, all fit within the humanistic conceptions of general and particular calling. All are 'summoned' and meaning and purpose emerge from the particularities of how one is summoned. Similarly, summons, meaning, purpose, and prosocial motives are all necessary to the concept of a vocational story. In fact, only the idea of a summons adds substantially to the existing conception of generative personality expressed in recent research (McAdams & Guo, 2015).

While it would be excessive to seek to capture all of these particularities, a model of vocational stories must nonetheless create a space for such variation and be able to make sense of it. We begin with an acceptance of McAdams' (2015) narrative components of the generative personality. However, we suggest additional considerations suggested by philosophical and psychological scholarship on calling to qualify such narratives. These stem largely from two aspects of the historical and philosophical conception of calling given above: (1) station and (2) deep calling.

Station recognizes the attunement of vocation to context. Certain kinds of pursuits and values are most relevant to some circumstances (as in the vocation to defeat Nazi regimes, end apartheid, or to end British rule in India), but these are historically and contextually contingent. Further, station may 'override' deep calling in its power to shape vocational narratives (as in King George VI's exhortation to the British people, depicted in *The King's Speech*). If one's station positions one to be particularly suited to achieve an important end, especially one not accessible to others, then it inheres in that station that one should seek to achieve the end through the most effective means available. This is so even if these means are means for which an individual has limited skills and unsuitable dispositions to be particularly effective. Doing so, especially if these limitations are known and the individual seeks to transcend them, may in fact enhance the power of the vocational story.

In fact, McAdam's framework, early advantage already hints at the importance of station to virtuous narratives. Early advantage is a recognition of one's station including some form of privilege. Thus individuals who tell their story in this way are indicating that their station provides them the opportunity to have become the kind of person who they are. However, station, deriving from sociological frameworks, might be considered to have two aspects (1) ascribed, and (2) achieved (Cote, 1996). Ascribed status, in this framework, applies to those roles that one fills because of inheritance and the contingencies associated with it. These include contingencies like social position, race, gender, wealth, and expectations of characteristics like

intelligence. Achieved status, in contrast, emphasizes social positions accomplished and reached by an individual's effort. Further, these are not strictly dichotomous types of status, it might be the case, for example, that an individual 'achieves' the status of university admission largely because of a variety of ascribed statuses (e.g., being a 'legacy' student with parents who attended the university and are major donors and also being an upper class white student who attended a prestigious private school).

Nonetheless, achieved status is especially important in the contemporary world and must be pursued actively. Individuals increasingly have agency in pursuing certain achieved statuses rather than others. However, this does not mean they should do so unreflectively or in a way that leaves them subjugated to the will of others (this would open them up to the exploitation noted earlier in discussing calling). Further, this may lead to challenges like compassion fatigue and burnout (Figley, 2002). Instead, pursuing and realizing an achieved status should be an expression of freedom. Freedom here is not meant in the sense of an individual's ability to choose any option, as this would indicate a kind of existential indifference to various alternatives. Instead, freedom here emphasizes a capacity to choose the good, and thus an individual is 'more' free the more capable they are of choosing the good (citation of relevant Thomist writing). This good is also relative to the individual, hearkening back to the earlier discussion of deep calling and one's calling as a 'perfect fit' (Duffy & Dik, 2013). For instance, some individuals may be best suited, as a result of their traits or experiences, to working in science policy, journalism, or education. Others, who are perhaps more introverted or less expert in social media and mass communication strategies, may be better suited to work as a lab technician.

Deep calling implies that there are more or less appropriate ways for a given individual to discern and live their callings based on their traits and dispositions. However, this is always embedded within one's current station (even as an one may aspire to a future station). Thus, an individual's vocational story should include reference to their particular dispositions and how

these inform both the means that they use to pursue the ends of their station(s) and their aspiration to other stations. Perhaps, for instance, a conscientious introvert in a political organization would be best suited to seek to contribute to society through extensive technical work, such as analyzing polling data, rather than through face-to-face exhortation in a political movement with mass rallies.

Vocation and Civic Virtue

Against this backdrop, we would like to venture some claims as to the relevance of vocation to civic virtue through the practice of science, whether physics, biology, or psychology. This is in part to broaden the considerations often emphasized in prior qualitative work on virtue, which focuses on moral exemplars primarily acting through social activism and political engagement (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Damon & Colby, 2015; Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010). As our emphasis is on civic virtue, we will consider those virtues that go beyond the immediate context of scientific practice through the sharing of scientific work with other scholars and the public.

This requires a consideration of an individual's station, as the expression of virtue is role specific (see above and Cokelet & Fowers, 2017). A virtuous technician should behave differently than a virtuous principal investigator. Further, one's tenure in a role may be relevant to the expression of virtue (e.g., a new graduate student should typically focus more on getting up to speed with the lab than on making novel intellectual contributions). Further, most scientists hold more than one station, they are at once scientists and brothers, daughters, and/or citizens. Civic justice requires a prioritization of these various stations, and, beyond this, an attempt at integration of these stations, such that conflict between one's role as a scientist and one's role as a citizen is minimized (and perhaps even that one's role as a scientist enhances one's civic pursuits). Thus civic justice, as we consider it below, is primarily about right action given one's station(s). Civic integrity, instead emphasizes the motivational component of civic virtue, desiring the civic good, for its own sake.

Rather than continue in abstractions, let us consider some more concrete examples, representing each of four possible combinations of civic justice and civic integrity (and types considered by Fowers, 2008). First, a scientist with racist or sexist attitudes (vicious). We also consider a scientist who pursues their work as 'pure' science, with no necessary relevance to societal problems despite seeing the civic goods their work might contribute to (incontinent). Scientists who work to ensure the proper understanding of their writing by journalists, even though they are tempted to take advantage of the professional status and power that misleading news reports might provide them (continent). Finally, we consider the example of a scientist who acts with civic virtue.

A racist, sexist, or in other ways ideologically authoritarian scientist is likely to have a form of vicious identity. This vicious identity is cross-cutting, in the sense that it actively shapes one's engagement in scientific practice, to the detriment of such practice. These include adopting views that the stereotyped group(s) are inferior. Such an identity is likely to issue in prejudice and problematic discrimination. Prejudice may be expressed by requiring excessive evidence that the objects of one's stereotypes do not conform to such stereotypes. Indeed, one of the likely features of such viciousness is the relative incorrigibility of those who hold them. This prejudice may then lead to discrimination, giving members of stereotyped groups less prestigious roles, more harshly evaluating their work, and perhaps even hurling epithets and other abusive treatment toward them.

All of this deeply undermines civic justice, treating others in one's community as one ought, and so fails to virtuously fill one's station. Further, racist and sexist attitudes can also lead to problematic research, especially in social science research when such researchers may be more likely to uncritically accept results indicating the limitations of stereotyped groups and to seek to refute findings that indicate their strengths. Thus, interpersonal attitudes, beliefs, and motives stemming from a lack of civic integrity, can issue in poor civic reasoning and even civic disengagement (when it is not 'worth' the effort to productively engage stereotyped groups).

Other expressions of vice may emerge from some expressions of a lack of civic integrity as well (see for instance Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock, 2015 on the problems emerging from a lack of political diversity in psychology).

Other scientists may adopt a scientific identity that is isolated from their broader civic identity and vocation. For instance, he may conduct work on ecology and the influence of chemicals seeping into groundwater on the development of plants and animals, especially humans. While this scientist may recognize the importance of this work for public policy, especially in cases of chemical spills, his scientific and civic identities are largely disconnected. He believes in seeking the common good, and even thinks that companies should be held responsible for the harm they cause, but does not consider it his place to get involved, even when his work provides compelling evidence of such harm. After all, as a scientist he is supposed to be objective and disinterested. Engaging in public discourse may, as he sees it, undermine his scientific credibility, distract from his involvement in scientific pursuits, and place his scientific identity at risk. It isn't what a scientist should do. Indeed, he even declines to serve as an expert witness in law suits brought against chemical polluters.

Here again we have a case of lack of civic justice, though a more nuanced one. What seems to be the case here is that, in contrast to the vicious identity discussed above, the scientific identity supersedes the civic identity and so prevents this individual from pursuing civic goods that they are uniquely positioned to realize. Further, there is, in this case, at least a semblance of civic integrity. This scientist genuinely desires to act toward civic goods and has even identified the goods at issue. However, he conceives of his station in a way that precludes such action, seeing the scientific station as having primacy over the civic station, at least with regard to some civic ends.

Some scientists, perhaps particularly those who are in tenuous positions, may be tempted to secure status or other rewards through their scientific work. She may be offered lucrative grants or positions with companies in order to advance the agendas of these

companies. She may be tempted to act nepotistically toward her friends in the field and to undermine her rivals. All of this is to say that they may be motivated to act in unjust ways.

Nonetheless, when she recognizes these temptations for what they are and instead acts appropriately, she is in fact demonstrating civic justice. What she is lacking, perhaps, is fully-developed civic integrity. Psychologically speaking, this may be the result of an identity she is seeking to enact but for which she lacks intrinsic motivation. Thus, she acts half-heartedly, if that, rather than wholeheartedly. One might say that lacking proper intrinsic motivation she can act honestly, in accord with her reason, without acting with full civic integrity.

Finally, some scientists, at least at times, act virtuously. Rather than generate an ad hoc example, I will draw an example from a study of exemplar scientists, *Good Mentoring* (Nakamura, Shernoff, & Hooker, 2009). Arno Motulsky is a physician-scientist whose work is on medical genetics. Raised a Jew in Nazi Prussia, Motulsky experienced life in a Vichy internment camp in his teens. After his release he emigrated to Chicago, slowly moved into biomedical research and founded the medical genetics program at the University of Washington. In his work Motulsky has made pioneering advances in medical genetics and is thought of as a founder of pharmacogenetics, which seeks to understand drug gene interactions. Amidst this, Motulsky maintains an intense commitment to his patients as well. He has also been an important advocate for informing the public about scientific findings and scientists (especially those he mentored) more fully considering and addressing the social relevance of their findings. Thus Motulsky says “One of our tasks [as scientists] is to help people understand the nature of [scientific] issues --- what can be done, what can’t be done, what might be done... Young scientists should be aware of the need for public education” (Nakamura et al., pg. 68) Many of Motulsky’s students have adopted this approach as well, crediting him with inspiring them to be more engaged in and aware of the social and public implications of their work. At the same time, Motulsky integrated his scientific and civic identity, noting that overinvolvement in public education can undermine scientific work.

Here we see, in contrast to the problems of cross-cutting identity in the example of the racist or sexist scientist above, synergy and integration in the virtuous scientist, who is able to both use their scientific expertise to pursue civic goods and who sees his science as enhanced by civic engagement. Thus, a high degree of civic integrity, perhaps inspired by Motulsky's childhood experiences of discrimination, undergirds his pursuit of civic justice, a pursuit which is enhanced by his station as a leading medical geneticist.

Conclusion

Drawing from the examples above, we see four ways in which civic virtue might be expressed or fail to be expressed in a scientific station. These different possibilities are seen to emerge from the different narratives and identities scientists adopt or fail to adopt. Adopting a racist or sexist perspective, for instance, is likely to shape both one's desires and actions. In contrast, many scientists may have some negative attitudes about certain racial groups, but actively take steps to mitigate any discrimination they may engage in toward such groups, for instance by limiting access to information that may indicate race in reviewing applicants (this could be another form of the third example). Over time, these scientists may adjust their attitudes through positive interactions with the stereotyped race. In this, they are seeking to construct a virtuous civic identity, even as they recognize their lack of virtue. In contrast, scientists like the one in the second example seem to have incorrectly prioritized their identities, from a civic perspective. Perhaps, with a mentor or colleagues like Motulsky, they would instead find ways to integrate their scientific and civic identities more fully. Doing so is essential to the realization of a virtuous vocational narrative and identity.

While space precludes a rich discussion of deep calling in this paper, we would simply note that deep calling seems to be expressed in the case of Motulsky and absent in the other examples. Deep calling is manifest in civic integrity, especially as such integrity is concurrent with scientific integrity, relational integrity (Motulsky also prioritizes his family), and in general the integration of one's personality and traits with their station, expressing the fullness of one's

identity. Thus, it is appropriate for deep calling to have varied expression, and the deep calling of other medical geneticists could take vastly different forms than Motulsky's calling takes. In addition, a deep calling to pursue medical genetics or any other particular scientific endeavor is likely rare. Further, integrity, rooted in deep calling, is expected to lead to justice, even though, as shown in the third example, justice alone does not necessitate full integrity.

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