

**Hope After War**  
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**(DRAFT: Do Not Quote Without Permission of Author)**  
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**1. Two Faces of Hope.** Returning service members often carry the weight of their war in messy moral emotions that are hard to process and sometimes hard to feel. Some of these emotions can get sidelined in clinical discussions of posttraumatic stress (PTS)<sup>1</sup> when the stressor is narrowed to exposure to life threat in the face of unpredictable danger, and symptoms streamlined to hyper-vigilance,

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<sup>1</sup> There has been a push within some sectors of the military to remove the “D” for “disorder” in PTSD—in order to destigmatize the phenomena. (Amputees, aff all suffer limb injuries, not leg disorders.) According to a 2008 RAND study nearly 20% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans screened positive for PTSD. (Tanielian, 2008) A summary critique of epidemiologic studies, from the National Center for PTSD put the figure in 2008 closer to 10-18 %  
<http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/newsletters/research-quarterly/V20N1.pdf>, accessed June 14, 2013.

The Department of Veterans Affairs recently released a report showing that 30 % of the Iraq and Afghanistan veterans treated at the V.A. hospitals and clinics have been diagnosed with PTSD. See  
<http://www.publichealth.va.gov/docs/epidemiology/ptsd-report-fy2012-qtr3.pdf>, accessed June 14, 2013. Also,  
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/21/nearly-30-of-vets-treated-by-v-a-have-ptsd.html>, accessed June 14, 2013.

numbing, and flashbacks.<sup>2</sup> The examples of this kind of PTS are familiar, real, and sometimes harrowing. They are a reminder of soldiers' exquisitely honed reflexes and observational skills highly adaptive in war, but often maladaptive at home: Soldiers still on hyper-alert can run to take cover at sudden loud noises or swerve fast off the road to avoid surface irregularities that downrange mark implanted bombs; some, good at compartmentalizing for mission focus, do the same at home, withdrawing from family and friends, feeling safe only with battle buddies who have lived and breathed their war; others return to the pitch of the battlefield in flashbacks that smell, sound, and feel like the real thing, and that can unleash real and lethal aggression. As one senior military psychiatrist, Charles Hoge puts it, "under prolonged stress, the stress "thermostat" is reset."<sup>3</sup> Recalibrating the physiopsychic thermostat back to what is conducive to healthy living in a peaceful civilian environment can be for some no small challenge, even if for many the transition is without trauma.

But the idea of resetting thermostats is limiting. In recent years, a number of military psychological researchers and clinicians have pressed to expand the clinical focus and recognize the prevalence and distinctiveness of a dimension of psychological stress that is *moral*—hence the notion of moral injury and its emotions and interventions.<sup>4</sup> Some argue that prolonged exposure techniques

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<sup>2</sup> For an important study of PTSD, see (Herman, 1992).

<sup>3</sup> (Hoge, 2010), xiv.

<sup>4</sup> See especially, (Litz, 2009) (Maguen, Jan 13, 2012; Nash, Krantz, Stein, Westphal, & Litz, 2011), (Shay, 1994, 2002),(Lansky, 1995, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009).

standardly used to desensitize and extinguish fear responses may have little effect in addressing crippling moral doubt or survivor guilt.

Still what often goes unremarked in that research is the ubiquity (and sometimes, naturalness, fit, and co-mingling) of moral emotions such as guilt, shame, resentment, disappointment, empathy, trust, and hope *outside* the clinical arena. These can be a part of healthy processing of war, and part and parcel of ordinary practices of holding persons responsible.

Though this is not a traditional subject for philosophers of war (whose primary focus remains on justification of norms of war), it is, of course, a standard focus in philosophical moral psychology, notably in work begun by Peter Strawson (1962) in his classic study of reactive attitudes, and in a literature that has followed and is growing.<sup>5</sup> Strawson's seminal idea is that reactive attitudes are constitutive of moral responsibility, and not a side effect of some independent, underlying belief in responsibility.<sup>6</sup>

With 2.4 million U.S. service members returning from a decade of war in which many have served long, multiple, deployments in complex and challenging partnerships, a philosophical discussion of reactive attitudes toward self and others in the context of war is timely. Even if not a part of military ethics, *per se*, it is certainly a part of ethics relevant to the military. And that the issues span more

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<sup>5</sup> (Strawson, 1993 ) (Watson, 2004), especially "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme," (Wallace, 1996) (Darwall, 2006), (Walker, 2006), (Macnamara, 2011) (Hurley, 2010), (Martin, 2008, 2010, 2011; Smith, 2005)

<sup>6</sup> (Watson, 2004), 220. Earlier moral psychologies, like Aristotle's, standardly link certain emotions, such as resentment or shame, with blame, and so with moral responsibility for attitude and conduct, but not in the radical way that Strawson does. See (Aristotle, 1984) *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter NE) II.7 (1108b1), NE III.1 *Rhetoric* (hereafter Rh). II. 2, II.6, II.9.

general concerns in moral psychology is a welcome way of bringing the moral psychology of soldiering into more mainstream philosophical discussion.

My specific interest in this essay is moral repair, very loosely and metaphorically understood as building up healthy moral relationships within self and with others, especially after war. Elsewhere I have written about self-empathy as a reactive attitude toward self that may be a corrective response to unwarranted or not entirely appropriate (however reasonable or natural) expressions of guilt. Self-empathy can help temper an overwrought sense of responsibility many soldiers assume in war and bring home in ways that go on to haunt. And, too, I have written about trust and self-trust, as attitudes that help overcome the deep resentment and isolation many soldiers feel when betrayed by command or behemoth bureaucracies, or by what they feel is civilian indifference or (sometimes disdain) for their choice of a profession of arms.<sup>7</sup>

In keeping with these themes, I now want to consider hope in persons (inter and intrapersonal) as a complementary but distinct sort of positive reactive attitude that focuses our attention and energies on pockets of good will in self or others, and occasions for aspiration and investment.<sup>8</sup> As such, it opposes indifference, and too, tendencies toward numbing that can go hand and hand with the harboring of deep suspicion and distrust. This kind of hope is paradigmatically forward-looking, and

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<sup>7</sup> On self-empathy in this context, see (Sherman, 2014b). For further discussion of these cases of subjective guilt, see (Sherman, 2010), especially, ch.4. On trust and self-trust, see (Sherman, 2014a).

<sup>8</sup> In thinking about hope, I am indebted to conversation with Adrienne Martin, especially with regard to (Martin, 2013). For other work on hope that has influenced my thought, see Margaret Urban Walker (Walker, 2006), Jonathan Lear (Lear, 2006), and Philip Pettit (Pettit, 2004).

plays an important role, I suggest, in social and intrapsychic moral reintegration after war. But I am also interested in hope for outcomes, and the kind of agency it can involve, and how the two kinds of hope support each other.

**2. Defiant Hope.** I want to set the tone and begin to explore the contours of hope with an example that is from war, but is not about its combatants. The example draws from the documentary movie, *Defiant Requiem*, about the Nazi camp of Terezin (in Theresienstadt, outside Prague), and the Jewish inmates singing for their life through performances of Verdi's *Requiem*. The movie documents conductor Murry Sidlin's recreation of that *Requiem* recently in the extant walls of Terezin.<sup>9</sup>

As is well known, many of the inmates at Terezin were accomplished artists and musicians, performers, conductors, and composers. And one, Raphael Schächter, a talented pianist and opera-choral conductor, captured by the Nazis in 1941, brought with him just one piece of music, Giuseppe Verdi's demanding chorale work, his 1874 *Requiem*. During the internment and with some complicity of the guards, the prisoners gathered nightly in the dank basement of the compound, around a piano, and learned the complicated choral parts of the Latin requiem, with Schächter holding the only copy of the score. They sang, with hope against hope, to change minds, to have the Nazi leadership hear the humanity of their voices and rescind their death sentence. That hope became increasingly futile, as one death train after another, rounded up Jews and took them onto death marches or

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<sup>9</sup> [http://www.murrysidlin.com/home/DR\\_Performance\\_History\\_and\\_Videos.html](http://www.murrysidlin.com/home/DR_Performance_History_and_Videos.html)  
<http://www.defiantrequiemfilm.com> I attended a showing at the Washington Jewish Community Center, May 6, 2013, after which Murry Sidlin spoke.

Auschwitz. And when that happened, they would reconstitute their chorus, over and over, with winnowing and frail population, and repeat the defiant act of hope. The Nazi brass eventually did come to hear the chorus in a culminating performance on June 23, 1944; it was entertainment for them, but for the singers, and Schächter, it was survival of the soul. And as Sidlin implied in remarks at a showing of the documentary in Washington D.C., the refrain in the *Requiem*, "*Dies Irae*," that the "day of wrath" would come, was ironically for these Jews, unpracticed in the rituals of Latin masses, a moral protest that they could deliver face-to-face to their torturers, concealed through art. It was their retribution.

But singing the *Requiem* also expressed their hope. And hope with two interrelated facets. The prisoners sang to express hope *for* a future outcome or eventuality—to be saved, rescued, and redeemed, whether by God's hand or human hand. And that hoped for outcome nourished some as food, despite desperate hunger, as one survivor of the chorus recalled. Singing to be saved brought back to life near-corpses.

But another aspect of their hope, far more galvanizing, I suspect, was the hope they had *in* each other and the aspirations they placed in their humanity. By singing together, after backbreaking days of labor and beaten servitude, they raised their voices and followed an extremely complex musical score. They worked on their parts, put them to memory, and saw mirrored in each other high humanity. They kindled hope in each other and in themselves, in their potential to rise above the most subjugating circumstances and to not just survive, but to thrive, in a sliver of a way, for a sliver of time, as artistic and spiritual souls. In the very act of choral

singing, in answering a soloist's vocal call with responses and intricate recants, they reciprocally *addressed* and *recognized* each other, and in this context, *acknowledged* each other's hope in humanity. Moral address was woven in the interaction and communicated as part of the choral activity. Perhaps, too, they had hope *in* the Nazi leadership that their art would awaken their own humanity. But I can't imagine that this energized as much as the reciprocal hope they placed in each other, a calling out to each (through music) of the potential of the other's humanity, and an echoing back, in acknowledgement, that she has been appropriately recognized. Singing Verdi's *Requiem* to each other, night after night, was an act of defiance, but also an act of resilience, a way of being buoyed by a commonwealth of humanity, at work in recreating a piece that must have been appreciated by the performers as itself an exquisitely fine and noble expression of humanity.

This is a powerful example of the promise of interpersonal hope, even in futile conditions. Hope can be about eventualities "nonnormative hope," following Adrienne Martin's usage; but it can also be about aspirations we hold on behalf of persons, "normative hope," as she calls it. And in some cases, though not all, part of the point of addressing others with hope is that the recipients might take up the values or principles deemed worthwhile and aspired for on their behalf. Hope can "scaffold" normative change.

Aristotle makes clear this last point in the beginning of the *Nicomachean*. His remarks also go somewhat toward showing the intermingling of normative and nonnormative hope. He reminds us that we don't accurately attribute happiness

(*eudaimonia*) to a child, but in calling him “happy,” invest hope in him that he will become that:

It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity [of reason and its excellences]. For this reason also a boy is not happy (*eudaimôn*); for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being deemed happy by reason of the hopes (*dia tēn elpida*) we have for them.<sup>10</sup>

Calling the child “happy” *misattributes* to him the developed rational capacities requisite for character excellence (or virtue) and which, when exercised properly, with the experience of years and adequate external goods, constitutes happiness. But the misattribution can be pedagogic: “deeming” or “congratulating” the child as happy sets a goal worth aspiring toward and begins to “bootstrap” (or “scaffold”) the requisite development and behavior for it. It gives the child “a job” and the parents a job, and encourages a two-way set of emotion-inflected behaviors that will communicate assessments in making progress on that job. Hope and disappointment, the parent’s and the child’s own, and in turn, responses to each other’s reactive uptakes and “updates”<sup>11</sup> in the face of various interim goals will

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<sup>10</sup> NE I.10 1099b33-1100a3, using revised Oxford translation throughout, with slight alteration here, changing “being congratulated” to “being deemed.”

<sup>11</sup> I thank Trip Glazer for this term.



populate the path. These are back and forth volleys-- mirrorings and challengings-- that are the familiar stuff of interpersonal engagement from childhood up.<sup>12</sup>

Given that hope for happiness in Aristotle's lexicon is not just hope for successful outcome (to conceive of happiness that way would be "a very defective arrangement," he insists, that would mistakenly "entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble"),<sup>13</sup> the hope he points to here is *primarily* normative—i.e., hope *in* the child that he will undertake the right "kind of study and care," as Aristotle puts it, requisite for realizing a flourishing and happy life.<sup>14</sup> To be sure, the Stoics will "call" Aristotle on just this point, arguing that he has fudged on the issue and still left too much to externals and luck.<sup>15</sup> Virtue is sufficient for happiness, they insist, following Socrates. There is something to this charge, and perhaps, for our purposes, what it shows is that *hope for* happiness, for an Aristotelian and probably for most of us, slides between *hope in* one's agency and reason (and that of others), and *hope for* a hospitable world in which we exercise our individual and shared agency. Normative and nonnormative hope mix and mingle. The point is a familiar one, especially in war. Good commanders place express hope in their troops, that they will embrace the rules of engagement and the skill bases necessary for good and just fighting. But they also hope that they will *fare well* in addition to *do well*. And the

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<sup>12</sup> For patterns of attunement and misattunement between child and caregiver, see (Stern, 1985).

<sup>13</sup> NE 1099b22.

<sup>14</sup> NE 1099b18.

<sup>15</sup> For further discussion of Stoic positions, see (Sherman, 2005).

wisest among them will hope that in doing well, they will have the resources to accept *and* internalize judicious discriminations of responsibility.<sup>16</sup>

With this as background, I want to continue with the following topics.

In 3) I make some general remarks about analyses of reactive attitudes that aim to accommodate positive attitudes, such as hope in persons. In 4), I consider nonnormative hope through a soldier's narrative. This kind of hope has an obvious role in moral repair, and important connections with hope in persons. In 5) I return to hope in persons, exploring the kind of moral address involved, with interviews from soldiers providing the central cases. In 6), I turn to hope in self, with focus on a Marine spouse's hope in her husband and its role in bootstrapping his hope in himself.

**2. Positive Reactive Attitudes.** One way of thinking about expressed reactive emotions is as a way of calling attention to another that we have taken normative review of her behavior and are now calling on her to respond in a normatively fitting way.<sup>17</sup> In expressing reactive attitudes, we are not making detached attributions or appraisals, but are engaging the other interpersonally. We're addressing her (and, in reflexive cases, me) with the demands, expectations,

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<sup>16</sup> This is not to suggest that such line drawing is ever easy or intuitive. For notions of responsibility in the context of balancing risks in force protection and protection of noncombatants, see (Luban, 2014). He suggests the plausibility of a strict liability view of accepting risks (and hence, acquiring responsibility) in cases where soldiers' cause danger to noncombatant civilians.

<sup>17</sup> (McGeer, 2012) 303; see discussion of this in (Macnamara, 2012) 2 scanned version.

or aspirations implicit in those emotional expressions. And we are looking for an appropriate reply.<sup>18</sup>

Until fairly recently, the focus on reactive attitudes has been on the negative ones—such as resentment, indignation, and guilt. But Strawson himself clearly had in mind a full range of positive emotions as an important part of the continuum.

In general, we demand some degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who stand in these relationships to us, though the forms we require it to take vary widely in different connections. The range and intensity of our reactive attitudes towards goodwill, its absence or its opposite vary no less widely. I have mentioned, specifically, resentment and gratitude; and they are usefully opposed. But, of course, there is a whole continuum of reactive attitude and feeling stretching on both sides of these and—the most comfortable area—in between them.<sup>19</sup>

Strawson, here and elsewhere, uses the language of “demand” (and “expectation”) to point to the specific kind of evaluation that reactive attitudes involve. And other prominent theorists, following Strawson, have developed demand-based account.<sup>20</sup> But as Coleen Macnamara and Adrienne Martin have argued, independently in recent work,<sup>21</sup> a demand analysis doesn’t do well in accommodating the broad spectrum of negative *and* positive reactive attitudes. And, as Macnamara argues, expressed attitudes construed as demandings may not even issue in tenable demands that can be complied with in the case of a

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<sup>18</sup> (Darwall, 2006) 159; (Walker 2006) 135.

<sup>19</sup>(Strawson, 1993 ), 1962. p 4 in online pdf .

<sup>20</sup> (Watson, 2004), (Wallace, 1996), (Darwall, 2006).

<sup>21</sup> (Macnamara, 2012), (Martin, 2013)

paradigmatic negative reactive attitude, such as resentment. “Demands seek compliance.”<sup>22</sup> But just what demand am I making, she asks, when I express resentment when you step on my toe?

My options for complying with your demand are rather limited. I cannot comply by refraining from the offending action, since it is already in the past...Future compliance, of course, is possible—I can refrain from stepping on your foot in the future. But while we can agree that this would be a good thing, such forbearance is not satisfying as a complete account of the response your expression of resentment aims at. It is highly implausible that my *merely* not stomping on your foot in the future renders your expression of resentment fully successful.<sup>23</sup>

And to demand that you *feel* guilt, she argues, is infelicitous, and to confuse a demand for contrite *behavior* with a demand to *feel* contrite, or remorse or guilt. Expressed reactive attitudes reasonably call out for both (behavior *and* feeling), but we can demand only behavior; feigned guilt doesn’t really satisfy the person who expresses resentment toward a target with the aim of her specific moral address being received or recognized, and expressly acknowledged. (Feigning or posing may serve as kind of conformity to the demand, but is not full compliance). Moreover, a promise not to step on your foot again does not get at the heart of the

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<sup>22</sup> (Macnamara, 2004), p. 9 online.  
<http://link.springer.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/article/10.1007/s11098-012-9995-3/fulltext.html#Sec4>

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

aimed for response, which is that the target acknowledge fault and so have a response that looks backward at the deed done.

To put matters this way is already to suggest the alternative analysis of reactive attitudes that Macnamara is developing, and to which I am broadly sympathetic. She sketches a call-and-response model of moral address that is itself a strand in the reactive attitude literature and that she thinks can do more overall explanatory and unifying work than it has thus far been enlisted to do. The call-and-response model lays bare the idea of reactive attitudes as “modes of recognition that seek that their target give expression to her recognition of having been appropriately recognized.”<sup>24</sup> I can’t flesh out the details of the account here. What is pertinent to our interests is that expressed reactive attitudes, as strict demands for compliance, may not fare well either in the core cases, like resentment, or in the less studied cases of positive attitudes.<sup>25</sup>

Adrienne Martin, taking her lead from Jonathan Bennett, notes a related constriction in demand-based accounts of reactive attitudes.<sup>26</sup> Her specific interest, as with mine, is hope in persons. While making demands may underlie paradigmatic reactive attitudes such as resentment or indignation, investing hope in someone, she argues, doesn’t have the same flavor of demanding or “normatively expecting conformity to a norm.”<sup>27</sup> As she puts it, hoping in someone or being disappointed in

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* For call-and-response models, see (Walker 2006) 135; (Darwall 2006) 159. Macnamara’s view also draws from the normative account of speech acts that Kukla and Lance develop, and specifically, their account of vocatives, or hailings: “Yo,’s.” See (Kukla & Lance, 2009), especially 145-6.

<sup>25</sup> Macnamara’s own example is gratitude.

<sup>26</sup> (Bennett, 2008).

<sup>27</sup> (Martin 2013) 5 pdf from author.

her (and too the stance one takes up in gratitude and admiration) is a “close sibling” of “holding responsible” characteristic of core reactive attitudes and compatible with it, but involves its own, distinct kind of participatory engagement. It is “*sui generis*—it is its own irreducible way of relating to someone interpersonally. It is a way of treating a principle as worth aspiring to, without *insisting* on compliance.”<sup>28</sup>

I can’t fully assess here the relative merits of these proposals, and specifically, the plausibility of a universal account of reactive attitudes, skeptical of demand (Macnamara’s broad approach) vs. a more “bespoke” approach that preserves a limited role for demand while distinguishing different kinds of participatory stances (Martin’s approach). But a few brief words are in order. Given the variety of ways we normatively react to persons, it is unlikely that too univocal a theory of *content* could adequately preserve the diverse phenomena. Moreover, it seems unlikely to capture the flavor of the core, negative reactive attitudes without some appeal in various contexts to a notion of normative expectation or demand, even if there are problems with fit. That said, expressed reactive attitudes nonetheless seem to share a *common structure* captured well by the call-and-response form. At least, I will presume that here without argument, as I have in the *Defiant Requiem* example.<sup>29</sup>

I shall come to hope in persons shortly, but first I want to consider hope for outcomes and its role in moral recovery after war.

#### 4. Hope for Outcomes

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<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 6

<sup>29</sup>And in related discussions of trust (Sherman, 2014a).

Returning service members sometimes tell me that they feel like they have lost meaning and purpose in their lives. Some desperately miss the sense of being part of something much larger than themselves in the way that a war effort is; others miss the fast operational tempo of missions that can intensify that sense of purpose and belonging.<sup>30</sup> Some long for the respect and status earned in uniform, as Eduardo (“Lalo”) Panyagua does, a 20-something Marine corporal who rose out of the LA barrio and its gangs to serve three deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, in his last, as a squad leader in charge of 35 Marine and Afghani National Security forces outside Marja, in extremely dangerous and demanding engagements in November 2009-June 2010.<sup>31</sup> For his “outstanding leadership and tremendous patience” in 27 partnered combat patrols often under small arms fire, he received a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.<sup>32</sup> Though a corporal, he often filled the billet of a sergeant. Lalo is just not sure he can find that kind of standing in civilian life. In his case, the loss is profound, the despondency, at times, unbearable, and the hunger for replacement meaning palpable. Others come home missing limbs, and some with severely disfiguring facial scars or brain injuries that severely challenge a notion of good functioning after war. For some, unhappiness as despair-- the sense that

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<sup>30</sup> This is not to downplay the boredom in war. For an interesting discussion, see <http://videos.huffingtonpost.com/the-boredom-of-war-517827695>

<sup>31</sup> Lalo is the husband of a former Georgetown student of mine, Donna Hernandez, whose story I tell below. I have interviewed both on several occasions, during 2012-2014.

<sup>32</sup> I refer to the citations in the Secretary of the Navy issued Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal citation awarded to Corporal Eduardao L. (“Lalo”) Panyagua on June 14,, 2010.

reality falls short of longed-for ideals and that one can't close the gap-- descends.<sup>33</sup>

Recent spikes in suicide rates within the military point to real and urgent concerns here.<sup>34</sup>

This is where hope can get a foothold.<sup>35</sup> Paradigmatically, hope, substantive hope looks with desire (or perhaps with its own special kind of motivation) to the future, with its possibilities but uncertainties, and in normative cases, to self and others, and to positive differences each can make in a life.<sup>36</sup> Hope presumes that

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<sup>33</sup> See Sarah Buss (Buss, 2004) for this notion, though she claims such unhappiness is at root, irrational.

<sup>34</sup> On this, see the Rand Report, "Losing the Battle," [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_LosingTheBattle\\_HarrellBerglass.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_LosingTheBattle_HarrellBerglass.pdf) For a recent report suggesting that deployment to war zones are not a major factor in the rise in military suicides (and for criticism of the report), see: [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/deployment-factors-found-not-related-to-military-suicide-spike.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/deployment-factors-found-not-related-to-military-suicide-spike.html?_r=0)

<sup>35</sup> For resilience and positive thinking initiatives in the Army, see Martin Seligman's designed Army-wide resilience training program: "Comprehensive Soldier Fitness," discussed in (Seligman, 2011; Seligman & Fowler, 2011) and (Reivich, Seligman, & McBride, 2011). For critiques of Seligman's positive psychology approach, see (Held, 2004), (Ehrenreich, 2009), and <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dangerous-ideas/201103/the-dark-side-comprehensive-soldier-fitness>. Hopefulness on my view is not an optimistic temperament or behaviorally trained positive attitude, but a normative, aspiring attitude with regard to worthwhile ends we set for ourselves or others (in the case of normative hope) or a desire for what we believe are uncertain outcomes where that hopefulness gives us a certain cognitive resolve to put projects and plans in place (nonnormative hope).

<sup>36</sup> By *substantive* (nonnormative) hope I mean to exclude trivial hopes, such as figure in the expression "I hope it won't rain today," or "I hope he catches his train," though I don't have good ways of drawing a hard line between these usages and weightier ones aside from context. My primary interests is in hope that mobilizes focus and practical agency, as will become clear shortly. Here, too, I recognize that there are genuine and substantive ways of hoping where a notion of agency (or agential investment) seems out of place—such as future directed hopes that do not involve effort (hoping that certain legislation passes but essentially being passive about it) or past directed hopes, where practical agency is out of place (e.g., hoping that Hitler died a miserable death). On this see, (Martin, 2011). Still, I am thinking of *hope paradigmatically* as a kind of agential investment.



possibilities (however bare) (and people) are *open* to one, and that prospect can galvanize energy. Hope presumes a kind of “possibilism,”<sup>37</sup> that can stabilize focus and fortify resolve.

Philip Pettit develops the idea: “To form the hope that something is the case or that I or someone else will manage to make it the case, I have to invest that scenario with a level of confidence” that may exceed “the confidence of my actual belief in the prospect and with a degree of stability that will certainly exceed the stability of my actual belief.”<sup>38</sup> In this sense, hope is a *pragmatic* rationality. It redirects attention and desire and imaginative planning to possibilities that a more fact-processing, probability-assessing, evidence-seeking mentality might reject:

Forming the hope that a particular scenario will eventuate, or at least eventuate in the event of your taking a certain initiative, is a way of handling the hurly burly of belief. It frees you from the bleakness of beliefs that wax and wane unpredictably in level of confidence. It gives you firm and friendly coordinates in an uncertain and uncompanionable world. To have hope is to have something we might describe as cognitive resolve.

.... Without hope, there would often be no possibility for us of asserting our agency and of putting our own signature or stamp on

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<sup>37</sup> Albert Hirshman’s term, discussed in Cass Sunstein *New York Review of Books* review essay on a recent biography of Albert Hirshman. See

<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/may/23/albert-hirschman-original-thinker/?pagination=false>

<sup>38</sup> (Pettit, 2004) 159.

our conduct. We would collapse in a heap of despair and uncertainty, beaten down by cascades of inimical fact.<sup>39</sup>

Hope on this picture, is deeply connected with practical agency, or as it sometimes put, is a form of “agential investment.”<sup>40</sup> In this regard, it is distinct from *mere* or *idle* wish, such as for the impossible or near impossible-- “for immortality,” as Aristotle says.<sup>41</sup> And, too, it is distinct from wishful thinking, at least in the way Freud sometimes understands the latter, as a “turning away from reality” with wishful fantasies “regarded as a better reality.”<sup>42</sup> For similar reasons, the notion of wish fulfillment, in the sense of satisfaction fully hived off from the constraints of reality, does not capture the meaning of hope either. To be sure, substantive hopes typically involve a kind of ego satisfaction, in the sense of a desire for one’s own thriving or

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>40</sup> For an overview and critique of agential investment views, see (Martin 2011); she argues that hope is not a special form of motivation, though a common way of expressing hope is through fantasies that “can influence motivation both rationally... and nonrationally,” 171. So in the end, she accommodates typical cases that express the motivational character of hope. Her worry is that viewing hope as itself a special form of motivation or effortful investment is too restrictive, and cannot accommodate the sort of counterexamples where hope is genuine but *passive*, whether respect to the future or past, e.g., hoping that certain legislation passes but putting no effort into advocacy and support, or hoping that Hitler died a miserable death, where agential effort just makes no sense. On this see, (Martin, 2011). Still, the kind of hope I am interested in this paper is *paradigmatically* agential and motivational, whether constitutively so or as a matter of concomitant, typical expression.

<sup>41</sup> “Choice cannot relate to impossibles, ... but there may be a wish even for impossibles, e.g., for immortality. And wish may relate to things that could in no way be brought about by one’s own efforts.” NE 111b20-25.

<sup>42</sup> See (Freud, 1974) SE XIV.233, see also SE XIV 244, 316-18, 324-5; SE XI, 50-51.

*eudaimonia*.<sup>43</sup> And these kinds of hopes may be expressed in the constructions of fantasy and its narratives, as mediums for practice and for trying out future possibilities.<sup>44</sup> I expand upon this shortly. But the point for now is that that fantasy can be an important way of *engaging* reality and, not of retreating from it, into a fully separate, disconnected track.

To explore some of these intuitions, consider Dan Berschinski, an Army veteran whom I have interviewed several times in the past few years. He embodies a sense of hope and the kind of investment of agency, imagination, and grit that hope often involves.

On August 18, 2009. Dan Berschinski, then a 25-year-old first lieutenant from West Point, in command of an infantry platoon in Kandahar, Afghanistan stepped on a bomb while trying to retrieve the remains of his unit observer. A botched-up medevac left Dan bleeding profusely, and his family pretty sure he was not going to make it alive out of Afghanistan. In the end, he was stabilized enough to be put on a plane to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, though too fragile to actually leave the plane. Within a week, he was flown to Walter Reed, where his parents awaited him. Bob and Susan Berschinski were warned that if he somehow pulled through, the hemorrhaging would likely result in severe brain damage. Dan miraculously did pull through, with no trace of traumatic brain injury. As Susan said to me, “once they brought him out of the coma, it was rapidly apparent *he* was still there.”

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<sup>43</sup> See (Nussbaum, 2001) 31-33 on this view of some emotions and their connection with *eudaimonia*.

<sup>44</sup> For more on the role of fantasy in hope, see (Martin, 2011), (Lear, 2006).

But his body wasn't all there. He had lost nearly half of his skeleton and the joints that held it together, now so much dust in the Afghani desert:

My guys found a boot...mostly intact actually, and they said to me later that they played rock-paper-scissors to see who would have to stick their hand inside the boot to see if there was any flesh inside. But there wasn't. It was empty.... I don't know what happened.

When Dan came to, he knew much of his body was gone, but under a protective white sheet, he couldn't really take in the damage, and his parents kept up a brave face. "He was a mess.... There was not a place on him that you could touch that didn't hurt," said Bob. After more than a dozen operations, and being pinned together by an exoskeletal frame to stabilize his remaining limbs, Dan officially became a double above-the-knee amputee, with a reconstructed left arm and hand, minus a pinky. But critically, he was missing a right hip joint. With that much skeletal damage, and profound socket challenges for a good fitting prostheses, it was fairly clear that Dan would never walk again. Without sit bones, he even had trouble sitting in a wheel chair without sliding off.

The evidence confirmed that prognosis. Others in the Army had suffered his kind of injury, but no one had walked again.

But then a shard of hope emerged. Dan soon learned of one "successful" (i.e., ambulatory) missing hip, above-the-knee amputee. Andre Kajlich, a civilian living in Seattle, was hit head on by a train while studying chemistry in Prague for six months. Ten years later, Kajlich now walks with two prosthetics legs and a single

cane. A YouTube video shows his jerky movements and falls going down stairs without quad muscles. But it also shows that he clearly walks.<sup>45</sup> And he not only walks, but he is a world-class paratriathlete.<sup>46</sup>

Kajlich soon became an emulatory model for Dan, and evidence that walking with his meager skeleton was humanly possible. And that possibilism set in a motion a *project* of hope, not unlike a complex master plan with embedded initiatives, collaborative and individual.<sup>47</sup> Those initiatives included consultations that brought Kajlich to Walter Reed Hospital in Bethesda, to discuss his case with Dan and other similarly injured vets. But gruelingly, for Dan, it involved two and-a-half years of intense physical and occupational therapy at the rehabilitation gym on Walter Reed's campus, and a deep immersion into the mechanics, fit, and usage of prosthetics. Dan became expert in the metrics of gait, stride, and balance and more basically, in "wearing legs": how to keep stumps comfortable inside a silicon sleeve and carbon socket all day; how to get a good fit in the morning, when the stump is thin and not yet swollen from rub and wear; how to maneuver and feel comfortable wearing the heavy belt needed to hoist up the leg that is missing its hip bone and socket. All this was in aid of making possible an independent and ambulatory life style.

Dan's case illustrates well Pettit's notion of the pragmatic rationality of hope. We can speculate that in the course of his recovery, Dan puts the counterevidence

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<sup>45</sup> <http://www.runnersworld.com/runners-stories/losing-his-legs-made-him-stronger-than-ever?page=single>

<sup>46</sup> See [http://www.walkingwithnewlegs.com/Andre\\_Kajlich.html](http://www.walkingwithnewlegs.com/Andre_Kajlich.html)

<sup>47</sup> (Bratman, 1987).

and low probabilities, the examples of “unsuccessful” similarly injured military guys that would stand between him and ambulation, to the side. They become background information, though presumably still accessible at some level. True, in taking up this stance of hope, he restricts exposure to evidence, but only in the way that many emotions do, by narrowing our focus to certain patterns of salience that then dispose us to building “epistemic landscapes” that cohere with those patterns of salience.<sup>48</sup> In this sense, hope is not systematically different from other emotionally laden ways of seeing.

Dan like many vets carries a mental calculation of where his war injuries fit relative to those others suffer. He has it easy, he thinks, compared to arm amputees or veterans that suffer severe brain damage. But he has it a lot harder than below-the-knee amputees: they’re mere “single” or “double” “paper cuts,” as he affectionately calls them! Also, he doesn’t take for granted that he is a veteran with a college education *behind* him, and that he has strong resources in a loving and upper middle class family and supportive girlfriend.<sup>49</sup> “All that helps,” he says. “Others aren’t as lucky.” These considerations factor into Dan’s hope. His hope is ardent, but it isn’t blind.

There is one final strand of this sketch of nonnormative hope to tease out. And that is the role of imagination and its motivational dimensions.<sup>50</sup> I suspect, at some level or other, Dan fantasizes that he is like Kajlich, and that some day he will

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<sup>48</sup> (Goldie, 2005)99, (Brady, 2007). Also, see (Hurley, 2010) for considerations on reactive attitudes *as* emotions and not beliefs, and background to this in (Sherman, 1997) 39.

<sup>49</sup> They both will attend Stanford Graduate School of Business in Fall 2013.

<sup>50</sup> See fn 48 above.

be able to do the things that he can do. To use Adam Smith's term, he "trades places in fancy" with Kajlich. And in the space of imagination, Dan is able to practice and anticipate constructively, "prerehearse" as the Stoics would say, what a possible future reality might look like, and so avoid the paralysis of idle fears and the futility of empty hopes.<sup>51</sup> Kajlich's precedent means that Dan does not have to have *radical hope*-- imagine from scratch, so to speak. I have in mind here Jonathan Lear's portrayal of Plenty Coup, the Sioux leader, who must and does imagine (through the interpretations of dreams and fantasies) a totally novel way of thriving for himself and his people in the face of the annihilation of Sioux culture with the death of the buffalo.<sup>52</sup> Sioux concepts of courage and virtue that depend upon the warrior life of hunting buffalo no longer have application; radical hope and radical fantasy are required to create new thick content for virtue if a people are to flourish again. Dan's conceptual and moral challenge is not as great. Still, in a related way, imagination, fantasy, and interpretations make concrete his hopes, and help to shape and revise plans that are expressions of his hopes.

Dan trades places with Kajlich, but I suspect Kajlich also "trades" places with Dan. Through a biographic, retrospective narrative of what it was like to take his first, post-accident, steps, he puts himself in Dan's "shoes" and closer to Dan's current frustrations and challenges. This also puts him in a position of investing *hope in Dan* (aspiring on his behalf), which, presumably, helps inspire Dan's own hope in himself.

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<sup>51</sup> I describe this kind of mental practice in (Sherman, 2005), esp. 117, 145 in connection with Seneca and Cicero's writings.

<sup>52</sup> (Lear, 2006). For a review essay on the book, see (Sherman, 2009).

**5. Hope in Others.** Dan's hope, in this reconstructed narrative, is for an eventuality that he can walk. But that hope is interlaced with normative hope. He invests hope *in* the medical and therapy staff at Walter Reed and in the institution that supports its rehabilitative gym;<sup>53</sup> he puts hope *in* the civilian contractors who make and fit prosthetics for veterans; he puts hope *in* his immediate circle of friends and family; he puts hope *in* Congress in myriad ways--to authorize adequate allocations for veteran spending, to deliberate wisely about future military and humanitarian engagements, to support worldwide rights for persons with disabilities.<sup>54</sup> And he puts hope *in* the American electorate to put the right people into office to make these decisions. Equally, he puts hope *in* American business and education leaders to create opportunities for veterans, like himself, to be reintegrated into the workforce and to return to school and training programs. And others invest hope *in* him-- his therapists, coaches, mentors, fellow amputees at the rehab gym, his family, girlfriend, peers, and so on. And he invests in himself in ways that are mutually reinforced by his investments in others and their investments in him. Normative investments underlie his hopes for himself (and others) to be able to function well after military service in war.

As suggested earlier, to expressly communicate hope to a person is to morally address that recipient, to call her in a way that normatively anticipates a

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<sup>53</sup> Known as the "M.A.T.C" (Military Athletic Training Center), and referred to by one of my interviewees and double amputee, Army Lt. Col. Greg Gadson, as the "Gold's gym for guys missing things."

<sup>54</sup> As in the United Nations treaty for disabled rights which the Senate recently rejected, <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/un-treaties/270831-senate-rejects-un-treaty-for-disabled-rights-in-vote>



response. As with trust, the anticipation falls short of confident belief and involves some exposure to vulnerability and risk-taking. One could be disappointed; the target might not take up the call; or she may recognize that she is being hoped in, counted on, so to speak (to use the language of trust), and acknowledge back that she has been appropriately recognized; but still she may not fulfill the aspirations invested in her or wholeheartedly take up the challenges. To return to Aristotle, our sons and daughters may not do what is required of them to meet the challenges implicit in our hopes. We may hope in them on credit, so to speak, but then be disappointed.

In the *De Beneficiis*, Seneca rehearses a colorful example of the call-and-response trope of recognition and acknowledgement in the case of benefaction and the return of gratitude. His example is prescient as a sketch of the reiterative looping characteristic of reactive attitudes and the need for a good interactive fit of call and response in successful uptake. Doing a kindness and being reciprocated with gratitude is like a game of catch. You should know to whom you are throwing the ball. The passage bears quoting at length:

I would like to take up an analogy which our own Chrysippus drew with a game of ball. It falls to the ground through the fault either of the person throwing it or of the person receiving it, while it only remains in play by passing, properly thrown and caught, from one pair of hands to the other. A good player needs to send it off differently to a tall partner than a to a short one.

The same principle applies to a favour. Only if properly

accommodated to both the persons involved, bestower and recipient, will it leave the one and reach the other as it should. Again, if the game with a trained and practised player, we shall be bolder in throwing the ball. No matter how it comes, his hand will be ready and quick to drive it back. Against an untrained novice, we shall not throw it so hard or so vigorously but be more relaxed, aiming the ball right into his hands and simply meeting it when it comes back. We should use the same procedure when doing favours.

.... As it is, we very often make people ungrateful and welcome the idea that they should be so, as though our favours could only be great if we cannot be thanked for the....How much better and more considerate it would be to see to it that recipients too have a part to play, to welcome the idea that you could be thanked...<sup>55</sup>

Obviously, doing someone a good turn is best geared to what that recipient needs and is capable of using. As Seneca goes on to suggest, giving books to a country bumpkin or a heavy coat to someone in summer will not count as a wise pass likely to be caught with enormous gratitude by the recipient!<sup>56</sup> Similarly, trust given to someone who has signaled no competence or interest in the domain in

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<sup>55</sup> Seneca, *On Favours*, II.17.3-6 in (Cooper & Procopé, 1995). For related analogy based on the looping back of the mutual reciprocations of the Three Graces, see *On Favours* 1.3.8 in (Cooper & Procopé, 1995).

<sup>56</sup> For an earlier discussion of Seneca on emotional expression in benefaction and gratitude, see (Sherman, 2006) and (Sherman, 2004).

which one is asking her to be trustworthy is not a wise exposure of vulnerability, nor a likely way to scaffold deeper trust in that person.<sup>57</sup>

But hope in others is somewhat different from trust. We may not fully trust persons and their readiness to receive us appropriately, but we still may hope in them, and in an even more robust way than trust, hope that our hope in them makes them responsive to our call. Thus hope in others can presume a clearly developmental stance. We want to move a recipient along and hope he will rise to the challenge and catch the ball. Still, we are often willing to accommodate somewhat--throw the ball, with the recipient's limits in mind—all the while still trying to get him to catch. And where we simply can't engage the other properly (or are met with deep resistance), we may enlist others help to throw the ball for us.

To make this concrete, consider the following narrative, one among many conversations I have had recently with a dozen or more women service members. (Most of the women have asked that their names be withheld.).

An elite pilot, "Roberta," with a distinguished record of academic laurels and military awards, is told to her face by her new commander that despite her promotion to a highly coveted senior job on his base, he "fought against" her going there and would continue to do everything he could to undermine her appointment. As she put it, using the lingo of her "brothers" on base, her very presence was "disrupting the status quo" and "tearing down heritage and tradition."<sup>58</sup> In her case, she turned to a male mentor to help break into the "bro network," and plead her

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<sup>57</sup> I develop these ideas in the case of trust in (Sherman, 2014a).

<sup>58</sup> Preserving "heritage and tradition," is also code, she adds, for protecting "pornography in on-line briefs and pinup posters on the wall."

cause. There was no way that her new boss could recognize directly *from her* that her hope in him to accept her on equal footing with her male peers was legitimate and something he had moral reason to commit to. He had to hear that through different channels. It is not even clear that he *recognized* the moral call in the end, and may only have felt pressured for political reasons to act in conformity with regulation and policy. To revert to Seneca's metaphor, this is a case where an individual (Roberta) is already in a game of ball, so to speak, but can't get successful uptake from the recipient. And when she finally does, only through the intervention of another player, the "successful" catch may reflect changed behavior more than changed attitude.

In this case, Roberta's hope presumably devolves to disappointment. But her disappointment in the commander is compatible with any resentment she might feel toward him, or indignation her mentor feels toward him.<sup>59</sup> The resentment or indignation has as its evaluative content that she has been demeaned and degraded by her commander, forced to work in a hostile environment where he encourages sexist values protective of the old military as a male only club. Any resentment, were she to express it directly to him, would hold him strictly accountable for his behavior. Her disappointment, in contrast, has as its evaluative content she is let down by his impoverished leadership and by his failure to recognize her bid to him, (or that made on her behalf) to take her military service seriously and on an equal footing with any male's.

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<sup>59</sup> There can be a "double attitude," as Adrienne Martin puts it, (Martin, 2013). I thank her for conversation on this issue.

One more clarification is important here. It might be thought that normative hope is a tamped down or suppressed version of resentment. We somehow hold back, suppress the full force of our blame or resentment, and feel only a milder version of it. I don't think this gets it right, even though on occasion we may *replace* our resentment with disappointment, in deference either to the youth and inexperience of the moral "progressor," or the difficult challenges, external or internal, a target faces in meeting aspirations. But even in such cases, we are taking up a different normative stance in disappointment than we are in resentment. In the first case, our aspirations on behalf of someone are frustrated and we feel let down; in the second, we feel violated, transgressed, toyed with, and hold a target responsible for the transgression. Moreover, disappointment, in others or self, needn't be inherently a mild emotion. It can be felt as profoundly and intensely as the most bitter kind of resentment or guilt. And it can cripple and paralyze and lead to the bleakest kind of despair. The difference between disappointment and resentment is qualitative, not scalar.

## **6. Hope in Self.**

We have been focusing on hope and disappointment in others. But many who return from war are dogged by profound disappointment in themselves, and the sense that they somehow have fallen short of ideals of what it is to be a good soldier. Sometimes the disappointment stems from an over idealized sense of good soldiering, or an intolerance for good and bad luck in war. In a related way, some may feel (subjective) guilt that doesn't track strict culpability or wrongdoing. In

some of these cases, there may be causal but not moral responsibility at work—such as when an individual is the proximate cause of a nonculpable accident. In other cases, merely surviving when a buddy doesn't, without in any sense being the agent or cause of that buddy's death unleashes deep guilt.<sup>60</sup>

In this final section I want briefly to turn to the corrective dimension of self-hope as a reply to overly harsh self-address. Hope in self can update earlier reactive uptakes. And we can be bolstered in that self-hope through the hope of others in us.

But first, it might seem a stretch to think of self-reactive attitudes as moral addresses. After all, in the self-reflexive case, we don't have to *express* the attitudes to *disclose* them to ourselves. And so, if address is primarily *expressed* attitude, then the idea of moral address to self seems strained. Moreover, the background notion of call and response in speech acts, or in Gospel music of the Church (and later absorbed in Rock and Roll patterns that typically have back-up "girl-group" choruses or sometimes a solo woman answering the call of a lead singer)<sup>61</sup> -- again points to the idea of public and paradigmatically, oral address and response. The model isn't an easy fit for private, normative self-review.

But this is too literal a read of moral address. Even in second-personal cases, we still may hold each other *responsible* without holding *accountable*, where the latter involves, in addition, imposing sanctions that only make sense when our

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<sup>60</sup> I discuss these cases in (Sherman 2010), ch. 4 and (Sherman, 2013)

<sup>61</sup> Classically, the Blossoms' "Doo do doo do doo do doo" in Lou Reed's, "Walk on the Wild Side," or Lisa Fischer or Merry Clayton's response to Mick Jagger's line "It's Just a Shot a Way" in the song "Gimme Shelter." See the documentary movie *Twenty Feet from Stardom* for insights into the role of the back up singers, typically African American women for whom the call-response pattern is inculcated early in Church gospel music. <http://twentyfeetfromstardom.com>

blame or reproach is communicated.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, insofar as evaluative attitudes are *emotions* that draw us in or rivet attention<sup>63</sup>, an important part of expressed address, which is to get someone to pay attention to you, is already at work in the self-reactive case. All this of course, is to put aside the fact that we often do openly express emotions to ourselves, in talking to ourselves, in singing to ourselves, in journaling, in screwing up our face muscles, and in scores of other communications. Some of these communications may need decoding and unmasking, but when they are, they are the beginning of interpretive narratives, again, which we *tell* ourselves.

But to return to the question I began with, in what sense can self-hope act as a corrective update on harsher reactive attitudes we hold toward ourselves, particularly when those attitudes, of guilt, shame, or self-disappointment are not entirely apt, and are the cause of deep anguish? Self-forgiveness, self-empathy, and self-compassion all can play a role.<sup>64</sup> But so, too, can normative hope. In so far as hope invests aspiration rather than normative demands for strict compliance, we begin by giving ourselves some latitude in the face of significant internal and external challenges we may face. We take up the progressor's stance, not the perfectionist stance of a sage, to use the Stoic idiom. For some, this will involve recognizing the limits of agency in the face of luck and embedded existence. And this willingness to tolerate luck may combine with the resources of hope to engage imagination, in order to be able to rethink and renarrate traumatic or nagging scenarios in a less "stuck" and less self-punishing way. So, in time, a Marine may

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<sup>62</sup> Macnamara emphasizes this point in (Macnamara, 2011).

<sup>63</sup> Or conversely, "emotionally significant objects and events capture and consume attention" as Michael Brady puts it, (Brady, 2009) 423.

<sup>64</sup> For the role of self-empathy in moral healing, see (Sherman, 2014b).

come to imagine those who have died under their watch as *in fact* not condemning him. Or he may no longer imagine himself exposed, under another's critical gaze, in a way that compromises self-presentation and brings on shame.<sup>65</sup> In short, new possibilities open up in how we hold ourselves responsible and how we view others as holding us responsible.

Consider again Marine Corporal Lalo Panyagua. As a result of his combat tours, he sustained back, neck, and traumatic brain injuries, severe posttraumatic stress, and chronic insomnia. But what anguishes him the most is moral injury, in particular, the guilt of losing three Marines. One incident especially haunts him. He was in Marja in charge of twelve Marines, living and traveling in tight quarters, out of an armored vehicle. Although the same age as some of his troops, he was paternal toward them, "his kids," he calls them, that he "taught and trained" how to use lethal force and restrain it. The area they travelled was thick with enemy insurgents and laced with mines. It had become his habit to warn each Marine, before exiting the vehicle, to carefully check his footing for explosives. One time, though he forgot to repeat the warning. A Marine exited the vehicle, stepped on a mine, and was instantly blown to pieces. Four years later, the guilt and self-reproach have not abated, despite the fact that Lalo has been regaled with citations and honors for his outstanding leadership and tremendous patience, "for having the maturity and judgment of a seasoned veteran." The final citation on his achievement medal reads, "Corporal Panyagua adapted and overcame any challenge."<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> For an exploration of this view of shame, see (Velleman, 2001).

<sup>66</sup> Department of the Navy issued Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal to Corporal Eduardo L.Panyagua, June 14, 2010.



Lalo is the husband of a Georgetown School of Foreign Service student of mine, Donna Hernandez, and as far as I know, the only undergraduate military spouse on the Georgetown campus in recent years. A first generation Latino from LA, she is a woman of remarkable strength, sass, humor, street smarts, and academic sophistication and talent. She is headed to Yale for a Masters degree in security studies, where she is being groomed for a career in the Foreign Service. I give this as important background to Lalo's own project of self-hope. Donna is gifted and has personal resources and capabilities that she brings to bear in her relationship with Lalo and that are crucial to his reentry back home. He is a moral progressor in her eyes, and his own project of hope in himself depends in critical ways on her hope in him. Still the journey has not been easy.

With little transition time, he returned from war to a stateside base where he became a combat guy at a desk job, surrounded by most who had not gone to war, and a commander who viewed him as a malingerer for taking off time for his medical appointments. It was Donna who got him to seek psychotherapy (to see "the wizard," as he puts it), two years after his return, and a pile up of frightening incidents where he flung her out of bed, across the room as he relived a battle scene flashback, held her to knife point, when she caught him by surprise from behind, nearly killed others in attempts to protect her. She has since taken away his knife. He has taken up archery in its place: "He can't really hurt me with a bow and arrow!" she laughs.

Donna is good at compartmentalizing, and since childhood, excelling in her studies has been her sanctuary and salvation. But she also has a sustained vision of

Lalo as someone who is absolutely loveable-- "everyone falls in love with Lalo," she has said to me several times, meaning not just that he charms, but that he is worthy of her love, and that of others. Estimations of worth and goodness, of course, needn't have anything to do with estimates of a person's *psychological* capacities to overcome crippling and harsh guilt, or accept the limits of agency and what is beyond one's control.

But *admiring* another's goodness or capacity for hard work in the service of important and worthwhile ends *may* have such an influence. And Donna knows well and deeply, in a way that Lalo can forget, just how good a Marine he is and how he surpassed expectations in every mission he was assigned. When he wears his regalia, at her request, at their wedding when they eloped when she was a freshman, and at her graduation from Georgetown this past year, she is reminding him of his honors and his capacities. She is trying to reconnect him with his capabilities and confidence in them.

These are public addresses of sorts *to* him of her hope *in* him. They are nudges, offerings of content for introjects that will renourish his own self-images. They are attempts at tempering and updating his self-blame for being a leader that lost troops. Of course, uptake, especially in this kind of case, can be partial and primarily a performance,<sup>67</sup> outer posturing of normative hope, perhaps in showing up for psychotherapy appointments, say, but resisting the hard work and trust alliance with a therapist required to really invest in the possibility of therapeutic change. But just as a therapist's finely expressed trust in a patient can elicit

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<sup>67</sup> For Stoic lessons on the difficulty of inner change, see Cicero's critique of Stoic doctrine in connection with his own grieving (Sherman, 2005), 132, 143-149.

trustworthiness,<sup>68</sup> so, too, can a partner's artful and finely attuned hope in one bootstrap one's own. Donna is able to do this for Lalo.

Lalo's self-hope, in this case, mirrors Donna's hope in him. It would be hard to spend any time with them and not see that quickly. They have invested in each other's futures, in her education and in his healing from war. She is a survivor of war, no less than he, and he has hopes one day of having a strong college education. They partner, in part, by trading places.

We human progressors are engaged in complicated moral and psychological interactions. We elicit change in response to each other's aspirations, as well as our own. For a returning veteran, recognizing that another has invested hope in you can be deeply corrective and healing. It can nourish overall hope in self and sustain hope for projects that rekindle a sense of meaning and purpose after war.

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<sup>68</sup> For an excellent discussion of trust and growing trustworthiness, see (Jones, 2012).

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